The United States strategic framework in the Pacific has three parts: peacetime engagement, as described above, which includes a forward presence; crisis response, which builds on forward-stationed forces, the "boots-on-the ground" and, if necessary, fighting and winning any conflict that might develop. The mechanisms to carry out this strategic framework are embedded in the regular contacts and engagement activities that the United States carries out with friends and allies in the region. What the future will look like in Asia will be determined largely on what happens on the Korean Peninsula. It could be changed by such eventualities as a resurgent, expansionist, or nationalistic Russia. But the dialogue that is taking place among strategists in Seoul and Tokyo needs to be broadened to include the United States. It also must become a public debate. The "tyranny of distance" requires a United States military presence, and the governments of Korea and Japan must involve their own voters in a civil debate, setting forth the case for a new security structure. This is important not only for domestic political reasons in Asia, but because the American people need to know that there is a civil debate about the subject among their allies, and that the alliances that have kept Asia safe, peaceful and prosperous for 55 years are still useful, welcome, and healthy.

For more than 50 years, countries around the world have looked to the United States for international leadership. Most Asian governments welcome a U.S. presence in the region to help preserve security and stability. They know that an American presence does not mean an occupying force since, if asked, the United States leaves. These countries are reassured by a more or less continuous presence of U.S. forces in a way that the temporary passage or intervention of expeditionary forces will not accomplish. The credibility and deterrent effect of a soldier (sailor, airman, or marine) on the ground represents commitment and stability. Face-to-face contact and "boots on the ground" are the only ways to defeat the "tyranny of distance" and really effect events on land in support of U.S. interests. The nexus of vital U.S. interests in Asia is in Northeast Asia because of the presence of five traditionally warring powers there: North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China.

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the evolving strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. Without unduly harming America's commitment to deterrence on the Korean peninsula, a reconfigured Army forward presence could help to achieve U.S. objectives throughout the theater more effectively through more regular, longer-duration engagement with critical allies and partners, while reducing the recurring transportation costs associated with today's practice of sending U.S.-based units to conduct most exercises and training events across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Certainly, there are some major challenges involved in reconfiguring the Army's forward presence, but these are not insurmountable. Furthermore, to avoid trying would severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Army's contribution to broader U.S. national security goals.

The U.S. Army's forward presence in the Pacific theater is long overdue for reconsideration and reconceptualization. Without unduly harming America's commitment to deterrence on the Korean peninsula, the Army forward presence could be reshaped and reconfigured to enable the United States to more effectively and more efficiently achieve its objectives across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

As East Asia is entering the 21st Century, Japan, in reassessing its security environment and thus its strategic calculus, is on the verge of deploying latest jointly-researched theater missile defenses (TMD) to counter the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles. In parallel, the People's Republic of China is constantly modernizing its ballistic missile forces and is gearing up for a possible contingency with its self-proclaimed "high-tech adversaries". This work shows what drives Japan to deploy theater missile defenses and how the People's Republic of China is poised to be reacting to it.