Fallujah Redux is the first book about the Fallujah Awakening written by Operation Iraqi Freedom military veterans who served there, providing a comprehensive account of the turning of Fallujah away from the al-Qaeda insurgency in 2007. The city of Fallujah will long be associated with some of the worst violence and brutality of the Iraq War. Initially occupied by U.S. forces in 2003, it eventually served as the headquarters for numerous insurgent groups operating west of Baghdad, including al-Qaeda in Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, until forcibly retaken at the end of 2004. Once the city was finally cleared, U.S. forces settled into the routine of waging a low-intensity warfare campaign against insurgent forces and trying to set the conditions for Iraqi government control. Even though U.S. forces were winning tactically, they struggled with a population that still strongly supported the insurgency. By the middle of 2007, four years after the initial invasion of Iraq, the city of Fallujah and its surrounding countryside were still mired in a seemingly intractable insurgency. As Anbar Province’s tribes began to turn against al-Qaeda, Fallujah’s residents were waiting for the movement to push eastward to help them eliminate al-Qaeda but they needed the help of U.S. forces. A concerted pacification campaign, in coordination with tribal efforts, was implemented by U.S. and Iraqi security forces that fundamentally altered local security conditions in Fallujah. This book describes the campaign that turned Fallujah from a perennial insurgent hotspot to an example of what can be achieved by the right combination of leadership and perseverance. Many books have told of the major battles in Fallujah—this book tells the rest of the story that never made the news.

Fallujah Redux is the first book about the Fallujah Awakening written by Operation Iraqi Freedom military veterans who served there, providing a comprehensive account of the turning of Fallujah away from the al-Qaeda insurgency in 2007. The city of Fallujah will long be associated with some of the worst violence and brutality of the Iraq War. Initially occupied by U.S. forces in 2003, it eventually served as the headquarters for numerous insurgent groups operating west of Baghdad, including al-Qaeda in Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, until forcibly retaken at the end of 2004. Once the city was finally cleared, U.S. forces settled into the routine of waging a low-intensity warfare campaign against insurgent forces and trying to set the conditions for Iraqi government control. Even though U.S. forces were winning tactically, they struggled with a population that still strongly supported the insurgency. By the middle of 2007, four years after the initial invasion of Iraq, the city of Fallujah and its surrounding countryside were still mired in a seemingly intractable insurgency. As Anbar Province's tribes began to turn against al-Qaeda, Fallujah's residents were waiting for the movement to push eastward to help them eliminate al-Qaeda but they needed the help of U.S. forces. A concerted pacification campaign, in coordination with tribal efforts, was implemented by U.S. and Iraqi security forces that fundamentally altered local security conditions in Fallujah. This book describes the campaign that turned Fallujah from a perennial insurgent hotspot to an example of what can be achieved by the right combination of leadership and perseverance. Many books have told of the major battles in Fallujah--this book tells the rest of the story that never made the news.

This book provides an analysis of how penal discourses are used to legitimate post-Cold War military interventions through three main case studies: Kosovo, Iraq and Libya. These cases reveal the operation of diverse modalities of punishment in extending the ambit of international liberal governance. The argument starts from an analysis of these discourses to trace the historical arc in which military interventions have increasingly been launched through reference to both the human rights discourse and humanitarian sentiments, and a desire to punish the perpetrators. The book continues with the analysis of practices involved in the post-intervention phase, looking at the ways in which states have been established as modes of governance (Kosovo), how punitive atmospheres have animated soldiers’ violence in the conduct of war (Iraq), and finally how interventions can expand moral control and a system of devolved surveillance in conjunction with both border control and the engagement of the International Criminal Court (Libya). In all these case, tensions and ambiguities emerge. These practices underscore how punitive intents were also present in the expansion of liberal governance, demonstrating how the rhetoric of punishment was useful in legitimating Western state powers and recomposing the borders of the liberal world at the periphery. War as Protection and Punishment ends with a number of critical comments on the diffusion of punitive discourse in the international arena, considering how issues of crime and justice have also animated, at least in part, the current engagement with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An accessible and compelling read, this book will appeal to students and scholars of criminology, sociology, politics and those interested in how penal discourses are used to legitimize military conventions.

"Our Latest Longest War is a chronicle of how, why, and in what ways the war in Afghanistan failed. Edited by historian and Marine lieutenant colonel Aaron B. O'Connell, the essays collected here represent nine different perspectives on the war--all from veterans of the conflict, both American and Afghan."--Book jacket.

This path-breaking collection of papers examines the phenomenon of jihadist insurgent movements in the Middle East and North, East and West Africa. It argues that military and strategic analysts have paid insufficient attention to the phenomenon of jihadism in insurgent movements, partly due to a failure to take the role of religion sufficiently seriously in the ideological mobilisation of recruits by guerrilla movements stretching back to the era of "national liberation" after World War Two. Several essays in the collection examine Al Qaeda and ISIL as military as well as political movements while others assess Boko Haram in West Africa, Al Shabaab in Somalia and jihadist movements in Libya. Additionally, some authors discuss the recruitment of foreign fighters and the longer-term terrorist threat posed by the existence of jihadist movements to security and ethnic relations in Europe Overall, this volume fills an important niche between studies that look at Islamic fundamentalism and "global jihad" at the international level and micro studies that look at movements locally. It poses the question whether jihadist insurgencies are serious revolutionary threats to global political stability or whether, like Soviet Russia after its initial revolutionary phase of the 1920s, they can be ultimately contained by the global political order. The volume sees these movements as continuing to evolve dynamically over the next few years suggesting that, even if ISIL is defeated, the movement that brought it into being will still exist and very probably morph into new movements. Jihadist Insurgent Movements was originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.