Presenting a critical history of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century, focusing on the transition from logical positivism in its first half to the "new philosophy of science" in its second, Stefano Gattei examines the influence of several key figures, but the main focus of the book are Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. Kuhn as the central figure of the new philosophy of science, and Popper as a key philosopher of the time who stands outside both traditions. Gattei makes two important claims about the development of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century; that Kuhn is much closer to positivism than many have supposed, failing to solve the crisis of neopostivism, and that Popper, in responding to the deeper crisis of foundationalism that spans the whole of the Western philosophical tradition, ultimately shows what is untenable in Kuhn's view. Gattei has written a very detailed and fine grained, yet accessible discussion making exceptionally interesting use of archive materials.

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, and second in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy.

"Participation in the Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie 2005 was an honor and a genuine intellectual pleasure for me. The symposium, with all its contributions by the Münster faculty and students, was a wonderfully valuable experience. I can hardly do justice to its spirit of free discussion, or adequately express my thanks, by these short replies. But I think that they will testify clearly to the stimulation the symposium provided and to how much I learned from this exchange." Bas van Fraassen

Both a history and a metahistory, Representing Electrons focuses on the development of various theoretical representations of electrons from the late 1890s to 1925 and the methodological problems associated with writing about unobservable scientific entities. Using the electron—or rather its representation—as a historical actor, Theodore Arabatzis illustrates the emergence and gradual consolidation of its representation in physics, its career throughout old quantum theory, and its appropriation and reinterpretation by chemists. As Arabatzis develops this novel biographical approach, he portrays scientific representations as partly autonomous agents with lives of their own. Furthermore, he argues that the considerable variance in the representation of the electron does not undermine its stable identity or existence. Raising philosophical issues of contentious debate in the history and philosophy of science—namely, scientific realism and meaning change—Arabatzis addresses the history of the electron across disciplines, integrating historical narrative with philosophical analysis in a book that will be a touchstone for historians and philosophers of science and scientists alike.

This is the first of two volumes comprising the papers submitted for publication by the invited participants to the Tenth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, held in Florence, August 1995. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. The invited lectures published in the two volumes demonstrate much of what goes on in the fields of the Congress and give the state of the art of current research. The two volumes cover the traditional subdisciplines of mathematical logic and philosophical logic, as well as their interfaces with computer science, linguistics and philosophy. Philosophy of science is broadly represented, too, including general issues of natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. The papers in Volume One are concerned with logic, mathematical logic, the philosophy of logic and mathematics, and computer science.

From the contents: Charles MORGAN: Canonical models and probabilistic semantics. - Francois LEPAGE: A many-valued probabilistic logic. - Piers RAWLING: The exchange paradox, finite additivity, and the principle of dominance. - Susan VINEBERG: The logical status of conditionalization and its role in confirmation. - Deborah MAYO: Science, error statistics, and arguing from error. - Mark N. LANCE: The best is the enemy of the good: Bayesian epistemology as a case study in unhelpful idealization. - Robert B. GARDNER & Michael C. WOOTEN: An application of Bayes' theorem to population genetics. - Peter D. JOHNSON, Jr.: Another look at group selection."