This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. Building on earlier work, this text combines theoretical perspectives with empirical work, to provide a comparative analysis of the electoral systems, party systems and governmental systems in the ethnic republics and regions of Russia. It also assesses the impact of these different institutional arrangements on democratization and federalism, moving the focus of research from the national level to the vitally important processes of institution building and democratization at the local level and to the study of federalism in Russia.

This paper examines how regional disparities have evolved in Russia and how Russia’s system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is managing these disparities. Regional disparities have fallen over the past two decades but remain relatively high. Socioeconomic outcomes remain worse in lagging regions despite faster growth and convergence in income levels. The twin shocks of COVID-19 and lower oil prices appear to have impacted richer regions disproportionately. Compared to other large countries with federal systems of government, Russia stands out with its high reliance on direct taxes as a revenue source for its regions. Transfers from the federal budget to the regions provide some redistribution by reducing the dispersion in real per capita fiscal spending, but also tend to be associated with lower growth. The Russian fiscal system offers degrees of redistribution and risk sharing of around 26 and 18 percent, respectively—with in-kind social transfers contributing the most. Finally, federal transfers in the aggregate tend to be procyclical and are also fairly unresponsive to shocks to regions’ own revenues.

Asking clear, direct and theoretically informed questions about the relationship between federalism, decentralisation and authoritarianism, this book explores the political survival of authoritarian leaders, the determinants of policy formulation and theories of federalism and decentralization to construct new frameworks for studying territorial go

The book offers a comparative analysis of center-region relations in Russia and in China. The authors focus in particular on fiscal ties and incentives, bureaucratic and local government practices, flows of information, and the determinants of divergence between both countries. The book is based on a synthesis of a large body of empirical and theoretical evidence, and will appeal to scholars in public economics, political economy and comparative politics, as well as to students and policy analysts.

A balanced look at Russia's attempts to build capitalism on the ruins of Soviet central planning. Recent commentators on Russia's economic reforms have almost uniformly declared them a disappointing and avoidable--failure. In this book, two American scholars take a new and more balanced look at the country's attempts to build capitalism on the ruins of Soviet central planning. They show how and why the Russian reforms achieved remarkable breakthroughs in some areas but came undone in others. Unlike Eastern European countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic, to which it is often compared, Russia is a federal, ethnically diverse, industrial giant with an economy heavily oriented toward raw materials extraction. The political obstacles it faced in designing reforms were incomparably greater. Shleifer and Treisman tell how Russia's leaders, navigating in uncharted economic terrain, managed to find a path around some of these obstacles. In successful episodes, central reformers devised a strategy to win over some key opponents, while dividing and marginalizing others. Such political tactics made possible the rapid privatization of 14,000 state enterprises in 1992-1994 and the defeat of inflation in 1995. But failure to outmaneuver the new oligarchs and regional governors after 1996 undermined reformers' attempts to collect taxes and clean up the bureaucracy that has stifled business growth.Renewing a strain of analysis that runs from Machiavelli to Hirschman, the authors reach conclusions about political strategies that have important implications for other reformers. They draw on their extensive knowledge of the country and recent experience as advisors to Russian policymakers. Written in an accessible style, the book should appeal to economists, political scientists, policymakers, businesspeople, and all those interested in Russian politics or economics.

Fiscal Federalism 2022 surveys recent trends and policies in intergovernmental fiscal relations and subnational government. Accessible and easy-to-read chapters provide insight into: good practices in fiscal federalism; the design of fiscal equalisation systems; measuring subnational tax and spending autonomy; promoting public sector performance across levels of government; digitalisation challenges and opportunities; the role of subnational accounting and insolvency frameworks; funding and financing of local government public investment; and early lessons from the COVID-19 crisis for intergovernmental fiscal relations.

A penetrating look into the extreme plutocracy Vladimir Putin has created and its implications for Russia’s future This insightful study explores how the economic system Vladimir Putin has developed in Russia works to consolidate control over the country. By appointing his close associates as heads of state enterprises and by giving control of the FSB and the judiciary to his friends from the KGB, he has enriched his business friends from Saint Petersburg with preferential government deals. Thus, Putin has created a super wealthy and loyal plutocracy that owes its existence to authoritarianism. Much of this wealth has been hidden in offshore havens in the United States and the United Kingdom, where companies with anonymous owners and black money transfers are allowed to thrive. Though beneficial to a select few, this system has left Russia’s economy in untenable stagnation, which Putin has tried to mask through military might.