To meet the enormous expenses of maintaining its powerful navy, democratic Athens gave wealthy citizens responsibility for financing and commanding the fleet. Known as trierarchs—literally, ship commanders—they bore the expenses of maintaining and repairing the ships, as well as recruiting and provisioning their crews. The trierarchy grew into a powerful social institution that was indispensable to Athens and primarily responsible for the city's naval prowess in the classical period. Financing the Athenian Fleet is the first full-length study of the financial, logistical, and social organization of the Athenian navy. Using a rich variety of sources, particularly the enormous body of inscriptions that served as naval records, Vincent Gabrielsen examines the development and function of the Athenian trierarchy and revises our understanding of the social, political, and ideological mechanisms of which that institution was a part. Exploring the workings, ships, and gear of Athens' navy, Gabrielsen explains how a huge, costly, and highly effective operation was run thanks to the voluntary service and contributions of the wealthy trierarchs. He concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of the relationship between Athens' democracy and its wealthiest citizens.

In The Political Economy of Classical Athens – a Naval Perspective, Barry O’Halloran offers an account of the economic history of classical Athens in which its strategy of naval conquest provided the foundations for a period of unprecedented economic efflorescence.

Research into the mechanisms and the morality of Athenian hegemony is now perhaps livelier than ever. Of particular importance are the methods by which Athens drew money from the Aegean world with which to fund a vast fleet, to facilitate her own demokratia and to create ambitious public buildings still visible today. This collection of new studies, inspired and guided by an internationally-acknowledged authority on ancient finance, Thomas Figueira, by focusing on how Athens raised finance, sheds light on more familiar questions: How oppressive, or otherwise, was Athens to fellow-Greeks and how did her demands vary over time? Contributors here suggest that Athens may have exercised hegemonic ambitions for longer than usually thought, applying greater experience, and more sensitivity to individual communities.

Presents a history of the epic battles, the indomitable ships, and the men--from extraordinary leaders to seductive rogues--who established Athens' supremacy, taking readers on a tour of the far-flung expeditions and detailing the legacy of a forgotten maritime empire.

Historians since Herodotus and Thucydides have claimed that the year 483 BCE marked a turning point in the history of Athens. For it was then that Themistocles mobilized the revenues from the city's highly productive silver mines to build an enormous war fleet. This income stream is thought to have become the basis of Athenian imperial power, the driving force behind its democracy and the centre of its system of public finance. But in his groundbreaking new book, Hans van Wees argues otherwise. He shows that Themistocles did not transform Athens, but merely expanded a navy-centred system of public finance that had already existed at least a generation before the general's own time, and had important precursors at least a century earlier. The author reconstructs the scattered evidence for all aspects of public finance, in archaic Greece at large and early Athens in particular, to reveal that a complex machinery of public funding and spending was in place as early as the reforms of Solon in 594 BCE. Public finance was in fact a key factor in the rise of the early Athenian state - long before Themistocles, the empire and democracy.

"In this book, Hyland examines the international relations of the First Persian Empire (the Achaemenid Empire) as a case study in ancient imperialism. He focuses in particular on Persian's relations with the Greek city-states and its diplomatic influence over Athens and Sparta. Previous studies have emphasized the ways in which Persia sought to protect its borders by playing the often warring Athens and Sparta off each other, prolonging their conflicts through limited aid and shifts of alliance. Hyland proposes a new model, employing Persian ideological texts and economic documents to contextualize the Greek narrative framework, that demonstrates that Persian Kings were less interested in control of the Ionian region where Greece bordered the empire than in displays of universal power through the acquisition of Athens or Sparta as client states. On the other hand, the establishment of "Pax Persica" beyond the Aegean was delayed by Persian efforts to limit the interventions' expense, and missteps in dealing with fractious Greek allies. This reevaluation of Persia's Greek relations marks an important contribution to scholarship on the Achaemenid empire and Greek history, and has value for the broader study of imperialism in the ancient world."--Provided by publisher.