Is the world hierarchically arranged, incorporating 'levels' of reality? What is the nature of objects and properties? What does 'realism' about ordinary objects or states of mind demand? When an assertion is true, what makes it true? Are natural properties best regarded as qualities or powers or some combination of these? What are colours? What explains the 'projective' character of intentionality? What is the nature of consciousness, and what relation do conscious experiences bearto material states and processes?From an Ontological Point of View endeavours to provide answers to such questions through an examination of ground-floor issues in ontology. The result is an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us and an application of this account to problems dominating recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics.The book, written in an accessible, non-technical style, is intended for non-specialists as well as seasoned metaphysicians.

Fifty years after Willard Van Orman Quine published From a logical point of view (1953), John Heil brought out his book 'From an ontological point of view' (2003). The title expresses the shift in contemporary philosophy from logical and epistemological concerns to metaphysics. The papers of this symposium discuss that shift, focussing on what John Heil calls 'ontological seriousness', truth-making, levels of being, properties, powers, and reductionism. Each paper is followed by a comment from John Heil. The volume covers a number of the most hotly debated issues in today’s metaphysics and moves the discussion on in several important aspects. 'It would be difficult to imagine a collection of more astute, penetrating, and philosophically hard-hitting discussions of the kind of metaphysical realism articulated in 'From an Ontological Point of View'. Symposium participants deploy an impressive range of analytical skills in a way that illuminates connections among metaphysical positions that too often escape notice.' (John Heil)

Fifty years after Willard Van Orman Quine published From a Logical Point of View (1953), John Heil brought out his book From an Ontological Point of View (2003). The title expresses the shift in contemporary philosophy from logical and epistemological concerns to metaphysics. The papers of this symposium discuss that shift, focusing on what John Heil calls "ontological seriousness," truth-making, levels of being, properties, powers, and reductionism. Each paper is followed by a comment from John Heil. The volume covers a number of the most hotly debated issues in today's metaphysics and moves the discussion on in several important aspects. Michael Esfeld is professor of philosophy at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland).

Is the world hierarchically arranged, incorporating 'levels' of reality? What is the nature of objects and properties? What does 'realism' about ordinary objects or states of mind demand? When an assertion is true, what makes it true? Are natural properties best regarded as qualities or powers or some combination of these? What are colours? What explains the 'projective' character of intentionality? What is the nature of consciousness, and what relation do conscious experiences bear to material states and processes? From an Ontological Point of View endeavours to provide answers to such questions through an examination of ground-floor issues in ontology. The result is an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us and an application of this account to problems dominating recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The book, written in an accessible, non-technical style, is intended for non-specialists as well as seasoned metaphysicians.

Both science and philosophy are interested in questions of ontology - questions about what exists and what these things are like. Science and philosophy, however, seem like very different ways of investigating the world, so how should one proceed? Some defer to the sciences, conceived as something apart from philosophy, and others to metaphysics, conceived as something apart from science, for certain kinds of answers. This book contends that these sorts of deference are misconceived. A compelling account of ontology must appreciate the ways in which the sciences incorporate metaphysical assumptions and arguments. At the same time, it must pay careful attention to how observation, experience, and the empirical dimensions of science are related to what may be viewed as defensible philosophical theorizing about ontology. The promise of an effectively naturalized metaphysics is to encourage beliefs that are formed in ways that do justice to scientific theorizing, modeling, and experimentation. But even armed with such a view, there is no one, uniquely rational way to draw lines between domains of ontology that are suitable for belief, and ones in which it would be better to suspend belief instead. In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology.

Examines conceptions of death as manifested in German literature and philosophy expanding on thanatological theories that distinguish between a metaphysical and an ontological view of human finitude. This book addresses the French philosophical treatment of death by Blanchot, Kojeve, and others in the wake of their German predecessors.

Existence questions have been topics for heated debates in metaphysics, but this book argues that they can often be answered easily, by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises. This 'easy' approach to ontology leads to realism about disputed entities, and to the view that metaphysical disputes about existence questions are misguided.