The largely sea-borne invasion of Northern France in June 1944, Operation Overlord, is acknowledged as one of the key actions which hastened the end of the Second World War. The RAF played a vital part in the landings. It then supported the subsequent advance of Montgomery’s 21st Army, and the Allies as a whole, through France, Belgium, Holland and into Germany. Following the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead in early August 1944, the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force moved forward in support of the troops, occupying a number of temporary airfields as it went. The ground support for this operation was complex, a situation that was exacerbated by the fact that much of it had to be highly mobile. The advance, however, was rapid and soon ran into problems as the supply lines grew longer by the day. The planners had envisaged that capturing the Belgian port of Antwerp would eventually enable them to bring in vitally needed supplies much further north on the Continent. Although the city and its port were liberated in September 1944, the port’s route to the sea along the River Scheldt was still controlled by German forces. It took nearly three months until this was resolved, and the port opened for business. Until then, in the RAF’s equivalent of the US Army’s famed ‘Red Ball Express’, it was some 300 miles by road from Normandy with the Second Tactical Air Force largely reliant on the Army for transporting its needs. For an air force needing large volumes of fuel and ammunition, demand soon began to outpace supply. A number of emergency measures were put in place to keep the aircraft operational, which saw the RAF resorting to the use of its heavy bombers to fly in supplies. Even when Antwerp was up and running, supplying the Second Tactical Air Force remained a hand-to-mouth affair right through until the enemy’s surrender in May 1945. In Forward Air Bases in Europe from D-Day to the Baltic the author explores the challenges of supporting a mobile air force in those uncertain days as Hitler’s forces were retreating to their homeland. As the Allies found, things can go badly wrong when thinking loses touch with the art of the possible – logistics. In the end, miraculously, it worked, but it was a close-run thing.

A brief, yet complete history of the Allied campaign for the liberation of Europe from the Normandy invasion to the surrender of Germany, this study describes not only what happened, but why it happened. While an enormous amount has been written about this campaign, most of it focuses upon a single army or an individual battle. This book stresses a true inter-Allied and all arms approach with a balance of both strategy and tactics; accounts of effort by land, sea, air forces; as well as the strong influence of logistics. Levine deals extensively with the German side, particularly morale issues, and he includes the role played by Canadian forces—a topic usually neglected in American accounts. Rapid changes in warfare rendered the character of the battles of 1944-1945 quite different from battles earlier in the war, and Levine finds that old-fashioned fortifications often had an unexpected and formidable impact on the fighting. Logistics played a central role in the struggle, and supply problems would continuously plague the U.S. Army during this campaign. Levine considers whether the war could have been won in 1944, and he discusses the lost opportunities on both sides. Casting new light on some familiar subjects and recounting many neglected issues, this book places the campaign within the larger context of European events in both the east and the Mediterranean.

This study describes not only what happened from the D-Day landings in June 1944 to the surrender of Germany eleven months later, but also why it happened. While an enormous amount has been written about this campaign, most of it focuses on a single army or an individual battle. Levine stresses a truly integrated approach that combines both strategy and tactics and covers the land, sea, and air efforts of both Allies and Axis. Levine deals extensively with the German side, particularly morale issues, and he includes the role played by Canadian forces--a topic usually neglected in American accounts. Concise history of the Allied campaign to liberate Northwest Europe during World War II Places the campaign in the war's broader context Casts new light on some familiar subjects and recounts many neglected issues

This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

The theme of the book is the creation of tactics for littoral warfare – as opposed to the more common blue ocean perspective. Themes are how NATO perceived the goals of the enemy; the purposes of the NATO organisations, the military instruments they had to organise, the organization of cooperation among units from sovereign states, and how they tested their military capabilities. Research is based on war plans and tactics of the Danish and West German navies and their planned support from air forces. We follow the modernisations of the navies from guns to missiles. Tactical discussions among military top offi cers are laid bare, and intelligence reports about the Warsaw Pact and its military capabilities are presented. Exercises are analysed based on the military reports.