This field manual/Marine Corps warfighting publication establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies-some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. The manual begins with a description of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The first chapter includes a set of principles and imperatives necessary for successful COIN operations. Chapter 2 discusses nonmilitary organizations commonly involved in COIN operations and principles for integrating military and civilian activities. Chapter 3 addresses aspects of intelligence specific to COIN operations. The next two chapters discuss the design and execution of those operations. Developing host-nation security forces, an essential aspect of successful COIN operations, is the subject of chapter 6. Leadership and ethical concerns are addressed in chapter 7. Chapter 8, which concerns sustainment of COIN operations, concludes the basic manual. The appendixes contain useful supplemental information. Appendix A discusses factors to consider during the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of a COIN operation. Appendixes B and C contain supplemental intelligence information. Appendix D addresses legal concerns. Appendix E describes the role of airpower. Doctrine by definition is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable worldwide. Thus, this publication is not focused on any region or country and is not intended to be a standalone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doctrine in this publication to the specific circumstances facing them. The primary audience for this manual is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above. This manual applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

Field Manual FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies May 2014 provides doctrine for Army and Marine units that are countering an insurgency. It provides a doctrinal foundation for counterinsurgency and is a guide for units fighting or training for counterinsurgency operations.Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environment where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three.Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two consists of chapters four and five. Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency.Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context,” answers the questions of how and why U.S. forces might get involved in a counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 highlights that there are many different ways U.S. forces could counter an insurgency and that there are a range of various contexts in which an insurgency can occur. Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment,” provides context for an operational environment where an insurgency might be occurring. Chapter 3, “Culture,” describes the role of culture in counterinsurgency operations. Understanding culture is essential in any effort to support a counterinsurgency effort. Culture is of unique importance in understanding an operational environment.Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals,” provides doctrine for understanding the prerequisites of an insurgency and the root causes that allow an insurgency to keep and gain legitimacy. Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics,” provides doctrine for understanding the threat characteristics of an insurgency.Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command,” provides doctrine for executing command and control under the philosophy of mission command. In a counterinsurgency effort, many units may perform many different tasks in decentralized operations. Understanding decentralized operations and ensuring these units are meeting the overall commander's intent is essential for successful counterinsurgency operations.Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations,” provides guidance on how commanders and staffs can work from conceptual planning to detailed planning in counterinsurgency operations. Chapter 8, “Intelligence,” provides considerations for intelligence in counterinsurgency. Because understanding the environment is essential in counterinsurgency, intelligence facilities successful operations.Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency,” provides guidance on how the Army and the Marine Corps directly counter an insurgency at the operational and tactical level. The operational philosophy behind the direct approach is shape-clear-hold-build-transition. Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies,” provides a framework for working with and through a host nation. While the U.S. may provide the primary counterinsurgent forces, it may also work indirectly through the host nation. There are also important indirect enablers.Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces,” provides a foundation for understanding how security cooperation efforts are integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. Whether U.S. forces are, for a time, the primary counterinsurgent forces or they are working indirectly through a host nation, enabling the host nation through security cooperation activities is essential.Chapter 12, “Assessments,” provides doctrine for understanding how a counterinsurgency environment changes and determining if counterinsurgent actions are having an effect on achieving the desired end state. Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations” provides some legal considerations that are important for commanders and staffs to consider in all counterinsurgency operations.

This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.

The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) was published in 2006 and used by the military to consolidate counterinsurgency strategies and tactics and correct the growing military problems in Iraq. However, rather unusually, this military doctrinal publication was also heavily publicized through a wide array of media to the American public giving it an important role in political discourse and the rhetorical history of the U.S. 'war on terror'. Beyond its military application, the FM 3-24 can be understood as a rhetorical device used by the Bush Administration to repair a collapsing 'war on terror' narrative and shore up plummeting public support for the war in Iraq, which had reached its lowest levels at the time of the manual's publication. Still more important is the language in the text itself, which bears a conspicuous tone of benevolence, historically uncharacteristic to military doctrine. Despite this 'spirit of goodwill, ' the FM 3-24, in fact, functions as a segment of the 'war on terror' narrative and an ideological vehicle for American global hegemony directed primarily toward American audiences. This view is justified by three main trends in the text: One, the manual omits mention of, or minimizes, the moral and political impact of military invasions on foreign countries that necessarily precede counterinsurgency operations; two, it relies fundamentally on legal arrangements with occupied countries that favor American prerogatives; and three, it reduces counterinsurgencies to a simple dichotomy between good and evil, the latter role being assigned to anyone who opposes the United States, which therefore denies the political complexities of that opposition. The FM 3-24 is a prescriptive document that has been 1) designed to militarily extend or reinforce American global power through counterinsurgency operations and 2) used politically to reproduce or justify particular attitudes in the American public that will foster support for those operations.

This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)-an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written in 2006, is a guide for the Army and Marine Corps to all counterinsurgency tactics and operations, designed for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first manual on counterinsurgency in 20 years for the Army and 25 years for the Marines, this book contains information on intelligence, integration of civilian activities, campaign design, execution, security, and sustainability, among other things. A fascinating read for anyone interested in military history and tactics. The U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, also known as TRADOC, was founded in 1973, to train the soldiers and civilian leaders of the U.S. Army, to develop operational policy, and to anticipate future operational needs of the Army. The U.S. MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND is responsible for training and indoctrinating the Marine Corps, cultivating war fighting abilities to make marines ready for combat. Training areas include leadership, education, organization, and requirements development.

"Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction in counterinsurgency is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their existing core competencies or operate in environments that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies, which are not accustomed to working together, makes coordination difficult. And all this must take place in an environment where an armed, violent foe, who understands the disadvantage to him of a successful reconstruction effort, is determined to go to almost any length to resist progress or destroy what has been accomplished. If the counterinsurgent understands what needs to be accomplished and to what end, and he has a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to execute that plan, reconstruction can indeed then become one of the array of key weapons that do not shoot that are available to the counterinsurgent. Even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter as well as the hunted. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to a manageable security environment and strong national institutions that have the confidence and the support of the people. But reconstruction that is mismanaged, bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent."--Page xiii.