The present book deals with coalition games in which expected pay-offs are only vaguely known. In fact, this idea about vagueness of expectations ap pears to be adequate to real situations in which the coalitional bargaining anticipates a proper realization of the game with a strategic behaviour of players. The vagueness being present in the expectations of profits is mod elled by means of the theory of fuzzy set and fuzzy quantities. The fuzziness of decision-making and strategic behaviour attracts the attention of mathematicians and its particular aspects are discussed in sev eral works. One can mention in this respect in particular the book "Fuzzy and Multiobjective Games for Conflict Resolution" by Ichiro Nishizaki and Masatoshi Sakawa (referred below as [43]) which has recently appeared in the series Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing published by Physica-Verlag in which the present book is also apperaing. That book, together with the one you carry in your hands, form in a certain sense a complementary pair. They present detailed views on two main aspects forming the core of game theory: strategic (mostly 2-person) games, and coalitional (or cooperative) games. As a pair they offer quite a wide overview of fuzzy set theoretical approaches to game theoretical models of human behaviour.

In a fuzzy cooperative game the playersmay choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. The characteristic function of a fuzzy game specifies the worth of each such coalition. This paper introduces well-known properties of classical cooperative games to the theory of fuzzy games, and studies their interrelations. It deals with convex games, exact games, games with a large core, extendable games and games with a stable core.

Cooperative game theory is a booming research area with many new developments in the last few years. So, our main purpose when prep- ing the second edition was to incorporate as much of these new dev- opments as possible without changing the structure of the book. First, this o?ered us the opportunity to enhance and expand the treatment of traditional cooperative games, called here crisp games, and, especially, that of multi-choice games, in the idea to make the three parts of the monograph more balanced. Second, we have used the opportunity of a secondeditiontoupdateandenlargethelistofreferencesregardingthe threemodels of cooperative games. Finally, we have bene?ted fromthis opportunity by removing typos and a few less important results from the ?rst edition of the book, and by slightly polishing the English style and the punctuation, for the sake of consistency along the monograph. The main changes are: (1) Chapter 3 contains an additional section, Section 3. 3, on the - erage lexicographic value, which is a recent one-point solution concept de?ned on the class of balanced crisp games. (2) Chapter 4 is new. It o?ers a brief overview on solution c- cepts for crisp games from the point of view of egalitarian criteria, and presents in Section 4. 2 a recent set-valued solution concept based on egalitarian considerations, namely the equal split-o? set. (3)Chapter5isbasicallyanenlargedversionofChapter4ofthe?rst edition because Section 5. 4 dealing with the relation between convex games and clan games with crisp coalitions is new.

This book offers a comprehensive introduction to cooperative game theory and a practice-oriented reference guide to new models and tools for studying bilateral fuzzy relations among several agents or players. It introduces the reader to several fuzzy models, each of which is first analyzed in the context of classical games (crisp games) and subsequently in the context of fuzzy games. Special emphasis is given to the value of Shapley, which is presented for the first time in the context of fuzzy games. Students and researchers will find here a self-contained reference guide to cooperative fuzzy games, characterized by a wealth of examples, descriptions of a wide range of possible situations, step-by-step explanations of the basic mathematical concepts involved, and easy-to-follow information on axioms and properties.

Decision makers in managerial and public organizations often encounter de cision problems under conflict or competition, because they select strategies independently or by mutual agreement and therefore their payoffs are then affected by the strategies of the other decision makers. Their interests do not always coincide and are at times even completely opposed. Competition or partial cooperation among decision makers should be considered as an essen tial part of the problem when we deal with the decision making problems in organizations which consist of decision makers with conflicting interests. Game theory has been dealing with such problems and its techniques have been used as powerful analytical tools in the resolution process of the decision problems. The publication of the great work by J. von Neumann and O. Morgen stern in 1944 attracted attention of many people and laid the foundation of game theory. We can see remarkable advances in the field of game theory for analysis of economic situations and a number of books in the field have been published in recent years. The aim of game theory is to specify the behavior of each player so as to optimize the interests of the player. It then recommends a set of solutions as strategies so that the actions chosen by each decision maker (player) lead to an outcome most profitable for himself or her self.

This book proposes novel methods for solving different types of non-cooperative games with interval/fuzzy/intuitionistic fuzzy payoffs. It starts by discussing several existing methods and shows that some mathematically incorrect assumptions have been considered in all these methods. It then proposes solutions to adapt those methods and validate the new proposed methods, such as Gaurika method Ambika-I-IV, Mehar method and others, by using them for solving existing numerical problems. The book offers a comprehensive guide on non-cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs to both students and researchers. It provides them with the all the necessary tools to understand the methods and the theory behind them.

This book constitutes extended, revised and selected papers from the Third East Asia Game Theory International Conference, EAGT 2019, held in Fuzhou, China, in March 2019. The 10 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 146 submissions. The papers in the volume are focused on non-cooperative and cooperative games and cover such subjects or disciplines as game theory, operations research, mathematics, decision science, management science, economics, experiment economics, system engineering, psychology and control theory.