A fascinating historical account of how and why the U.S. cultural penetration in Yugoslavia became a key feature for the attainment of Washington’s short, middle and long-term policy goals there.

The book claims that the United States and the Soviet Union attained the mastery of the international order by projecting universalist values that responded to the particularist markers of the domestic order that was generated in the 1950s. The geopolitical orientation adopted by the superpowers in the 1950s was shaped by the way in which their societies developed politically, socially and economically in the 1950s. The main argument of this book is that the quest for the mastery of the international order that informed superpower relations in the 1950s was guided by the need to respond to the local circumstances that emerged in the United States and the Soviet Union. The particularist markers that arose in the 1950s led to the establishment of a geopolitical project underpinned by certain universalist values that could be applied in order to build the superpowers’ sphere of influence.

This book examines the Vogeler/Sanders espionage case that ruptured ties between the US and UK and Hungary in 1949, and analyses this as an example of Western covert operations in the early Cold War. The work focuses on the 1949 case of ITT in Hungary, where two of its executives, the American Robert A. Vogeler and the Briton Edgar Sanders, were arrested by the secret police, tortured, forced to confess, put on a public show trial, and found guilty of espionage. This happened at a time that the US and the UK were cooperating in numerous operations to undermine the credibility of the communist regime and to encourage local resistance by “all means short of war.” Using the case as a lens to examine the dynamics of the early Cold War, the book integrates business history, diplomatic history and intelligence history, and thereby traces the impact of the case on Anglo-Hungarian, American-Hungarian, and Anglo-American relations during the critical period of 1949-1956. Vogeler’s case had a strong impact on the growing criticism of the Truman Administration’s containment policies and contributed to the demand for a more activist policy of ‘liberation of captive peoples’. His experiences also rallied the business community, especially trade associations such as the National Foreign Trade Council, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers, to support the anti-communist crusade both abroad and at home. Vogeler’s wife also waged a personal campaign to secure her husband’s release and exemplifies the activism of conservative and Catholic women who waged their own anti-communist crusade. The book thus tells the “rest of the story” often omitted in traditional works. This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, intelligence studies and European political history.

This book focuses on the highly complex and intertwined relationship between civil aviation, technological globalization and Cold War politics. It explores how the advancement of Soviet civil aircraft engineering during the 1950s technically triggered the globalization of the Cold War. The study also shows how the processes of technological standardization facilitated transfers of technology and knowledge across the Iron Curtain and how East-West as well as East-South connections evolved. It uncovers the motives and reasons for this transfer of knowledge and expertise, and aims to identify the specific roles played by states, international organizations and interpersonal networks. By taking a global approach to this history, the book advances ongoing debates in the field. It reassesses Europe’s role in the Cold War, pointing out the substantial differences in how Western Europe and the United States viewed the Communist world. This book will be of interest to scholars of international history, the history of technology and Cold War history.

From a writer with long and high-level experience in the U.S. government, a startling and provocative assessment of America’s global dominance. Maximalist puts the history of our foreign policy in an unexpected new light, while drawing fresh, compelling lessons for the present and future. When the United States has succeeded in the world, Stephen Sestanovich argues, it has done so not by staying the course but by having to change it—usually amid deep controversy and uncertainty. For decades, the United States has been a power like no other. Yet presidents and policy makers worry that they—and, even more, their predecessors—haven’t gotten things right. Other nations, they say to themselves, contribute little to meeting common challenges. International institutions work badly. An effective foreign policy costs too much. Public support is shaky. Even the greatest successes often didn’t feel that way at the time. Sestanovich explores the dramatic results of American global primacy built on these anxious foundations, recounting cycles of overcommitment and underperformance, highs of achievement and confidence followed by lows of doubt. We may think there was a time when America’s international role reflected bipartisan unity, policy continuity, and a unique ability to work with others, but Maximalist tells a different story—one of divided administrations and divisive decision making, of clashes with friends and allies, of regular attempts to set a new direction. Doing too much has always been followed by doing too little, and vice versa. Maximalist unearths the backroom stories and personalities that bring American foreign policy to life. Who knew how hard Lyndon Johnson fought to stay out of the war in Vietnam—or how often Henry Kissinger ridiculed the idea of visiting China? Who remembers that George Bush Sr. found Ronald Reagan’s diplomacy too passive—or that Bush Jr. considered Bill Clinton’s too active? Leaders and scoundrels alike emerge from this retelling in sharper focus than ever before. Sestanovich finds lessons in the past that anticipate and clarify our chaotic present.