Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.

Developing an Anti-Fragile Faith Violence against Christ-followers is increasing globally. The lived reality for many Christians involves daily threats, risks, and persecution. When evil casts its shadow on us, and we’re tempted to despair, it is vital to develop anti-fragile faith and the guts to endure in hard places. Facing Fear is a practical guide for believers who long to have bold, mature courage. Cultivating this courage is necessary to endure wisely for Christ’s sake. Anna Hampton integrates exegesis and psychology to explain how humans respond to fear and how the Holy Spirit enables us to make a different choice than our normal. Learning to face our fears, name them, and manage them requires learning specific steps to reduce their impact on us. This book is a pastoral and practical resource for those working to advance the gospel in the world’s most dangerous places. You’ll gain valuable skills to become “shrewd as a serpent” and stand with unshakable faith in unsafe situations. Risk can be an offering of worship. Jesus is worthy of whatever pain you go through, whatever loss you experience, and whatever fears you have.

This report describes research to quantify the "rescuability window" of downed aircrews to assist the U.S. Air Force's reassessment of its personnel recovery force structure.

Den amerikanske hærs første officielle historiske beretning om operationerne i den anden Irakiske Krig, "Operation Iraqi Freedom", (OIF). Fra forberedelserne, mobiliseringen, forlægningen af enhederne til indsættelsen af disse i kampene ved Talil og As Samawah, An Najaf og de afsluttende kampe ved Bagdad. Foruden en detaljeret gennemgang af de enkelte kampenheder(Order of Battle), beskrives og analyseres udviklingen i anvendte våben og doktriner fra den første til den anden Golf Krig.

Based on hundreds of oral interviews and unclassified documents, this study offers a comprehensive chronological narrative of the first four years of Operation Enduring Freedom.

During the more than three decades that have elapsed since the war in Vietnam ended, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have progressively developed a remarkable degree of harmony in the integrated conduct of aerial strike operations. That close harmony stands in sharp contrast to the situation that prevailed throughout most of the Cold War, when the two services lived and operated in wholly separate physical and conceptual worlds, had distinct and unique operating mindsets and cultures, and could claim no significant interoperability features to speak of. Once the unexpected demands of fighting a joint littoral war against Iraq in 1991 underscored the costs of that absence of interoperability, however, both the Air Force and the Navy quickly came to recognize and embrace the need to change their operating practices to accommodate the demise of the Soviet threat that had largely determined their previous approaches to warfare and to develop new ways of working with each other in the conduct of joint air operations to meet a new array of post-Cold War challenges around the world. This monograph describes the evolution of Air Force and Navy integration in aerial strike warfare from the time of the Vietnam War, when any such integration was virtually nonexistent, to the contemporary era when Air Force and Navy air combat operations have moved ever closer to a point where they can be said to provide both a mature capability for near-seamless joint-force employment and a role model for other possible types of closer Air Force and Navy force integration in areas where the air and maritime operating domains intersect.

For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.