This publication (Field Manual [FM] 3-60, The Targeting Process) describes the targeting process used by the United States Army. The FM 3-60 is descriptive and not prescriptive in nature. This manual has applicability in any theater of operations. The manual offers considerations for commanders and staffers in preparing for challenges with targeting, yet it is flexible enough to adapt to dynamic situation. FM 3-60 replaces FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. The development and research of FM 3-60 parallels similar ongoing efforts by other Army proponents to develop their own supporting branch doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the division, support brigades, brigade combat teams, and subordinate elements.

Field Manual (FM) 3-60, The Targeting Process consists of five chapters and eight appendices to describe the Army's targeting process. Each chapter and appendix addresses how the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology enhances the targeting process. The D3A is a methodology which optimizes the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fire support, and intelligence from task force to corps level operations. The D3A is described without tying it to specific hardware that will eventually become dated. The Army's targetingprocess consists of time tested techniques organized in a systematic framework.The FM 3-60 addresses how D3A methodology interfaces with the joint targeting cycle, military decisionmaking process (MDMP), and operations process. The joint targeting fundamental principles and doctrinal guidance are also presented in this publication. Successful targeting requires that the leadership team and their staff possess an understanding of the functions associated with the targeting process. The FM 3-60 builds on the collective knowledge, experience gained through recent operations, and numerous exercises. The manual is rooted in time tested principles and fundamentals, while accommodating force design, new technologies, and diverse threats to national security.

ADP 5-0 provides doctrine on the operations process. It describes fundamentals for effective planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and lead forces to mission accomplishment. To comprehend doctrine contained in ADP 5-0, readers should first understand the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0. As the operations process is the framework for the exercise of command and control, readers should also understand the fundamentals of command and control and mission command described in ADP 6-0. Readers must also understand how the Army ethic guides decision making throughout the operations process (see Army doctrine on the Army profession).

Information operations (IO) creates effects in and through the information environment. IO optimizes the information element of combat power and supports and enhances all other elements in order to gain an operational advantage over an enemy or adversary. These effects are intended to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp enemy or adversary decision making and everything that enables it, while enabling and protecting friendly decision making. Because IO's central focus is affecting decision making and, by extension, the will to fight, commanders personally ensure IO is integrated into operations from the start

This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.

This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.

Doctrine provides a military organization with unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. This manual, "Theater Army Operations" (FM3-93), discusses the organization and operations of the theater army headquarters, including its role as the Army Service component command (ASCC) to the geographic combatant commander (GCC) and the relationships between the theater army headquarters and the theater enabling commands. The manual also discusses theater army responsibilities for setting the theater, Title 10 functions and responsibilities, generally referred to as the combatant commander's daily operations requirements, as well as the operational employment of the theater army's contingency command post (CCP) to directly mission command limited types of operations.