Several European Union countries have recently implemented or are envisaging fiscal that operations improve budgetary figures but have no structural impact on government finances. This paper evaluates some of these measures using a balance sheet approach. In particular, it examines the degree to which reductions in government debt in EU countries has been accompanied by a decumulation of government assets. In the run-up to Maastricht (1997) it finds a strong correlation between changes in government liabilities and government assets, and larger declines in government assets in countries starting from higher public debt levels.

This paper assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of fiscal institutions in ten Southeastern European countries, using recent benchmarking methodologies developed by FAD. The assessment evaluates each country’s understanding of the scale of the fiscal adjustment challenge, its ability to develop a credible consolidation strategy, and its capacity to implement the strategy. Key institutional arrangements, are generally in place, including top-down budgeting and medium-term budget frameworks. Other institutional arrangements require further attention, including macro-fiscal forecasting, fiscal risk analysis, setting fiscal objectives, presence and role of independent fiscal agencies, and top-down parliamentary approval.

What are fiscal policy rules? What are the principal benefits and drawbacks associated with various fiscal rules, particularly compared with alternative approaches to fiscal adjustment? Can fiscal rules contribute to long-run sustainability and welfare without sacrificing short-run stabilization? If so, what characteristics of fiscal rules make this contribution most effective? And in what circumstances and contexts, if any should the IMF encourage its member countries to adopt fiscal rules? This paper seeks to identify sensible fiscal policy rules that can succeed, if chosen by a member country, as an alternative to descretionary fiscal rules.

The pamphlet (which updates the 1995 Guidelines for Fiscal Adjustment) presents the IMF’s approach to fiscal adjustment, and focuses on the role that sound government finances play in promoting macroeconomic stability and growth. Structured around five practical questions—when to adjust, how to assess the fiscal position, what makes for successful adjustment, how to carry out adjustment, and which institutions can help—it covers topics such as tax policies, debt sustainability, fiscal responsibility laws, and transparency.

This paper provides evidence of fiscal procyclicality, excessive deficits, distorted budget composition and poor compliance with fiscal rules in the euro area. Our analysis relies on real-time data for 19 countries participating in the euro area over 1999–2015. We look for, but do not find, conclusive evidence of bias in procedures in relation to country size. The paper also briefly reviews the literature on political economy factors and policy biases, and offers some reflections on the euro area architecture.