This primary reference reveals the contemporary, often verbatim record of how the German command decisions were made during World War II, and the reasoning and planning behind them.

By the time Hitler declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, he knew that his military machine was running out of fuel. In response, he launched Operation Blau, a campaign designed to protect Nazi oilfields in Rumania while securing new ones in the Caucasus. All that stood in the way was Stalingrad. Most accounts of the Battle of Stalingrad have focused on the dismal fate of the German Army. Joel Hayward now chronicles Luftwaffe operations during that campaign, focusing on Hitler's use of the air force as a tactical rather than strategic weapon in close support of ground forces. He vividly details the Luftwaffe's key role as "flying artillery," showing that the army relied on Luftwaffe support to a far greater degree than has been previously revealed and that its successes in the East occurred largely because of the effectiveness of that support. Hayward analyzes this major German offensive from the standpoint of cooperation between ground and air forces to attain mutually agreed objectives. He draws on diaries of both key commanders and regular airmen to recreate crucial battles and convey the drama of Hitler's frustrations and reckless leadership. Ultimately, Hayward shows, the poorly conceived strategies of Hitler, Goering, and others in Berlin doomed the efforts of air commander Wolfram von Richthofen, a courageous and resolute leader attempting to come to grips with an increasingly impossible situation. Stopped at Stalingrad is a dynamic case study in combined arms warfare that fills in many of the gaps left by other studies of the eastern war. By reconsidering the campaign in the light of a wider body of documentary sources and analyzing many previously ignored events, Hayward provides military historians and general readers a much deeper and more complete understanding of the Battle of Stalingrad and its impact on World War II.

Craig L. Symonds' World War II at Sea offers a definitive naval history of the Second World War presenting the chronology of the naval war, from The London Conference of 1930 to the surrender in Tokyo Bay in 1945, on a global scale for the first time.

This book marks the first comprehensive history of Britain's naval bulwark, the Home Fleet. It illuminates the vital role that fleet played in preserving Britain as a base of operations against Hitler. We see portrayed the hard days of blockade, patrol, and battle that encompassed the Home Fleet's war. And we see how that war was made harder by weaknesses at the Admiralty and by the damaging interference of the Minister of Defence - Winston Churchill.

"Burtt offers an account of how an invasion might have unfolded and its consequences, by drawing on parallel events at other times and places...Definitely worth a read." — The NYMAS Review When writing his memoirs after World War II, German Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring stated, “Italy’s missing her chance to occupy the island [of Malta] at the start of hostilities will go down in history as a fundamental blunder.” It’s easy to see why this tiny 95 square mile island held such a prominent place in the war’s Mediterranean Theater. Located almost halfway between the British bases of Gibraltar and Alexandria, Egypt, and just 60 miles south of Sicily, her airfields and naval base stood directly in the path of Italy’s (and her German partner’s) line of communication from Europe to North Africa. Operation C3 is a detailed study of the Axis 1942 plan to invade and take the island of Malta. The book examines the future combatants up to the Axis capture of Tobruk, in June 1942. The book then provides a realistic assessment of what would have had to happen if the Axis had decided to launch the invasion. Operation C3 then provides a day-by-day battle narrative of the invasion as if it had occurred on Saturday, August 15, 1942. The battle narrative is based on the combatant’s actual plans from the Italian and Maltese archives. and the realistic appraisal of what could have happened when those plans collide. A Reality & Analysis section is added after the battle narrative to discuss what really happened after Tobruk fell and why Operation C3 was never attempted.

Originally published: Santa Barbara, California: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, 2009.

Naval Warfare 1919–45 is a comprehensive history of the war at sea from the end of the Great War to the end of World War Two. Showing the bewildering nature and complexity of the war facing those charged with fighting it around the world, this book ranges far and wide: sweeping across all naval theatres and those powers performing major, as well as minor, roles within them. Armed with the latest material from an extensive set of sources, Malcolm H. Murfett has written an absorbing as well as a comprehensive reference work. He demonstrates that superior equipment and the best intelligence, ominous power and systematic planning, vast finance and suitable training are often simply not enough in themselves to guarantee the successful outcome of a particular encounter at sea. Sometimes the narrow difference between victory and defeat hinges on those infinite variables: the individual’s performance under acute pressure and sheer luck. Naval Warfare 1919–45 is an analytical and interpretive study which is an accessible and fascinating read both for students and for interested members of the general public.