Military deception is as old as war itself and it adheres to a logical process. This monograph explores how an increased understanding of pattern recognition as part of human decision making can enhance the effectiveness of military deception operations. Before one can exercise the art of military deception, one must understand the science of it. The science of military deception is revealed in the way that people make decisions. One of the prerequisites of decision making is that one needs to have knowledge about the issue upon which one is about to decide. This makes it necessary for one to also investigate the subject and theory of knowledge. This exploration leads the author to ask three questions. First, how do we acquire knowledge? When we have acquired knowledge, how do we retain it? Finally, how do we use knowledge? This last question leads one back to decision making. The author then sought to establish a causal relationship between pattern recognition and decision making. Through experimental research, he tried to cause a decrease in ambiguity and thereby facilitate the erroneous orientation of the decision maker. He expected that this would make the decision maker decisive, certain, and wrong. However, according to statistics, the experiment did not show conclusive evidence that previous experiences influence people in making decisions. But there is strong evidence that indicates a relationship between experience and decision making. Further research with a larger sample might show a significant statistical relationship. To let military practitioners rise above the subconscious level of the science of military deception, it is necessary to provide them with education and training. The subject of military deception should be introduced into military doctrine and into the curricula of military education.

It is said that deception among people in a civilized society is something to be loathed even though it seems to be part of human nature; but deception in war is a virtue. Properly designed and executed, stratagems reduce the horrific costs of war. This book is a comprehensive collection of classic articles on deception, hand-picked and expertly introduced by well-known experts on military deception. The purpose of this book is to set in motion a renaissance for using deception as an instrument of statecraft. The various sections are designed to cumulatively provide sufficient breadth and depth on the subject to satisfy both the novice as well as the expert. Packed with expert commentary, interesting background information, and original readings, this book provides the reader with sufficient knowledge to pursue General Eisenhower’s vision for the proper role of deception in support of the national interest.

From the Trojan Horse to Gulf War subterfuge, this far-reaching military history examines the importance and ingenuity of wartime deception campaigns. The art of military deception is as old as the art of war. This fascinating account of the practice draws on conflicts from around the world and across millennia. The examples stretch from the very beginnings of recorded military history—Pharaoh Ramses II's campaign against the Hittites in 1294 B.C.—to modern times, when technology has placed a stunning array of devices into the arsenals of military commanders. Military historians often underestimate the importance of deception in warfare. This book is the first to fully describe its value. Jon Latimer demonstrates how simple tricks have been devastatingly effective. He also explores how technology has increased the range and subtlety of what is possible—including bogus radio traffic, virtual images, even false smells. Deception in War includes examples from land, sea, and air to show how great commanders have always had, as Winston Churchill put it, that indispensable “element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.”

What is Military Deception Military deception (MILDEC) is an attempt by a military unit to gain an advantage during warfare by misleading adversary decision makers into taking action or inaction that creates favorable conditions for the deceiving force. This is usually achieved by creating or amplifying an artificial fog of war via psychological operations, information warfare, visual deception, or other methods. As a form of disinformation, it overlaps with psychological warfare. Military deception is also closely connected to operations security (OPSEC) in that OPSEC attempts to conceal from the adversary critical information about an organization's capabilities, activities, limitations, and intentions, or provide a plausible alternate explanation for the details the adversary can observe, while deception reveals false information in an effort to mislead the adversary. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Military Deception Chapter 2: Operation Fortitude Chapter 3: Operation Bodyguard Chapter 4: Ruse de guerre Chapter 5: Operation Bertram Chapter 6: Counterattack Chapter 7: Quaker gun Chapter 8: List of military strategies and concepts Chapter 9: Operation Zeppelin (deception plan) Chapter 10: Military dummy (II) Answering the public top questions about military deception. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Military Deception.

This paper addresses the topic of military deception at the operational level, and asserts its continued utility and feasibility in an age of increasingly high-technology intelligence gathering and dissemination systems. Beginning with a consideration of the nature of deception, the paper then examines four key tenets of a successful operational deception, namely Magruder's Principle (reinforce the enemy's preconceptions), plausibility, the use of multiple channels, and the combination of secrecy, central control and coordination. For each of these tenets, historical examples of their use in military operations are discussed; the paper then considers the extent to which each of these tenets remains applicable in a high-tech world. The paper concludes with a consideration of the continued feasibility and increasing desirability of deception in the future.

This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.

The author reviews the basic concepts related to "deception." Dr. Caddell defines terms, provides historical examples, and discusses problems associated with deception. He provides a general overview, a "primer" which is not directed at those who already possess a working knowledge of deception operations. Nevertheless, given the complex and everchanging nature of deception in the political-military environment, it may serve as a useful reminder of the basic assumptions and methods concerning the subject.