This collection of new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism.

Externalism about knowledge is thriving in contemporary epistemology. Nonetheless, externalism is too often caricatured as merely reliabilism, too often reduced to simply externalism about justification, and rarely considered as a cohesive family of related but importantly different views. Externalism About Knowledge addresses all of these issues by bringing new essays from leading externalist epistemologists working on seven different branches of this tradition: process reliabilism, tracking views, safety views, virtue epistemology, proper functionalism, naturalized epistemology, and knowledge first epistemology. This collection highlights their unity, their differences, their interconnections, and their most recent challenges, developments, and extensions.

Starting in the middle -- Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument -- Locating ourselves in the world -- Notes on models of self-locating belief -- Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability -- Acquaintance and essence -- Knowing what one is thinking -- After the fall.

One of the most provocative projects in recent analytic philosophy has been the development of the doctrine of externalism, or, as it is often called, anti-individualism. While there is no agreement as to whether externalism is true or not, a number of recent investigations have begun to explore the question of what follows if it is true. One of the most interesting of these investigations thus far has been the question of whether externalism has consequences for the doctrine that we have authoritative, a priori self-knowledge of our mental states. The selected works presented in this volume, some previously published, some new, are representative of this debate and open up new questions and issues for philosophical investigation, including the connection between externalism, self-knowledge, epistemic warrant, and memory.

Michael Bergmann provides a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism, developing his theory of justification by imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement.

Duncan Pritchard offers students not only a new exploration of topics central to current epistemological debate, but also a new way of doing epistemology. This advanced textbook covers such key topics as virtue epistemology, anti-luck epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism and attributer contextualism.