NEW YORK TIMES BUSINESS BEST SELLER • A suspenseful behind-the-scenes look at the dysfunction that contributed to one of the worst tragedies in modern aviation: the 2018 and 2019 crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX. An "authoritative, gripping and finely detailed narrative that charts the decline of one of the great American companies" (New York Times Book Review), from the award-winning reporter for Bloomberg. Boeing is a century-old titan of industry. It played a major role in the early days of commercial flight, World War II bombing missions, and moon landings. The planemaker remains a cornerstone of the U.S. economy, as well as a linchpin in the awesome routine of modern air travel. But in 2018 and 2019, two crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 killed 346 people. The crashes exposed a shocking pattern of malfeasance, leading to the biggest crisis in the company’s history—and one of the costliest corporate scandals ever. How did things go so horribly wrong at Boeing? Flying Blind is the definitive exposé of the disasters that transfixed the world. Drawing from exclusive interviews with current and former employees of Boeing and the FAA; industry executives and analysts; and family members of the victims, it reveals how a broken corporate culture paved the way for catastrophe. It shows how in the race to beat the competition and reward top executives, Boeing skimped on testing, pressured employees to meet unrealistic deadlines, and convinced regulators to put planes into service without properly equipping them or their pilots for flight. It examines how the company, once a treasured American innovator, became obsessed with the bottom line, putting shareholders over customers, employees, and communities. By Bloomberg investigative journalist Peter Robison, who covered Boeing as a beat reporter during the company’s fateful merger with McDonnell Douglas in the late ‘90s, this is the story of a business gone wildly off course. At once riveting and disturbing, it shows how an iconic company fell prey to a win-at-all-costs mentality, threatening an industry and endangering countless lives.

Written by a crusading former government official, FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE is the book that must be read by everyone who flies. In it is the vital airline safety information the public has a right--and a need--to know: the most dangerous planes and flying conditions; the least secure vs the best equipped airports; which carriers to avoid and why; and ways to help yourseslf increase safety. As Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation from 1990-1996, Mary Schiavo made waves, headlines, and enemies and brought about much needed change during her administration. A former assistant U.S. attorney and licensed pilot, Transportation's "top cop" became concerned early on with what she believed were holes in the aviation safety net and set out to investigate unsettling allegations of fraud, mismanagement, waste, abuse, corruption, and duplicity within the airline industry and the FAA itself. What she uncovered were deep-seated internal policies of denial and cover-up, a shocking lack of concern for public safety and a conscious acceptance of substandard work, parts, maintenance, supervision, and security procedures and practices that have been exposed by dozens of air disasters--including the tragic ValuJet crash in Florida and TWA flight 800 in New York--and which will doubtless be responsible for many more unless Schiavo's warnings are heeded. FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE is your guide to safer, smarter air travel.

Moderate-conservative radio talk show host Michael Smerconish asks theuestion: In a post 9-11 world marked by constant threat of terrorism, why ishe Department of Transportation and the Transportation Securitydministration jeopardising airline security by enforcing outdated screeningegulations that cater to political correctness?

Flying Blind offers an astute analysis of the role of organizational forces in initiating and shaping weapons programs. Michael E. Brown concerns himself with how weapons programs begin and why they turn out as they do. In the process he redresses a large imbalance in our understanding of how nations arm themselves. In an unmatched account constructed from massive archival work and material declassified through the Freedom of Information Act, the author provides a detailed description of all fifteen postwar U.S. strategic bomber programs, from the B-35 to the B-2. Challenging the conventional wisdom about arms races and the weapons acquisition process, Brown marshals compelling evidence that Air Force reactions to strategic developments, not technological opportunism or industry initiative, brought about many major innovations in those programs. He also discusses competing explanations of the cost, schedule, and performance problems that plague U.S. acquisition efforts. He maintains that powerful strategic and bureaucratic forces lead American military organizations to set their performance requirements far beyond the state of the art and to push their programs as fast as possible. This, he argues, is a recipe for disaster. Developing a comprehensive explanation of the cost and performance problems that plague modern weapons programs, he presents policy recommendations designed to address these issues.

In 1970s Chicago, PI Nathan Heller is hired to solve the case of Amelia Earhart, the aviatrix who went missing on her round-the-world flight. A tall order, given the flight took place in 1937, but he succeeds nevertheless.

Flying Blind is a novel of one man’s hazardous journey in South Asia during the Second World War. Flight Officer–Service Pilot Roger Caron joined the army air force even though he was too old to be drafted. He simply couldn’t pass up the opportunity to fly military aircraft. Like many men his age, he became hooked on aviation by Charles Lindbergh’s 1927 solo transatlantic flight. Caron started out flying gliders and pulling weeds for flying lessons. He learned all he could about repairing and piloting airplanes—it was the focus of his life. Through a flying buddy, he met a young girl who worked her way into his heart. She had some health issues and was very young, only sixteen, but they ended up getting married anyway. His passion for aviation often kept them apart while he traveled from place to place, advancing his career. So after he joined the army air force and was sent to war in China, Burma, and India, the separation was just another of many. It was made bearable for Caron because he would be flying—and flying was in his blood. After spending many months enduring the hazards of war, life back home reached across the seas and grabbed him. The story begins with his landing in Calcutta near the end of September 1944. His treacherous assignment was to fly army cargo planes over the towering Himalayas, referred to as the Hump. As a member of the Army Air Force Air Transport Command, he would be supplying war materials and troops to China in support of the Allied effort against the Japanese invaders. Unfortunately, aircraft of that era were poorly suited for the dangerous weather of the cloud-enshrouded mountains, made worse by the region’s lack of sophisticated navigational aids. An equally threatening hazard was the occasional, but lethal Japanese fighter out hunting for unarmed Allied transports. Caron would need skill, tenacity, and a healthy dose of luck to survive his coming ordeal. After a quick turnaround in Calcutta, he found himself a passenger on a C-47 transport on his way to his first duty station in Myitkyina, Burma. This remote outpost had just recently been retaken from the Japanese at great cost by General Stilwell’s army. While landing in Myitkyina, Caron’s plane was strafed by a Japanese Zero and crash-landed. He and the rest of those onboard survived the ordeal, but it was an ominous welcome to his first duty station in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of Operations. On his first flight over the Hump, Caron was copilot on a war-weary olive drab C-47 piloted by one of his tent mates, Bill Lackey, whom he had first met in Myitkyina. Like Caron, Lackey was from Los Angeles, and they’d quickly become friends. Their volatile cargo was high-octane gasoline carried in fifty-five-gallon drums. On this passage through the towering mountains, ice formed on the wings, hailstones hammered the fuselage, and the plane lost altitude. When the crew was nearly ready to bail out, an updraft shot them up and over the dangerous peaks to safety. This trip foretold what most would be like—flying blind through the clouds, on instruments only. On what later became known as Black Friday, Caron and his crew experienced a harrowing ride over the Hump. Upon arrival in Kunming, China, the plane captain tried to delay the return flight to Burma because of the extreme weather and the multitude of maydays called in from other aircraft. Permission was denied, but they were able to stall until the Hump was declared closed. Many planes and crews were lost in the killer storm, and his tent mate and friend, Bill Lackey, was one of those missing. Caron’s luck ran out following a promotion to plane captain. Sitting in the left-hand seat of the cockpit, he and his crew flew mules to China where, just before landing, one of the mules stuck its head through a window. Despite concern of the effect on the plane’s stability under minimum weather conditions, Caron successfully landed the plane. However, on the return leg of the

Flying Blind offers an astute analysis of the role of organizational forces in initiating and shaping weapons programs. Michael E. Brown concerns himself with how weapons programs begin and why they turn out as they do. In the process he redresses a large imbalance in our understanding of how nations arm themselves. In an unmatched account constructed from massive archival work and material declassified through the Freedom of Information Act, the author provides a detailed description of all fifteen postwar U.S. strategic bomber programs, from the B-35 to the B-2. Challenging the conventional wisdom about arms races and the weapons acquisition process, Brown marshals compelling evidence that Air Force reactions to strategic developments, not technological opportunism or industry initiative, brought about many major innovations in those programs. He also discusses competing explanations of the cost, schedule, and performance problems that plague U.S. acquisition efforts. He maintains that powerful strategic and bureaucratic forces lead American military organizations to set their performance requirements far beyond the state of the art and to push their programs as fast as possible. This, he argues, is a recipe for disaster. Developing a comprehensive explanation of the cost and performance problems that plague modern weapons programs, he presents policy recommendations designed to address these issues.