This book contains the papers, comments, and the discussion at a conference on "Flexible Exchange Rates and Stabilization Policy", held at Saltsjobaden, Stockholm, August 26–27, 1975. The papers integrate the flexible exchange rates theory with macro theory and stabilization policy analysis. .

Most trade is invoiced in very few currencies. Despite this, the Mundell-Fleming benchmark and its variants focus on pricing in the producer’s currency or in local currency. We model instead a ‘dominant currency paradigm’ for small open economies characterized by three features: pricing in a dominant currency; pricing complementarities, and imported input use in production. Under this paradigm: (a) the terms-of-trade is stable; (b) dominant currency exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices is high regardless of destination or origin of goods; (c) exchange rate pass-through of non-dominant currencies is small; (d) expenditure switching occurs mostly via imports, driven by the dollar exchange rate while exports respond weakly, if at all; (e) strengthening of the dominant currency relative to non-dominant ones can negatively impact global trade; (f) optimal monetary policy targets deviations from the law of one price arising from dominant currency fluctuations, in addition to the inflation and output gap. Using data from Colombia we document strong support for the dominant currency paradigm.

Volatile exchange rates and how to manage them are a contentious topic whenever economic policymakers gather in international meetings. This book examines the broad parameters of exchange rate policy in light of both high-powered theory and real-world experience. What are the costs and benefits of flexible versus fixed exchange rates? How much of a role should the exchange rate play in monetary policy? Why don't volatile exchange rates destabilize inflation and output? The principal finding of this book is that using monetary policy to fight exchange rate volatility, including through the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime, leads to greater volatility of employment, output, and inflation. In other words, the "cure" for exchange rate volatility is worse than the disease. This finding is demonstrated in economic models, in historical case studies, and in statistical analysis of the data. The book devotes considerable attention to understanding the reasons why volatile exchange rates do not destabilize inflation and output. The book concludes that many countries would benefit from allowing greater flexibility of their exchange rates in order to target monetary policy at stabilization of their domestic economies. Few, if any, countries would benefit from a move in the opposite direction.

This book provides an empirical analysis of economic and political structures impacting the CFA franc zone. Concise and practical chapters explore the history of the CFA franc zone, challenges to development, geopolitical issues, the importance of flexible exchanges rates, growth trends, and the impact of the Covid crisis. Policy reform is examined to detail economic approaches that could reduce poverty and increase the quality of life within the area. This book aims to present a macroeconomic and exchange rate framework to promote development and post-Covid recovery within the CFA franc zone. It will be of interest to students, researchers, and policymakers involved in African economics, the political economy, and development economics.

''In summary, the book is valuable as a textbook both at the advanced undergraduate level and at the graduate level. It is also very useful for the economist who wants to be brought up-to-date on theoretical and empirical research on exchange rate behaviour.'' ""Journal of International Economics""

Helmut Schneider 1. The Formulation of the Research Programme 1. In the late sixties the acceleration of US inflation revived the discussion of the fifties about the superiority of flexible exchange rates: The US balance of payments deteriorated since 1965, the dollar shortage after World War II changed to a dollar surplus. The import of US inflation by their main trading partners intensified political pressures so that at the beginning of the seventies most leading countries decided, contrary to the rules of the Bretton Woods agreement, to stop their intervention in the market for foreign exchange and to let the exchange rates be determined by market forces. It is worthwhile recalling that at that time one had only very limited experience with the regime of flexible exchange rates: The most important case, the floating of Canadian against the US dollar, could not be generalized to a world where nearly all important countries adhered to the regime of flexible exchange rates. ! - But one really had rich experience with destabilizing capital flows (or "hot money") that forced monetary authorities to adjust exchange rates in a system of managed flexibility to the expecta tions of "speculators".