This paper presents the theoretical structure of MAPMOD, a new IMF model designed to study vulnerabilities associated with excessive credit expansions, and to support macroprudential policy analysis. In MAPMOD, bank loans create purchasing power that facilitates adjustments in the real economy. But excessively large and risky loans can impair balance sheets and sow the seeds of a financial crisis. Banks respond to losses through higher spreads and rapid credit cutbacks, with adverse effects for the real economy. These features allow the model to capture the basic facts of financial cycles. A companion paper studies the simulation properties of MAPMOD.

This paper, together with a technical companion paper, presents MAPMOD, a new IMF model designed to study vulnerabilities associated with excessive credit expansions, and to support macroprudential policy analysis. In MAPMOD, bank loans create purchasing power that facilitates adjustments in the real economy. But excessively large and risky loans can impair balance sheets and sow the seeds of a financial crisis. Banks respond to losses through higher spreads and rapid credit cutbacks, with adverse effects for the real economy. These features allow the model to capture the basic facts of both the pre-crisis and crisis phases of financial cycles.

This book on financial crises is written at a time when the whole world is facing another crisis, a different one this time; one that is related to our health, as well as the economy in a painful manner. The first chapter of this book focuses on the economic effects of this crisis with particular emphasis on the financial sector. The remainder of the book presents a selection of readings related to the GFC. These touch upon issues such as corporate governance; the effect of the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on the net-worth of financial and non-financial firms; securitization and why the alchemy “did not work”; and finally, a case-study on Turkey and in particular the Turkish short-term interest rates and exchange rates and their relationship to political developments.

In the years since the subprime financial crisis of 2007–2011, we have learned a number of important lessons about the crisis, and have subsequently applied appropriate legislation, such as increased capital ratios and systematic stress testing, in order to combat it. However, it would be naive to suggest that such measures have put an end to the possibility of future crises. In this book, senior figures in economics, risk Management, and the banking sector use active research and policy debates to offer a wide perspective on what the next financial crisis may look like and what can be done about it from a regulatory point of view. By first exploring issues of macroeconomic policy, and then studying cutting-edge methodologies, challenging important aspects of testing financial practice, this book will be an essential read for all those studying and researching financial crises, financial regulation and macroprudential policy-making.

One of the most puzzling facts in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is that output across advanced and emerging economies recovered at a much slower rate than anticipated by most forecasting agencies. This paper delves into the mechanics behind the observed slow recovery and the associated permanent output losses in the aftermath of the crisis, with a particular focus on the role played by financial frictions and investment dynamics. The paper provides two main contributions. First, we empirically document that lower investment during financial crises is the key factor leading to permanent loss of output and total factor productivity (TFP) in the wake of a crisis. Second, we develop a DSGE model with financial frictions and capital-embodied technological change capable of reproducing the empirical facts. We also evaluate the role of financial policies in stabilizing output and TFP in response to disruptions in financial markets.

This paper estimates a New Keynesian DSGE model with an explicit financial intermediary sector. Having measures of financial stress, such as the spread between lending and borrowing, enables the model to capture the impact of the financial crisis in a more direct and efficient way. The model fits US post-war macroeconomic data well, and shows that financial shocks play a greater role in explaining the volatility of macroeconomic variables than marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shocks.

We estimate a workhorse DSGE model with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. First, we propose a new specification of the occasionally binding constraint, where the transition between the unconstrained and constrained states is a stochastic function of the leverage level and the constraint multiplier. This specification maps into an endogenous regime-switching model. Second, we develop a general perturbation method for the solution of such a model. Third, we estimate the model with Bayesian methods to fit Mexico's business cycle and financial crisis history since 1981. The estimated model fits the data well, identifying three crisis episodes of varying duration and intensity: the Debt Crisis in the early-1980s, the Peso Crisis in the mid-1990s, and the Global Financial Crisis in the late-2000s. The crisis episodes generated by the estimated model display sluggish and long-lasting build-up and stagnation phases driven by plausible combinations of shocks. Different sets of shocks explain different variables over the business cycle and the three historical episodes of sudden stops identified.