Data base security; Encryption as a security mechanism; Design-oriented models of operating system security; Theoretical models of operating system security.

The final quarter of the 20th century has seen the establishment of a global computational infrastructure. This and the advent of programming languages such as Java, supporting mobile distributed computing, has posed a significant challenge to computer sciences. The infrastructure can support commerce, medicine and government, but only if communications and computing can be secured against catastrophic failure and malicious interference.

Crypto '91 was the eleventh in a series of workshops on cryptology sponsoredby the International Association for Cryptologic Research and was held in Santa Barbara, California, in August 1991. This volume contains a full paper or an extended abstract for each of the 39 talks presented at the workshop. All theoretical and practical aspects of cryptology are represented, including: protocol design and analysis, combinatorics and authentication, secret sharing and information theory, cryptanalysis, complexity theory, cryptographic schemas based on number theory, pseudorandomness, applications and implementations, viruses, public-key cryptosystems, and digital signatures.

Software developers need to worry about security as never before. They need clear guidance on safe coding practices, and that’s exactly what this book delivers. The book does not delve deep into theory, or rant about the politics of security. Instead, it clearly and simply lays out the most common threats that programmers need to defend against. It then shows programmers how to make their defense. The book takes a broad focus, ranging over SQL injection, worms and buffer overflows, password security, and more. It sets programmers on the path towards successfully defending against the entire gamut of security threats that they might face.

Practitioners and researchers seeking a concise, accessible introduction to secure multi-party computation which quickly enables them to build practical systems or conduct further research will find this essential reading.

This book provides information on theoretically secure multiparty computation (MPC) and secret sharing, and the fascinating relationship between the two concepts.

In the setting of multiparty computation, sets of two or more parties with p- vate inputs wish to jointly compute some (predetermined) function of their inputs. The computation should be such that the outputs received by the parties are correctly distributed, and furthermore, that the privacy of each party’s input is preserved as much as possible, even in the presence of - versarial behavior. This encompasses any distributed computing task and includes computations as simple as coin-tossing and broadcast, and as c- plex as electronic voting, electronic auctions, electronic cash schemes and anonymous transactions. The feasibility (and infeasibility) of multiparty c- putation has been extensively studied, resulting in a rather comprehensive understanding of what can and cannot be securely computed, and under what assumptions. The theory of cryptography in general, and secure multiparty computation in particular, is rich and elegant. Indeed, the mere fact that it is possible to actually achieve the aforementioned task is both surprising and intriguing.