In weak intellectual property rights (IPR) environments, the imitation of proprietary technology by domestic firms has become a deterrent for foreign investment. Different multinationals may view this deterrent differently. This paper develops a model where firms with more technology are less likely to invest in weak IPR environments. If imitation is costly, the model predicts that multinationals with the lowest level and highest level of technology will invest in weak IPR environments, and multinationals with a moderate level of technology will invest only in strong IPR environments. Empirical analysis with firm level data is consistent with this non-monotonicity result.

We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.

Strategy scholars have documented in various empirical settings that firms seek and leverage stronger institutions to mitigate hazards and gain competitive advantage. In this paper, we argue that such “institution-seeking” behavior may not be confined to the pursuit of strong institutions: firms may also seek weak institutions to mitigate hazards. Using panel data from the global smartphone industry and recent patent wars among key industry rivals, we examine how smartphone vendors that are not directly involved in patent litigation strategically respond to increased litigation risks in this industry. We find that as patent wars intensify, smartphone vendors strategically shift more of their business toward markets with weaker intellectual property (IP) protection because of institutional arbitrage opportunities. This shift is more pronounced for vendors whose stocks of patents are small and whose home markets have weak IP systems. Our study is the first to examine the relationship between heterogeneity in national patent systems and firms’ global strategies. It provides a more balanced view of firms’ institution-seeking behavior by documenting how they make strategic use of weaker institutions.

The series of papers in this publication were commissioned from renowned international economists from all regions. They review the existing empirical literature on six selected themes relating to the economics of intellectual property, identify the key research questions, point out research gaps and explore possible avenues for future research.

This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement on multinationals' choice of input suppliers and industry profits in a host economy. The framework consists of suppliers with heterogeneous capabilities who must engage in a relation-specific investment to customize intermediate inputs upon a transfer payment by final producers. An outsourcing contract with better technologically endowed suppliers requires a lower transfer and generates a higher surplus. Stronger IPR enforcement leads firms to self-select into better quality suppliers on average by reducing their outside option. Weak legal institutions instead make it possible for a larger range of suppliers, including the less capable ones, to form partnerships by granting them a larger outside option. A better IPR environment is more likely to harm lagging countries where the technology distribution is characterized by less capable suppliers.

. . . a gratifying collection of informed and engaging contributions. John A. Tessensohn, European Intellectual Property Review The importance of intellectual property rights is now well established as a vital component in the success of firms and nations. The diverse contributors to this volume, drawn from the fields of law, business and economics, clarify and analyze the problems and promise of IP policy from a global perspective. They discuss both developed and emerging nations and advance the understanding of this increasingly important topic. The articles address issues from an interdisciplinary focus with an emphasis on current topical issues. Topics addressed include intellectual rights protection in emerging nations such as China, an exploration of a specific cross-national intellectual property perspective, strategies for protecting intellectual property rights, and a guide to understanding emerging and non-western legal systems. A mix of theoretical and practical observations helps the reader navigate the increasingly international topic of intellectual property as well as offers strategies for optimal utilization of intellectual property assets. The volume serves well both as a solution-oriented book and as a tool for facilitating further discussion and analysis in the classroom. Scholars and students in law, business and economics, as well as business practitioners interested in a global perspective on IP policy, will enjoy this book.