A highly illustrated account of the daring German assault by Heersgruppe A through Holland and Belgium in May 1940. The great blitzkrieg campaign of May/June 1940 saw German forces pour through Holland and Belgium to confront the French and British. The assault was audacious; it relied on speed, feinting and manoeuvre as much as superior force, and in the end these qualities were to prove decisive to German success. Featuring vivid illustrations, illuminative bird's eye views and maps, this book charts the unfolding of an unprecedented 'lightning war', which saw the first ever airborne assault at a strategic level, and the largest clash of armour to date. Never in the history of warfare had the clash between such large, powerful, and apparently equal forces been decided so swiftly and conclusively.

The objective of this study is to determine if the German “blitzkrieg” and Fall Gelb of 1940 were an expression of operational art. Despite the mythology surrounding Fall Gelb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germans. Fall Gelb was not an expression of operational art. This conclusion is based upon an analysis using the approaches posed by U.S. Army and joint doctrine, Dr. James Schneider and Dr. Shimon Naveh. The purpose of this study is to examine more closely what is meant by “operational art” and to use those contemporary insights to re-examine German military operations in France in May 1940, Fall Gelb. Fall Gelb was chosen because it is a campaign that is frequently studied and often used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. The study of the Fall Gelb campaign offers a glimpse of past operations through the lens of contemporary thought. That study provides the contemporary military professional an opportunity to improve his understanding of operational art through the study of a historical campaign.

Here, for the first time in English, is an illuminating new German perspective on the decisive Blitzkrieg campaign of 1940. Karl-Heinz Frieser's account provides the definitive explanation for Germany's startling success and the equally surprising and rapid military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent. In a little over a month, Germany decisively defeated the Allies in battle, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I. First published in 1995 as the official German history of the 1940 campaign in the west, the book goes beyond standard explanations to show that German victory was not inevitable and French defeat was not preordained. Contrary to the usual accounts of the campaign, Frieser illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign planning was sound. The key to victory or defeat, he argues, was the execution of operational plans—both preplanned and ad hoc—amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war. Frieser shows why on the eve of the campaign the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them. This study explodes many of the myths concerning German Blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. A groundbreaking new interpretation of a topic that has long interested students of military history, it is being published in cooperation with the Association of the U.S. Army

A “masterly account” of the juggernaut offensive that conquered France—but also marked the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany in World War II (Kirkus Reviews). In the spring of 1940, the German forces launched an attack on France that combined superb intelligence, cutting edge strategy, and new technology—the blitzkrieg, or “lightning war.” In just six weeks, it would achieve what their fathers had failed to do in all four years of the First World War. It was a stunning victory. But here, leading British military historian and academic Lloyd Clark argues that much of our understanding of this victory is based on myth. Far from being a foregone conclusion, Hitler’s plan could easily have failed had the Allies been even slightly less inept or the Germans less fortunate. The Germans recognized that success depended not only on surprise, but also avoiding a protracted struggle for which they were not prepared—making defeat a very real possibility. Their surprise victory proved the apex of their achievement; far from being undefeatable, Clark argues, the Battle of France revealed Germany and its armed forces to be highly vulnerable. And Hitler dismissed this fact as he planned his next move—and greatest blunder: the invasion of the Soviet Union. In this eye-opening reassessment, complete with maps and illustrations, Clark “presents a well-balanced narrative that highlights the knife-edge victory of the German forces” and reveals how very close the Nazi war machine came to catastrophe in the early days of World War II (New York Journal of Books).

Even after the legendary evacuation from Dunkirk in June 1940 there were still large British formations fighting the Germans alongside their French allies. After mounting a vigorous counterattack at Abbeville and then conducting a tough defence along the Somme, the British were forced to conduct a second evacuation from the ports of Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest and St Nazaire. While France was in its death throes, politicians and soldiers debated what to do – flee to England or North Africa, or seek an armistice. Case Red captures the drama of the final three weeks of military operations in France in June 1940, and explains the great impact it had on the course of relations between Britain and France during the remainder of the war. It also addresses the military, political and human drama of France's collapse in June 1940, and how the windfall of captured military equipment, fuel and industrial resources enhanced the Third Reich's ability to attack its next foe – the Soviet Union.

"The objective of this study is to determine if the German "blitzkrieg" and Fall Gelb of 1940 were an expression of operational art. Despite the mythology surrounding Fall Gelb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germans. Fall Gelb was not an expression of operational art. This conclusion is based upon an analysis using the approaches posed by U.S. Army and joint doctrine, Dr. James Schneider and Dr. Shimon Naveh. The purpose of this study is to examine more closely what is meant by "operational art" and to use those contemporary insights to reexamine German military operations in France in May 1940, Fall Gelb. Fall Gelb was chosen because it is a campaign that is frequently studied and often used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. The study of the Fall Gelb campaign offers a glimpse of past operations through the lens of contemporary thought. That study provides the contemporary military professional an opportunity to improve his understanding of operational art through the study of a historical campaign. Fall Gelb must be analyzed using criteria derived from a modern understanding of operational art to objectively assess the significance of Fall Gelb. There are three distinctive approaches to operational art. One way to approach the problem is to use contemporary doctrine as a yardstick. Contemporary doctrine approaches the issue by using simple definitions and lists to describe the essential elements of operational art. Another approach is that taken by Dr. James Schneider from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Schneider's approach seeks to describe the phenomena associated with the practice of Operation Art. Schneider breaks down operational art into key attributes necessary for the practice of Operational Art. A third approach to the issue is that used by Dr. Shimon Naveh, an Israeli military theorist."--Abstract

Photo chronicle of the German invasion of France in the spring of 1940.