From Plural to Institutional Agency
Title | From Plural to Institutional Agency PDF eBook |
Author | Kirk Ludwig |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 311 |
Release | 2017-10-13 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0192507389 |
Kirk Ludwig presents a philosophical account of institutional action, such as action by corporations and nation states, arguing that it can be understood exhaustively in terms of the agency of individuals and concepts constructed out of materials that are already at play in our understanding of individual action. He thus argues for a strong form of methodological individualism. The book provides a new account of the logical form of grammatically singular group action sentences (e.g. 'Company laid off 10,000 workers'), and features new analyses of the concepts of a constitutive rule, status function, status role, collective acceptance, and proxy agency. He also provides an analysis of the structure of corporate action, including the status of corporations as legal persons, and of the nature of state action in relation to its citizens. This is the companion volume to From Individual to Plural Agency (OUP 2016), extending the multiple-agents account of collective action set out in the earlier volume.
From Plural to Institutional Agency
Title | From Plural to Institutional Agency PDF eBook |
Author | Kirk Ludwig |
Publisher | |
Pages | |
Release | 2017 |
Genre | PHILOSOPHY |
ISBN | 9780191831560 |
Kirk Ludwig presents a philosophical account of institutional action, such as action by corporations and nation states. He argues that it can be fully understood in terms of the agency of individuals, and concepts derived from our understanding of individual action. He thus argues for a strong form of methodological individualism.
From Individual to Plural Agency
Title | From Individual to Plural Agency PDF eBook |
Author | Kirk Ludwig |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 323 |
Release | 2016-10-06 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0191072230 |
Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action. Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention, expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and it requires no group agents per se. Shared intention is a matter of agents in a group each intending that they bring about some end in accordance with a shared plan. Thus their participatory intentions (their we-intentions) differ from individual intentions not in their mode but in their content. Joint intentional action then is a matter of a group of individuals successfully executing a shared intention. The account does not reduce shared intention to aggregates of individual intentions. However, it argues that the content of we-intentions can be analyzed wholly in terms of concepts already at play in our understanding of individual intentional action. The account thus vindicates methodological individualism for plural agency. The account is contrasted with other major positions on shared intention and joint action, and defended against objections. This forms the foundation for a reductive account of the agency of mobs and institutions, expressed in grammatically singular action sentences about groups and their intentions, in a second volume.
Shared and Institutional Agency
Title | Shared and Institutional Agency PDF eBook |
Author | Michael Bratman |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 289 |
Release | 2022 |
Genre | Act (Philosophy) |
ISBN | 0197580890 |
"A fundamental feature of our individual, human agency is its organization over time. Think again about growing food in a garden, or taking a trip, or writing a book. A central idea is that our capacity for planning agency is at the heart of this cross-temporal organization of our individual, human agency. Appeal to this role of our capacity for planning agency both fits our commonsense self-understanding and, I conjecture, would be a part of an empirically informed psychological theory that begins with-- but potentially adjusts--this commonsense self-understanding. The basic thought is that we are resource-limited agents who achieve cross-temporal organization in part by settling in advance on prior, partial plans. These somewhat stable partial plans help pose problems of means and preliminary steps, and in pursuit of needed coordination help filter potential options. They thereby provide a background framework for downstream thought and action"--
From Individual to Plural Agency
Title | From Individual to Plural Agency PDF eBook |
Author | Kirk Ludwig |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 335 |
Release | 2016 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 0198755627 |
Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. He argues that collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and requires no group agents, while shared intentions are distributions of intentions across members of the group.
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science
Title | The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science PDF eBook |
Author | Lee McIntyre |
Publisher | Taylor & Francis |
Pages | 475 |
Release | 2016-12-08 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 1315410087 |
37 Why Is There No Philosophy of Political Science?
Social Ontology, Normativity and Law
Title | Social Ontology, Normativity and Law PDF eBook |
Author | Miguel Garcia-Godinez |
Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG |
Pages | 247 |
Release | 2020-07-06 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 3110663619 |
This volume contains the proceedings of the Social Ontology, Normativity, and Philosophy of Law conference, which took place on May 30–31, 2019 at the University of Glasgow. At the invitation of the Social Ontology Research Group, a panel of prominent scholars shed light on normativity from the perspective of social ontology and the philosophy of law.