Field Manuals serve as the primary means of promulgating military doctrine, tactics and techniques for all parts of the Army. They make available in condensed form, a ready reference in the field to the approved principles, doctrines, and methods that govern the training and employment of the various arms, together with such reference data and regulations that are needed for mobilization, training, and field service.

This book is a partial reprint of U.S. Army manual FM 3-90, July 2001.

A milestone in Army doctrine

Created during WWII by the War Department, the Handbook on German Military Forces was intended to familiarize command staff with nearly every aspect of Hitler's war machine. Originally classified "restricted," the Handbook was created from the best intelligence that the OSS and other military information sources could offer. It contains comprehensive information and analysis of the German military system, and includes chapters on the organization of Wehrmacht field forces, military and auxiliary organizations (including SS and SA), tactics, fortifications and defenses, movement, supply and evacuation. It also contains a description of German uniforms and equipment. This includes mechanized forces and weapons from small arms to mortars, artillery, vehicles and tanks, and rocket weapons. The Handbook's final chapters are devoted to a study of the Luftwaffe, including its chain of command, equipment, training and tactics. While some of the details within this book may bear review in light of history, it remains one of the most comprehensive compendiums of information about the German forces ever assembled. Although it was declassified after WWII, it's never been easy to obtain a copy of this book. This high quality reprint includes all the original text, diagrams and photographs from the final, 1945 revised version of the manual.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.