By setting up an Infrastructure Financing Unit, HM Treasury helped reactivate the lending market for private finance projects which was putting government PFI programmes in doubt as a result of the credit crisis. While the extra finance costs for projects in 2009 were value for money in the short term to stimulate the economy, the Treasury should not presume that continuing the use of private finance at current rates will be value for money. In line with policy on acting to stimulate the economy, the Treasury and other government departments gave priority to closing deals at the prevailing market rates, even if this meant the public sector paying more, and the banks carrying less risk. Analysis by the NAO suggests that higher financing costs increased the annual charge of PFI projects by six to seven per cent and that between £500 million to £1 billion of higher cost has been built in over 30 years, partly offset by an increased public sector share of refinancing gains. The NAO also considered whether reconsidering business cases would have improved value for money. The NAO found that this might have put policy objectives to give a boost to the economy at risk and would not have been a reasonable yardstick to assess the protection of value for money. The NAO recommends that there now be a thorough project by project review of the forward programme to apply more exacting and narrower criteria than applied to projects at the height of the crisis

The 2008 credit crisis had an enormous impact on the Government's public infrastructure programme. Severe restrictions on bank lending at that time meant no sizeable Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts could be let. This affected the viability of a large number of infrastructure projects, including school and road building schemes, with a total investment value of over £13 billion. The Treasury's response was to make project finance available by lending public money on the same terms as the banks. However the Treasury did not put pressure on government-supported banks to either make lending available or reduce the extent of increased financing costs. Overall, bank financing costs increased by 20-33 per cent compared to bank charges before the credit crisis. This added £1 billion to the contract price, payable over 30 years, for the 35 projects financed in 2009. Other alternatives to the high cost bank finance were not properly explored during the credit crisis. Greater use of Treasury loans, or direct grant funding, could have put pressure on banks to lower their charges. Neither did the Treasury adequately explore how lower cost finance sources such as life insurance and pension funds could be encouraged to invest more in PFI projects. The Treasury also could have made more use of funding from the European Investment Bank. The appropriate mix of financing sources for future project contracts, including public and private finance, is an issue that needs serious reconsideration.

This report examines the risks and rewards for private equity investors in government private finance projects. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model has been used by governments in some 700 projects over the last 20 years but defects, including failures to demonstrate the value for money case satisfactorily, the use of long inflexible contracts and the costly contracting process, and inefficient pricing of equity have made continuing with the current model unsustainable. The Treasury is currently reviewing the PFI model. It needs to improve flexibility in the way that private finance is used, establishing quicker and more efficient procurement procedures and achieving a better balance between investors' risks and their rewards. Private finance should only be used where it secures real value for money for the taxpayer, not because of definitional statistical incentives to get projects off the balance sheet (only some 20% of long term PFI liabilities are recorded as debt in the national accounts). Business cases must be an unbiased and transparent assessment of the best form of procurement for the particular project being undertaken, taking account of expected tax receipts from alternative options and not adjusting assumptions to bias the outcome of the assessment. The Treasury needs to collect data on investors' experiences and use this information to assess and challenge investors' returns. There needs to be greater transparency over the pricing of contracts, and inefficiencies which add to the cost of private deals, such as long procurement times, need to be addressed.

The last three decades have seen the evolution of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Relationship Contracting (RC) as alternative procurement approaches to traditional methods of delivering public infrastructure. The potential for growth in these new forms of procurement has led to an on-going debate on the nature of requirements, particularly in terms of policy development, encouraging private investment and value for money. A key argument for Governments to procure projects using PPPs and RC is that the process delivers better value for all the stakeholders, including the community and asset end-users. This wide-ranging study of such crucial procurement issues includes international historical context, collaboration and risk management, with a focus on sustainable procurement approaches. The international significance of PPPs and RC procurement is reinforced with case study examples from the UK, Europe, North America, South Africa and the Asia-Pacific. It features cutting-edge research from around the world on subjects such as: Reviews and reflection of the PPP approach Project Alliancing Implementation of RC in developing countries Changes in procurement policy Value for money, collaboration and stakeholder involvement Growth and emergence of PPPs in Asia Risk management Including contributions from some of the world's most prominent academics and practitioners in this field, it is a crucial guide to the strategic choices governments now face for the provision of infrastructure, between using ‘public’ or ‘private’ mechanisms, or a combination of the two.

Lessons from the experience of using PFI can be applied to improve other forms of procurement and help Government achieve its aim of securing annual infrastructure delivery cost savings of £2 billion to £3 billion. To secure the best value for money from all types of procurement, the public sector needs to develop skills the NAO has identified. These are collecting better data to inform decision-making; ensuring projects have the right skills; establishing effective arrangements to test, challenge and, if necessary, stop projects; and using commercial awareness to obtain better deals. The case for using private finance in public procurement needs to be challenged more. Also, privately financed projects will often still be off balance-sheet which may continue to act as an incentive to use PFI. There has not been a systematic value for money evaluation of operational PFI projects by departments. So there is insufficient data to demonstrate whether the use of private finance has led to better or worse value for money than other forms of procurement. The Treasury and departments should identify alternative methods for delivering infrastructure and related facilities services to maximise value for money for government. The NAO welcomes the current plans of the Treasury and Cabinet Office to strengthen project assurance. The report highlights the need for independent challenge capable of stopping projects which do not give the prospect of value for money. This is particularly important as there is still a shortage of the skills needed to manage and oversee complex major projects.

Large-scale infrastructure projects, in sectors such as energy, rail, roads, water, waste, flood defences and digital communications, pose significant challenges. With limited funds available, the government is looking to private companies to wholly own and finance around 64 per cent of the £310 billion expected cost by 2015, with the burden of funding likely to shift towards the public as consumers rather than taxpayers. The first of the risks to achieving value for money is that forecasters might get wrong the need for infrastructure in the long term. Secondly, uncertainty over government policy might lead to deferment or abandonment of projects in the UK for opportunities elsewhere. Thirdly, there is the possibility of a failure to take into account the cumulative impact on consumers. Increasing the burden on consumers may increase the risk of financial hardship, or the need for unplanned taxpayer support. The full impact of spending on economic infrastructure in the years ahead is unclear. While there is information on individual sectors, no overall assessment has been undertaken by government. Taxpayers may be exposed to substantial losses as a result of government guarantees to bear some project risks should they materialize. The NAO has made a series of recommendations to help ensure value for money is achieved. It calls for the Treasury to work with departments and regulators to provide greater clarity for consumers regarding the financial impact of planned infrastructure investment. Where there are limits on affordability and availability of finance, the NAO notes that the Treasury and departments may need to refine their prioritization of infrastructure programmes and projects.