The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) provide democracy assistance for Cuba aimed at developing civil society and promoting freedom of information. Typical program beneficiaries include Cuban community leaders, independent journalists, women, youths, and marginalized groups. USAID receives the majority of funding allocated for this assistance, although State has received 32 percent of funding since 2004. In recent years, both USAID and State have provided more funding for program implementation to for-profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) with a worldwide or regional focus than to universities and to NGOs that focus only on Cuba. All types of implementing partners, but worldwide or regional organizations in particular, used subpartners to implement program activities under 21 of the 29 awards and contracts that GAO reviewed. USAID and State legal officials view the Cuba democracy program’s authorizing legislation as allowing the agencies discretion in determining the types of activities that can be funded with program assistance. Agency officials added that the agencies ensure that program activities directly relate to democracy promotion as broadly illustrated in related program legislation. The officials stated that organizations are expected to work with agency program officers to determine what activities are permitted or appropriate. In addition, they said that program partners and subpartners are expected to spend U.S. government funds consistent with U.S. laws, and that requirements in primary award agreements generally flow down to any subpartners. USAID has improved its performance and financial monitoring of implementing partners’ use of program funds by implementing new policies and hiring contractors to improve monitoring and evaluation and to conduct financial internal controls reviews, but GAO found gaps in State’s financial monitoring. While GAO found some gaps in implementing partners’ performance planning and reporting, both agencies are taking steps to improve performance monitoring. For financial monitoring, USAID performs financial internal controls reviews of its implementing partners with the assistance of an external auditor. Since 2008, USAID has used a risk-based approach to determine the coverage and frequency of the 30 reviews the auditor has conducted, which have identified weaknesses in implementing partners’ financial management, procurement, and internal controls. However, because of resource constraints, State did not perform financial internal controls reviews for more than two-thirds of its implementing partners during fiscal years 2010 through 2012. State procured an external financial auditor in September 2012 that plans to review more than half of State’s implementing partners, and has taken steps toward implementing a risk-based approach for scheduling these reviews. Federal regulations generally require agencies to approve the use of subpartners. GAO found that USAID issued specific guidance in 2011 to its implementing partners on requirements for subpartner approval. While State told GAO it has similar requirements, State’s requirements are not clearly specified in its written guidance. As a result, State was not provided with the information it would have needed to approve at least 91 subawards and subcontracts that were obligated under eight awards. Why GAO Did This Study: Since 1996, Congress has appropriated $205 million to USAID and State to support democracy assistance for Cuba. Because of Cuban government restrictions, conditions in Cuba pose security risks to the implementing partners—primarily NGOs—and subpartners that provide U.S. assistance. For this report, GAO (1) identified current assistance, implementing partners, subpartners, and beneficiaries; (2) reviewed USAID’s and State’s efforts to implement the program in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and to address program risks; and (3) examined USAID’s and State’s monitoring of the use of program funds. This report is a publicly releasable version of a Sensitive But Unclassified Report that GAO issued in December 2012. What GAO Recommends: GAO is recommending that State take steps to improve its financial monitoring of implementing partners and provide clear guidance for approving subpartners. State concurred with GAO’s recommendations and cited steps they are taking to address them.

Since the early 1960s, the U.S. has maintained an embargo on Cuba through various laws, regulations, and presidential proclamations re: trade, travel, and financial transactions. In Sept. 2009, Treasury and Commerce published regulatory changes that further ease some embargo restrictions. These amended regulations further ease restrictions on travel, remittances, gifts, and exports to Cuba. This correspondence describes: (1) the Sept. 2009 changes to the embargo; (2) options available to the Pres. to further modify the embargo; (3) actions that the Pres. can or must take in the event of certain changes in the Cuban gov¿t.; and (4) possible congressional actions to end the embargo. Charts and tables.

History is being made in U.S.-Cuban relations. Now in paperback and updated to tell the real story behind the stunning December 17, 2014, announcement by President Obama and President Castro of their move to restore full diplomatic relations, this powerful book is essential to understanding ongoing efforts toward normalization in a new era of engagement. Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual conflict and aggression between the United States and Cuba since 1959, Back Channel to Cuba chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh here present a remarkably new and relevant account, describing how, despite the intense political clamor surrounding efforts to improve relations with Havana, negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a new approach, LeoGrande and Kornbluh uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. They reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, that provides the historical foundation for the dramatic breakthrough in U.S.-Cuba ties.

The U.S. Agency for Internat. Development¿s (USAID) Cuba Program provides assistance to support human rights and promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba. From 1996 through 2008, the program awarded $83 million in grants to nongovernmental org. and univ. In 2006, weaknesses were found that increased the risk of grantees' improperly using grant funds and failing to comply with U.S. laws. In 2008, misuse of grant funds at org. with the program's two largest grants was detected. This report examines: (1) actions that USAID has taken since 2006, or plans to take, to improve its award and oversight of the Cuba Program's grants; and (2) actions that USAID has taken in response to the recently detected misuses of grant funds. Illus.