This volume provides a rounded view of financial liberalization after the collapses in East Asia.

Korea's financial development has been a tale of liberalization and opening but the new system has failed to steer the country away from financial crises. This study analyzes the changes in the financial system and finds that financial liberalization has contributed little to grow and stabilize the Korean economy.

Analysis and evidence of how the factors that give rise to boom-bust cycles in fast-growing developing economies also enhance long-run growth. The volatility that has hit many middle-income countries (MICs) after liberalizing their financial markets has prompted critics to call for new policies to stabilize these boom-bust cycles. But, as Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann point out in this book, over the last two decades most of the developing countries that have experienced lending booms and busts have also exhibited the fastest growth among MICs. Countries with more stable credit growth, by contrast, have exhibited, on average, lower growth rates. Factors that contribute to financial fragility thus appear, paradoxically, to be a source of long-run growth as well. Tornell and Westermann analyze boom-bust cycles in the developing world and discuss how these cycles are generated by credit market imperfections. They explain why the financial liberalization that allows countries to overcome imperfections impeding rapid growth also generates the financial fragility that leads to greater volatility and occasional crises. The conceptual framework they present illustrates this linkage and allows Tornell and Westermann to address normative questions regarding liberalization policies.The authors also characterize key macroeconomic regularities observed across MICs, showing that credit markets play a key role not only in boom-bust episodes but in the strong "credit channel" observed during tranquil times. A theoretical framework is then presented that explains how credit market imperfections can account for these empirical patterns. Finally, Tornell and Westermann provide microeconomic evidence on the credit market imperfections that drive the results of the theoretical framework, finding that asymmetries between tradables and nontradables are key to understanding the patterns in MIC data.

The right of governments to employ capital controls has always been the official orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, and the organization's formal rules providing this right have not changed significantly since the IMF was founded in 1945. But informally, among the staff inside the IMF, these controls became heresy in the 1980s and 1990s, prompting critics to accuse the IMF of indiscriminately encouraging the liberalization of controls and precipitating a wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. In Capital Ideas, Jeffrey Chwieroth explores the inner workings of the IMF to understand how its staff's thinking about capital controls changed so radically. In doing so, he also provides an important case study of how international organizations work and evolve. Drawing on original survey and archival research, extensive interviews, and scholarship from economics, politics, and sociology, Chwieroth traces the evolution of the IMF's approach to capital controls from the 1940s through spring 2009 and the first stages of the subprime credit crisis. He shows that IMF staff vigorously debated the legitimacy of capital controls and that these internal debates eventually changed the organization's behavior--despite the lack of major rule changes. He also shows that the IMF exercised a significant amount of autonomy despite the influence of member states. Normative and behavioral changes in international organizations, Chwieroth concludes, are driven not just by new rules but also by the evolving makeup, beliefs, debates, and strategic agency of their staffs.

Can knowledge of financial policies in developing countries over four decades help the socialist economies of Asia and Eastern Europe become open market economies in the 1990s? In all these countries the loss of fiscal and monetary control has often resulted in high inflation that undermines the liberalization process itself. In the second edition of The Order of Economic Liberalization, Ronald McKinnon builds on his influential work on the liberalization of financial markets in less developed countries and outlines the progression necessary to move from a "repressed" to an open economy. New to this edition are chapters that contrast the gradual Chinese approach to liberalizing domestic and foreign trade with the "big bang" approach followed by some Eastern European countries and republics of the former Soviet Union. Financial control and macroeconomic stability, McKinnon argues, are more critical to a successful transition than is any crash program to privatize state-owned industrial assets and the banking system.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil has followed a pattern of economic development inspired by Washington Consensus. This framework includes a set of liberalising and market friendly policies such as privatisation, trade liberalization, stimulus to foreign direct investment, tax reform, and social security reforms. This book assesses the determinants and impacts of financial liberalisation in Brazil considering its two dimensions: the opening up of the balance of payments capital account, and the penetration by foreign bank of the domestic banking sector. The author combines theoretical and empirical analyses. Some make use of mathematical models and/or statistical techniques; however, they are only used when they are strictly necessary to the analysis.