This book presents new efficient methods for optimization in realistic large-scale, multi-agent systems. These methods do not require the agents to have the full information about the system, but instead allow them to make their local decisions based only on the local information, possibly obtained during communication with their local neighbors. The book, primarily aimed at researchers in optimization and control, considers three different information settings in multi-agent systems: oracle-based, communication-based, and payoff-based. For each of these information types, an efficient optimization algorithm is developed, which leads the system to an optimal state. The optimization problems are set without such restrictive assumptions as convexity of the objective functions, complicated communication topologies, closed-form expressions for costs and utilities, and finiteness of the system’s state space.

Multiagent systems is an expanding field that blends classical fields like game theory and decentralized control with modern fields like computer science and machine learning. This monograph provides a concise introduction to the subject, covering the theoretical foundations as well as more recent developments in a coherent and readable manner. The text is centered on the concept of an agent as decision maker. Chapter 1 is a short introduction to the field of multiagent systems. Chapter 2 covers the basic theory of singleagent decision making under uncertainty. Chapter 3 is a brief introduction to game theory, explaining classical concepts like Nash equilibrium. Chapter 4 deals with the fundamental problem of coordinating a team of collaborative agents. Chapter 5 studies the problem of multiagent reasoning and decision making under partial observability. Chapter 6 focuses on the design of protocols that are stable against manipulations by self-interested agents. Chapter 7 provides a short introduction to the rapidly expanding field of multiagent reinforcement learning. The material can be used for teaching a half-semester course on multiagent systems covering, roughly, one chapter per lecture.

Introducing a new approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and distributed artificial intelligence, this guide shows how classical game theory can be used to compose basic learning units. This approach to creating agents has the advantage of leading to powerful, yet intuitively simple, algorithms that can be analyzed. The setup is demonstrated here in a number of different settings, with a detailed analysis of agent learning behaviors provided for each. A review of required background materials from game theory and reinforcement learning is also provided, along with an overview of related multiagent learning methods.

This book contains three well-written research tutorials that inform the graduate reader about the forefront of current research in multi-agent optimization. These tutorials cover topics that have not yet found their way in standard books and offer the reader the unique opportunity to be guided by major researchers in the respective fields. Multi-agent optimization, lying at the intersection of classical optimization, game theory, and variational inequality theory, is at the forefront of modern optimization and has recently undergone a dramatic development. It seems timely to provide an overview that describes in detail ongoing research and important trends. This book concentrates on Distributed Optimization over Networks; Differential Variational Inequalities; and Advanced Decomposition Algorithms for Multi-agent Systems. This book will appeal to both mathematicians and mathematically oriented engineers and will be the source of inspiration for PhD students and researchers.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.

The study of multi-agent systems (MAS) focuses on systems in which many intelligent agents interact with each other. These agents are considered to be autonomous entities such as software programs or robots. Their interactions can either be cooperative (for example as in an ant colony) or selfish (as in a free market economy). This book assumes only basic knowledge of algorithms and discrete maths, both of which are taught as standard in the first or second year of computer science degree programmes. A basic knowledge of artificial intelligence would useful to help understand some of the issues, but is not essential. The book’s main aims are: To introduce the student to the concept of agents and multi-agent systems, and the main applications for which they are appropriate To introduce the main issues surrounding the design of intelligent agents To introduce the main issues surrounding the design of a multi-agent society To introduce a number of typical applications for agent technology After reading the book the student should understand: The notion of an agent, how agents are distinct from other software paradigms (e.g. objects) and the characteristics of applications that lend themselves to agent-oriented software The key issues associated with constructing agents capable of intelligent autonomous action and the main approaches taken to developing such agents The key issues in designing societies of agents that can effectively cooperate in order to solve problems, including an understanding of the key types of multi-agent interactions possible in such systems The main application areas of agent-based systems