The 1989 Workshop on the Assessment of Formal Methods for Trustworthy Com puter Systems (FM89} was an invitational workshop that brought together repre sentatives from the research, commercial and governmental spheres of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The workshop was held in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, from July 23 through July 27, 1989. This document reports the activities, observations, recommendations and conclusions resulting. from FM89. 1. 1 Purpose of Workshop The primary purpose for holding FM89 was to assess the role of formal methods in the development and fielding of trustworthy critical systems. The need for this assessment was predicated upon four observations: 1. Critical systems are increasingly being controlled by computer systems; 2. Existing techniques for developing, assuring and certifying computer-based critical systems are inadequate; 3. Formal methods have the potential for playing the same role in the devel opment of computer-based systems as applied mathematics does for other engineering disciplines; and 4. Formal methods have had limited impact on the development of comput- based systems and supporting technologies. · The goal of the workshop was to complete the following tasks: 1. Assess the problems retarding the development of trustworthy critical systems; 2. Determine the (potential) impact of applying formal methods techniques to the development of trustworthy critical systems; 3. Determine the research and development required to facilitate a broader ap plication of formal methods techniques; 4.

Formal methods are mathematically-based techniques, often supported by reasoning tools, that can offer a rigorous and effective way to model, design and analyze computer systems. The purpose of this study is to evaluate international industrial experience in using formal methods. The cases selected are representative of industrial-grade projects and span a variety of application domains. The study had three main objectives: · To better inform deliberations within industry and government on standards and regulations; · To provide an authoritative record on the practical experience of formal methods to date; and À To suggest areas where future research and technology development are needed. This study was undertaken by three experts in formal methods and software engineering: Dan Craigen of ORA Canada, Susan Gerhart of Applied Formal Methods, and Ted Ralston of Ralston Research Associates. Robin Bloomfield of Adelard was involved with the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Shutdown System case. Support for this study was provided by organizations in Canada and the United States. The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada (AECB) provided support for Dan Craigen and for the technical editing provided by Karen Summerskill. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratories (NRL), Washington, DC, provided support for all three authors. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provided support for Ted Ralston.

Communication, Management and Information Technology contains the contributions presented at the International Conference on Communication, Management and Information Technology (ICCMIT 2016, Cosenza, Italy, 26-29 April 2016, organized by the Universal Society of Applied Research (USAR). The book aims at researchers, scientists, engineers, and scholar students interested or involved in Computer Science and Systems, Communication, and Management.

As the complexity of embedded computer-controlled systems increases, the present industrial practice for their development gives cause for concern, especially for safety-critical applications where human lives are at stake. The use of software in such systems has increased enormously in the last decade. Formal methods, based on firm mathematical foundations, provide one means to help with reducing the risk of introducing errors during specification and development. There is currently much interest in both academic and industrial circles concerning the issues involved, but the techniques still need further investigation and promulgation to make their widespread use a reality. This book presents results of research into techniques to aid the formal verification of mixed hardware/software systems. Aspects of system specification and verification from requirements down to the underlying hardware are addressed, with particular regard to real-time issues. The work presented is largely based around the Occam programming language and Transputer microprocessor paradigm. The HOL theorem prover, based on higher order logic, has mainly been used in the application of machine-checked proofs. The book describes research work undertaken on the collaborative UK DTI/SERC-funded Information Engineering Dictorate Safemos project. The partners were Inmos Ltd., Cambridge SRI, the Oxford University Computing Laboratory and the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, who investigated the problems of formally verifying embedded systems. The most important results of the project are presented in the form of a series of interrelated chapters by project members and associated personnel. In addition, overviews of two other ventures with similar objectives are included as appendices. The material in this book is intended for computing science researchers and advanced industrial practitioners interested in the application of formal methods to real-time safety-critical systems at all levels of abstraction from requirements to hardware. In addition, material of a more general nature is presented, which may be of interest to managers in charge of projects applying formal methods, especially for safety-critical-systems, and others who are considering their use.

This book presents the proceedings of the 9th International Conference of Z Users, ZUM '95, held in Limerick, Ireland in September 1995. The book contains 34 carefully selected papers on Z, using Z, applications of Z, proof, testing, industrial usage, object orientation, animation of specification, method integration, and teaching formal methods. Of particular interest is the inclusion of an annotated Z bibliography listing 544 entries. While focussing on Z, by far the most commonly used "formal method" both in industry and application, the volume is of high relevance for the whole formal methods community.

1 In a number of recent presentations – most notably at FME’96 –oneofthe foremost scientists in the ?eld of formal methods, C.A.R. Hoare,has highlighted the fact that formal methods are not the only technique for producing reliable software. This seems to have caused some controversy,not least amongst formal methods practitioners. How can one of the founding fathers of formal methods seemingly denounce the ?eld of research after over a quarter of a century of support? This is a question that has been posed recently by some formal methods skeptics. However, Prof. Hoare has not abandoned formal methods. He is reiterating, 2 albeitmoreradically,his1987view thatmorethanonetoolandnotationwillbe requiredinthepractical,industrialdevelopmentoflarge-scalecomplexcomputer systems; and not all of these tools and notations will be, or even need be, formal in nature. Formalmethods arenotasolution,butratheroneofaselectionoftechniques that have proven to be useful in the development of reliable complex systems, and to result in hardware and software systems that can be produced on-time and within a budget, while satisfying the stated requirements. After almostthree decades,the time has come to view formalmethods in the context of overall industrial-scale system development, and their relationship to othertechniquesandmethods.Weshouldnolongerconsidertheissueofwhether we are “pro-formal” or “anti-formal”, but rather the degree of formality (if any) that we need to support in system development. This is a goal of ZUM’98, the 11th International Conference of Z Users, held for the ?rst time within continental Europe in the city of Berlin, Germany.

Computers at Risk presents a comprehensive agenda for developing nationwide policies and practices for computer security. Specific recommendations are provided for industry and for government agencies engaged in computer security activities. The volume also outlines problems and opportunities in computer security research, recommends ways to improve the research infrastructure, and suggests topics for investigators. The book explores the diversity of the field, the need to engineer countermeasures based on speculation of what experts think computer attackers may do next, why the technology community has failed to respond to the need for enhanced security systems, how innovators could be encouraged to bring more options to the marketplace, and balancing the importance of security against the right of privacy.