The Ministry of Defence plans to replace the Royal Navy's current strength of three aircraft carriers with two larger, more versatile carriers capable of carrying a more powerful force, including new aircraft to replace the Harrier. This report analyses the progress of the Future Carrier and related Joint Combat Aircraft programmes. There is a serious risk that the two carriers will not enter service in 2012 and 2015 as planned, due to delays in investment decision-making. The novel 'Alliance' between MoD and three commercial companies has not yet been finalised. Delays are already impacting UK shipyards, and threatening jobs and the survival of the yards.The Joint Strike Fighter, a US-led programme, is the aircraft of choice for the new carriers, but there are unresolved weight problems. The target In-Service Date has been put back from 2012 to 2014, so it is possible that the new carrier would be operational (in 2012) before the new aircraft is available. There must be adequate assurances that the UK will have access to all the relevant technology (the 'Sovereign Capability') to enable maintenance and upgrading of new aircraft. Otherwise, the UK should consider withdrawing from the Fighter programme.

This book analyzes the development and evolution of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a multinational aircraft endeavor involving the U.S. and many of its allies. The author provides a historical overview of jet fighter aircraft, discussing the different generations of these planes and their technical characteristics, as well as an outline of emerging international geopolitical and security trends the F-35 may see combat in. By examining the role of defense industries, domestic politics, and governmental oversight of the Joint Strike Fighter in various countries, the author concludes that this aircraft will be deployed in most of these countries to replace their aging jet fighter fleets and combat potential military aggression from China, Russia, and other revisionist international powers.

The mission of the MoD's (Ministry of Defence's) Defence Equipment and Support (DE & S) organisation is to equip and support our Armed Forces for operations now and in the future. Support to current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken priority and the organisation has performed well. The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) system remains highly effective in enabling vital equipment to be provided quickly to the two theatres to meet rapidly changing threats, but there are concerns that UORs represent a partial failure to equip our forces for predicted expeditionary operations, and on their effects on the core budget in future years. DE & S' performance in procuring longer-term equipment declined significantly in 2007-08. The forecast costs for the 20 largest defence projects increased by £205 million and the forecast delays increased by some 100 months in the year. The improvements promised by both the long-standing application of the principles of 'smart procurement' and the more recent formation of the DE & S organisation appear not to have materialised. The FRES (Future Rapid Effect System) programme has been a fiasco, being poorly conceived and managed from the outset. The Committee condemns the failure to date to publish an updated version of the Defence Industrial Strategy and considers that its continuing absence increases the risk that the UK Defence Industrial Base will not be able to meet the future requirements of our Armed Forces. Finally, the UK's future military capability depends on the investment made today in Research and Development. Sufficient funding for defence research needs to be ring-fenced and the MoD must recognise the very high priority of research and reverse the recent cut in research spending.

The ability of the Defence Equipment and Support organisation within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to deliver the equipment programme is overshadowed by the existence of a funding gap which the NAO estimates could be as much as £36 billion over the next ten years. Both the National Audit Office "Major Projects Report 2009" (HC 85-I, session 2009-10, ISBN 9780102963342) and Bernard Gray's "Review of Acquisition" for the MoD have confirmed that the MoD's ten year equipment programme is unaffordable. Furthermore the MoD's practice of delaying projects so as to reduce costs in the early years of a programme is adding to overall procurement costs and so further increases the funding gap. The MoD has apparently made no attempt to calculate the full extent of the costs of delays and it has taken decisions to delay projects without understanding the full implications of those decisions. The report examines: progress on the many key programmes; defence research spending (declining from £540 million in 2007-08 to £471 million in 2009-10 and will decrease further in 2010-11 to £439 million); the response to and implementation of the Gray report; balancing the equipment programme and the use of regular Strategic Defence Reviews to maintain an up-to-date strategic context for the equipment programme; clarifying roles and accountabilities, including better leadership and decision-making; injecting key skills and tools into DE&S.

The defence industrial strategy published in December 2005 (Command paper Cm. 6697, ISBN 0101669720). Its aim was to provide greater transparency on the UK's future defence requirements and to set out those industrial capabilities the UK needs to maintain appropriate sovereignty and operate equipment independently. The Committee praises the production of the strategy to a tight timetable and with wide consultation. The strategy has been well received by industry. In the future there will be more focus on upgrading and maintaining platforms rather than designing and building new equipment. The Committee wants the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to continue improvements in the procurement process, and to give more information about future requirements. Investment in research and technology needs to increase, or the result will be lower quality defence equipment. The MoD also needs to develop a greater understanding of the vital role of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain. Competitive procurement will not always be possible in some areas, where there is only a single company with the capacity and capability to deliver the MoD's requirements. The Committee expresses concerns about the planned use of long-term partnering arrangements, seeing the risk of possible monopoly supply and lack of access of other companies to sub-contract work.

In 1909 the British Admiralty placed an order for a rigid airship, marking the beginning of the Royal Navy's involvement with airpower. This collection charts the Navy's involvement with aviation over the following century, and the ways in which its rapid expansion and evolution radically altered the nature of maritime power and naval strategy. Drawing on much new historical research, the collection takes a broadly chronological approach which allows a scholarly examination of key themes from across the history of British naval aviation. The subjects tackled include long-standing controversies over the control of naval air power, crucial turning points within British defence policy and strategy, the role of naval aviation in limited war, and discussion of campaigns - such the contribution of the Fleet Air Arm in the Mediterranean and Pacific theatres of the Second World War - that have hitherto received relatively little attention. The collection concludes with a discussion of recent debates surrounding the Royal Navy's acquisition of a new generation of carriers, setting the arguments within an historical context. Taken as a whole the volume offers fascinating insights into the development of a key aspect of naval power as well as shedding new light on one of the most important aspects of Britain's defence policy and military history. By simultaneous addressing historical and current political debates, it is sure to find a ready audience and stimulate further discussion.

This report analyses MoD's annual report and accounts 2004-05 (published in October 2005 - later than planned - as HC 464, session 2005-06, ISBN 0102935424) which combines MoD's annual performance report and the consolidated departmental resource accounts. Overall MoD's performance against its seven Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets has been mixed: three were "met", two were "partly met", one was "on course" to be met, and one was "not yet assessed". On recruitment and retention (partly met) all three armed services are suffering from critical shortages in various specialist trades, including aircrew and medical personnel. Although MoD reported £400m of savings in the operating costs of the Defence Logistics Organisation, the Committee criticizes the fact that not all of them could be validated. On procurement, MoD did not meet the targets relating to project time slippage. Cost decreases of £699 million were reported on the top 20 major defence equipment projects, but much of this was a result of cuts in the numbers of equipment ordered or in the capability of equipment. Losses reported in MoD's Financial Accounts totalled some £400 million, a lower figure than the previous year but still a substantial sum. Reported losses on the Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) programme, which involves the procurement of four transport ships, were some £100 million and further losses might arise. Another loss totalling £147 million related to a building project at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. The building was unable to meet the requirement and no other use could be found for it. It is another example of substantial waste which has to avoided in the future.