Since the origins in its modern form, due to the seminal works of von Neumann and Nash, Game theory has most often been considered for its applications to economic and social sciences. However, its mathematical roots are more general, and its set of analytical tools that can be used to predict the outcome of interactive decision situations can be very relevant for many other scientific fields, especially including information and industrial engineering, where it has recently become a common curricular subject in university programs. To train the “brain muscles” to solve problems in a game theoretic way, students may find it useful to practice on concrete examples. For this reason, this book presents a collection of exercises that can be suitable for any entry-level course on Game theory. While there is no specific major for which such a practical activity can be useful, the book is conceived with an engineering spirit, and a general regard for modeling and optimization (from technological scenarios to childish gameplay). Still, some useful considerations can also be derived for other fields such as social psychology, biology, or humanities. Rather than in-depth speculative discussions, the book covers mostly practical cases, however providing a preliminary theoretical justification for the solution methods. Covered topics include static games of complete information, zero-sum games and minimax problems, lotteries, sequential games, multistage games, Bayesian games. This may also encourage the reader to approach more advanced topics, with a solid methodological background and a full-rounded appreciation of the subject.

Since the origins in its modern form, due to the seminal works of von Neumann and Nash, Game theory has most often been considered for its applications to economic and social sciences. However, its mathematical roots are more general, and its set of analytical tools that can be used to predict the outcome of interactive decision situations can be very relevant for many other scientific fields, especially including information and industrial engineering, where it has recently become a common curricular subject in university programs. To train the "brain muscles" to solve problems in a game theoretic way, students may find it useful to practice on concrete examples. For this reason, this book presents a collection of exercises that can be suitable for any entry-level course on Game theory. While there is no specific major for which such a practical activity can be useful, the book is conceived with an engineering spirit, and a general regard for modeling and optimization (from technological scenarios to childish gameplay). Still, some useful considerations can also be derived for other fields such as social psychology, biology, or humanities. Rather than in-depth speculative discussions, the book covers mostly practical cases, however providing a preliminary theoretical justification for the solution methods. Covered topics include static games of complete information, zero-sum games and minimax problems, lotteries, sequential games, multistage games, Bayesian games. This may also encourage the reader to approach more advanced topics, with a solid methodological background and a full-rounded appreciation of the subject.

This textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations. While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can learn to systematically apply theoretical solution concepts to different fields of economics and business. The text initially presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for masters level courses. The first six chapters cover complete-information games, separately analyzing simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, with applications in industrial economics, law, and regulation. Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students’ attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis. In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. By providing detailed worked-out examples, this text gives students at various levels the tools they need to apply the tenets of game theory in many fields of business and economics. This text is appropriate for introductory-to-intermediate courses in game theory at the upper undergraduate and master’s level.

This textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations. While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can learn to systematically apply theoretical solution concepts to different fields of economics and business. The text initially presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for graduate level courses. The first six chapters cover complete-information games, separately analyzing simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, with applications in industrial economics, law, and regulation. Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students’ attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis. In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. By providing detailed worked-out examples, this text gives students at various levels the tools they need to apply the tenets of game theory in many fields of business and economics. The second edition of the text has been revised to provide additional exercises at the introductory and intermediate level, expanding the scope of the book to be appropriate for upper undergraduate students looking to improve their understanding of the subject. The second edition also includes a new chapter devoted entirely to cheap talk games. Revised to appeal to a larger audience of instructors and students, this text is appropriate for introductory-to-intermediate courses in game theory at the upper undergraduate and graduate levels.

Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.

The outstanding feature of this book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem. It covers the basic ideas of decision theory, classical game theory, and evolutionary game theory in one volume. No background knowledge of economics or biology is required as examples have been carefully selected for their accessibility. Detailed solutions to the numerous exercises are provided at the back of the book, making it ideal for self-study. This introduction to game theory is intended as a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it will also interest advanced students or researchers in biology and economics.

This book is an introduction to mathematical game theory, which might better be called the mathematical theory of conflict and cooperation. It is applicable whenever two individuals—or companies, or political parties, or nations—confront situations where the outcome for each depends on the behavior of all. What are the best strategies in such situations? If there are chances of cooperation, with whom should you cooperate, and how should you share the proceeds of cooperation? Since its creation by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944, game theory has shed new light on business, politics, economics, social psychology, philosophy, and evolutionary biology. In this book, its fundamental ideas are developed with mathematics at the level of high school algebra and applied to many of these fields (see the table of contents). Ideas like “fairness” are presented via axioms that fair allocations should satisfy; thus the reader is introduced to axiomatic thinking as well as to mathematical modeling of actual situations.