The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was tasked by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to review the Navy's seabasing concept, identify potential operational problems, and propose science and technology (S & T) investments to produce new technologies or significantly improve existing ones. Formulation of such S & T recommendations requires a clear definition of the concept and operational construct of the sea base. The authors began with a review of the literature that describes the sea base and the technologies that must be developed to make it possible. They supplemented the literature review with discussions with experts in the area of seabasing. They also examined the composition of the sea base as a function of the type and scope of the contingencies that have been addressed by seabased forces and determined that all seabasing operations, large or small, require a common set of operational capabilities. These needed capabilities can be grouped into three categories: Logistics systems, Connectors, and Logistics command and control (C2). In this report, they analyze logistics command and control. Analyses of the other categories are reported separately. The logistics management of the sea base will require a system that is fundamentally different from the logistics system now in place. It will have enhanced capability and much greater capacity because the logistics flow will be greater and detailed information about logistics must be available in real time for planning and operational purposes. The C2 system will be consistent with the Navy's vision of embracing network-centric warfare and will emphasize new types of information gathering and utilization. It should be based on the concept of Sense and Respond Logistics, which is defined as a network-centric, adaptable logistics system that can respond quickly to the unpredictability of demand. A prototype for the operational system -- Distributive Collaborative Command and Control (DCC2) -- is being developed now.

Originally published in 2000, this book describes the relation between technology and the exercise of sea power. It emphasizes the importance of mastering and maintaining technology for the means of exercising maritime power whether the USA is at peace or in a time of conflict. The changing character of maritime power is evaluated through an examination of current trends, historical precedent and deductive logic. Many factors influence sea power, but it is the exponential growth in the use of science and technology which the author believes is the key to understanding the future of sea power.

The availability of land bases from which to launch and maintain military, diplomatic, and humanitarian relief operations is becoming increasingly uncertain because of physical or political constraints. The ability to operate from a sea base, therefore, is likely to become more and more important. The Defense Science Board recently concluded that Sea Basing will be a critical future joint military capability and that DOD should proceed to develop such capability. Following the DSB report, the Navy requested that the National Research Council (NRC) convene a workshop to assess the science and technology base, both inside and outside the Navy, for developing Sea Basing and to identify R&D for supporting future concepts. This report of the workshop includes an examination of Sea Basing operational concepts; ship and aircraft technology available to make Sea Basing work; and issues involved in creating the sea base as a joint system of systems.

Reviewing the past, present, and future contribution of maritime forces to the conduct of expeditionary operations, the author concludes that the importance of this contribution is growing. He considers the diplomatic and "good order" roles of maritime forces which enable such operations in the first place. He reviews contemporary naval thinking about the nature and the relevance of sea control, and examines changes in the way maritime power may be projected ashore. Finally, the author analyses the extent to which future sea-basing can enable expeditionary forces can meet the challenges of the 21st century. Using past and recent experience, he demonstrates how important maritime outcomes are to the achievement and, equally important, the consolidation of victories ashore. Accordingly, navies around the world are having to adjust their plans and their priorities in order to meet these challenges.

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the United States Marine Corps capstone concept for the twenty-first Century. It encompasses the way Marines train, equip, organize, lead, think and fight. It is an integral component of the Navy's Sea Power 21 concept, specifically, its Sea Strike concept. Within this overarching concept are the complimentary concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) Sea Based Logistics (Seabasing) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). This paper focuses on STOM and its enabling capability Sea Based Logistics. Seabasing is a potentially transformational capability dependent upon future classes of maritime propositioning and amphibious ships that will allow for the creation of a sea base from which operations ashore can be sustained without the need for ground logistics bases. This capability frees future naval joint forces from the requirement of host-nation air and seaports of debarkation. It also reduces the logistics footprint ashore for ground forces and allows for rapid movement to multiple objectives via surface and vertical lift assets without pausing at the shoreline in order to establish a beachhead and build logistical sustainment. Forces ashore are sustained from the sea base which in turn is sustained from extended air and sea lines of communications reaching back to intermediate support bases connected to the United States. This system is capable of increasing throughput through the sea base if initial operations grow into sustained operations ashore requiring more forces equipment and sustainment.