This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed – unsuccessfully – at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Most students of the history of Arab-Jewish relations have come to take for granted the stubborn resistance of the continuing dispute to any form of lasting and ‘reasonable’ solution. This book, first published in 1983, examines early Arab-Zionist negotiating experience with the assumption that this has direct relevance to our understanding of the possible outcomes of diplomatic approaches to resolving the conflict. Its main purpose is to assemble (half of the book consists of original souce documents) and discuss some of the raw material which may help readers focus more clearly on the origins of the conflict, and perhaps to eliminate some recurring fallacies about its development and the prospects for its resolution. An examination of the period 1913 to 1931 reveals of wealth of previous negotiating experience which is today largely forgotten, and indicates that there was little or no movement of any of the parties in the direction of modifying its basic minimum demands and aspirations.

This book, first published in 1997, provides a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of this volume comprises both an in-depth analysis of the period and events, and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.

This book is a chronology of the dialogue between the colonised Palestinians and their British colonisers during the 'Mandate' years from November 1917 through May 1948. It names, dates, quotes from and discusses 490 separate manifestos, letters, statements of policy, petitions, resolutions, minutes and debates going either from the British to the indigenous Palestinians or vice versa. A few examples: Samuel's The Future of Palestine, the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Covenant, the Report on the State of Palestine and other tracts by the Palestine Arab Congress and the Moslem-Christian Associations, the King-Crane report, the General Syrian Congress, the Palin, Haycraft, Cavendish, Shaw, Hope Simpson, Peel and Anglo-American investigations, the arguments of the Palestinian Delegations to London, the Churchill, Passfield and MacDonald White Papers, some petitions of the Arab Executive Committee to the League of Nations, various positions of the Palestine High Commissioners, protests of the Women's Delegations, debates in both Houses of Parliament, Ramsey MacDonald's Black Letter, the manifestos of several Arab newspapers and many leaders such as Musa Kazem al-Husseini, Musa Alami, Awni Abdul Hadi, Ragheb Nashashibi, Izzat Darwaza, George Antonius, Yaqub al-Ghussein, Matiel E.T. Mogannam, Jamal al-Husseini, Izzat Tannous, Emil Ghoury, Aref Abdul Razzak, Henry Cattan, Amin al-Husseini, Mohammed Zafarullah Khan and Albert Hourani, and finally the spewings of the UN General Assembly and its Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Its main sources are: 1) records held at the National Archives at Kew, London, mainly the minutes of Cabinet meetings and material written by the Foreign and Colonial Offices; 2) other records accessible online held by universities and private historians; and 3) other books and articles about the Mandate, i.e. 'secondary sources'. It thus traces the ins and outs of the three decades of robbery of Palestine by Britain from its rightful owners, preparing the ground for Palestine's takeover in 1948 by Egypt, Jordan and the Zionist state of Israel. The story is nothing if not simple: The Palestinians demanded their independence, the British denied it. The book is dedicated to the Palestinians who fought and suffered, or died, for their self-determination, and to the often-unsung Palestinian freedom fighters, resisters and historians who have related these events in their own ways.

The first volume of the former Israeli prime minister’s journals from the nation’s early years. My Struggle for Peace is a remarkable political document offering insights into the complex workings of the young Israeli political system, set against the backdrop of the disintegration of the country’s fragile armistice with the Arab states. Replete with Moshe Sharett’s candid comments on Israel’s first-generation leaders and world statesmen of the day, the diary also tells the dramatic human story of a political career cut short—the removal of an unusually sensitive, dedicated, and talented public servant. My Struggle for Peace is, above all, an intimate record of the decline of Sharett’s moderate approach and the rise of more “activist-militant” trends in Israeli society, culminating in the Suez/Sinai war of 1956. The diary challenges the popular narrative that Israel’s confrontation with its neighbors was unavoidable by offering daily evidence of Sharett’s statesmanship, moderation, diplomacy, and concern for Israel’s place in international affairs. This is the first volume in the 3-volume English abridgement of Sharett’s Yoman Ishi [Personal diary] (Ma’ariv, 1978) maintains the integrity, flavor, and impact of the 8-volume Hebrew original and includes additional documentary material that was not accessible at the time. The volumes are also available to purchase as a set or individually. “The editors . . . vastly improved on the Hebrew version by adding Sharett’s speeches, reports, cabinet minutes, and other sources to the text’. . . . These additions makes this work so important and welcome by all who aspire to understand the foreign and defense policies of Israel in its first decade.” —Israel Studies Review

Thoroughly updated and expanded, this new edition of Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace examines the history of recurrent efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and identifies a pattern of negative negotiating behaviors that seem to repeatedly derail efforts to achieve peace. In a lively and accessible style, Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan examine eight case studies of recent Arab-Israeli diplomatic encounters, from the Egyptian-Israeli peace of 1979 to the beginning of the Obama administration, in light of the historical record. By measuring contemporary diplomatic episodes against the pattern of counterproductive negotiating habits, this book makes possible a coherent comparison of over sixty years of Arab-Israeli negotiations and gives readers a framework with which to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of peace-making attempts, past, present, and future.

Given on January 5, 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine Address forever changed America’s relationship with the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, President Dwight D. Eisenhower boldly declared that the United States would henceforth serve as the region’s “protector of freedom” against Communist aggression. Eighteen months later the president invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, landing troops in Lebanon and setting an enduring precedent for U.S. intervention in the Middle East. How did Eisenhower justify this intervention to an American public wary of foreign entanglements? Why did he boldly issue the doctrine that bears his name? And, most important, how has Eisenhower’s rhetoric continued to influence American policy and perception of the Middle East? Randall Fowler answers these questions and more in More Than a Doctrine. With the expansion of America’s global influence and the executive branch’s power, presidential rhetoric has become an increasingly important tool in U.S. foreign policy—nowhere more so than in the Middle East. By examining Eisenhower’s rhetoric, More Than a Doctrine explores how the argumentative origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine Address continue to impact us today.