This book, first published in 2005, develops a comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the two factors conflict depends on four factors: the individual electoral interests, a shared intergovernmental fiscal system, the manner in which regional interests are represented in national policy making and the levers of partisan influence national leaders have over subnational politicians. In testing the argument with a combination of cross-sectional time-series and case study analysis, this book contributes to the broad literatures on development and the comparative political economy of federalism and decentralization.

!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN" meta name="generator" content="HTML Tidy, see www.w3.org" Federalism is at once a set of institutions -- the division of public authority between two or more constitutionally defined orders of government -- and a set of ideas which underpin such institutions. As an idea, federalism points us to issues such as shared and divided sovereignty, multiple loyalties and identities, and governance through multi-level institutions. Seen in this more complex way, federalism is deeply relevant to a wide range of issues facing contemporary societies. Global forces -- economic and social -- are forcing a rethinking of the role of the central state, with power and authority diffusing both downwards to local and state institutions and upwards to supranational bodies. Economic restructuring is altering relationships within countries, as well as the relationships of countries with each other. At a societal level, the recent growth of ethnic and regional nationalisms -- most dramatically in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in many other countries in western Europe and North America -- is forcing a rethinking of the relationship between state and nation, and of the meaning and content of 'citizenship.' Rethinking Federalism explores the power and relevance of federalism in the contemporary world, and provides a wide-ranging assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, and potential in a variety of contexts. Interdisciplinary in its approach, it brings together leading scholars from law, economics, sociology, and political science, many of whom draw on their own extensive involvement in the public policy process. Among the contributors, each writing with the authority of experience, are Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and Jacques Pelkmans on the European Union, Paul Chartrand on Aboriginal rights, Samuel Beer on North American federalism, Alan Cairns on identity, and Vsevolod Vasiliev on citizenship after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The themes refracted through these different disciplines and political perspectives include nationalism, minority protection, representation, and economic integration. The message throughout this volume is that federalism is not enough -- rights protection and representation are also of fundamental importance in designing multi-level governments.

What is the price of federalism? Does it result in governmental interconnections that are too complex? Does it create overlapping responsibilities? Does it perpetuate social inequalities? Does it stifle economic growth? To answer these questions, Paul Peterson sets forth two theories of federalism: functional and legislative. Functional theory is optimistic. It says that each level of the federal system is well designed to carry out the tasks for which it is mainly responsible. State and local governments assume responsibility for their area's physical and social development; the national government cares for the needy and reduces economic inequities. Legislative theory, in contrast, is pessimistic: it says that national political leaders, responding to electoral pressures, misuse their power. They shift unpopular burdens to lower levels of government while spending national dollars on popular government programs for which they can claim credit. Both theories are used to explain different aspects of American federalism. Legislative theory explains why federal grants have never been used to equalize public services. Elected officials cannot easily justify to their constituents a vote to shift funds away from the geographic area they represent. The overall direction that American federalism has taken in recent years is better explained by functional theory. As the costs of transportation and communication have declined, labor and capital have become increasingly mobile, placing states and localities in greater competition with one another. State and local governments are responding to these changes by overlooking the needs of the poor, focusing instead on economic development. As a further consequence, older, big cities of the Rust Belt, inefficient in their operations and burdened by social responsibilities, are losing jobs and population to the suburban communities that surround them. Peterson recommends that the national government adopt p

This collection focuses on the ways in which federalism has affected and been affected by economic reform, especially global integration. The editors and contributors focus in particular on the political economy of institutional and economic change - how the division of authority between national and subnational governments shapes debates over policy changes, as well as how the changing economic environment creates incentives to modify the basic agreements between levels of governments. Each chapter contains a historical overview, and an in-depth account of division of authority, lines of accountability, and legislative, bureaucratic, and other arenas in which the levels of government interact for a particular country. The analyses are based on reform (or non-reform) episodes for each country - most from recent history, but some spanning the century. As a collection, the country studies span a range of developing and industrial countries with varying political systems.

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Comparing Fiscal Federalism investigates intergovernmental financial relations and the current de jure and de facto allocation of financial and fiscal powers in compound states from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. The volume combines theoretical approaches with case studies and involves scholars from various disciplines, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of different approaches, developments and trends. This includes outlining fiscal federalism’s basic principles and overall frameworks, investigating current constitutional/legislative settings and how financial systems function, as well as zooming in on a selection of emerging issues in financial and fiscal relations. The single chapters are based on comparative investigations under the umbrella of a broad definition of fiscal federalism that includes all varieties of federal systems.