We have been asked by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund to undertake an external review of the activities of its Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). This is the second such evaluation in the IEO’s twelve year history. The first review, led by Karin Lissakers (the “Lissakers Report”), was presented to the Board in 2006. That report considered the extent to which the Office had succeeded during its first five years of operation in fulfilling its mandates and made recommendations to enhance its role within the IMF’s institutional architecture. Our report thus focuses on IEO activities since 2006. As set out in the terms of reference of our Panel (see Appendix I), the central objective of this report is to evaluate how well the IEO has met its institutional mandates. The terms of reference, while not constraining the range of issues we could consider, also asks that we “assess the IEO’s effectiveness along several dimensions, including: (i) the appropriateness of evaluation topics; (ii) the independence of the IEO; (iii) the cost-effectiveness of the IEO and its operations; and (iv) the appropriateness and adequacy of the evaluation process including, but not limited to, how IEO recommendations are endorsed by the Board and implemented.”

The IEO of the IMF was created in 2000 to enhance the learning culture of the IMF, to build the IMF’s external credibility by undertaking objective evaluations in a transparent manner, to provide independent feedback to the Executive Board in its governance and oversight responsibilities, and to promote greater understanding of the work of the IMF among its members and the broader public. In the period October 2005-February 2006, the Evaluation Panel assessed how well the IEO meets these objectives, asking at the outset whether the IMF needs an IEO and whether the existing office is adequately independent. The Panel concludes that the IEO has served the IMF well but identifies certain weaknesses and makes recommendations to the IEO and the IMF to address them.

Since October 2012, the Executive Board has discussed two IEO evaluation reports, International Reserves—IMF Concerns and Country Perspectives on December 7, 2012, and The Role of the IMF as Trusted Advisor on February 1, 2013. The Board also discussed the External Evaluation of the IEO on March 21, 2013. In addition, the IEO advanced work on the ongoing “Assessment of Self-Evaluation in the IMF,” which will go forward to the Executive Board in coming months. Following consultations on possible topics, the IEO has also initiated evaluations on IMF forecasting, country statistics, and the IMF’s response to the global financial crisis.

Over the past six months, a key theme has been ensuring strong follow-up to IEO evaluations, a priority stressed by the recently competed External Evaluation of the IEO. Of particular note, the Managing Director has issued a statement highlighting actions planned to strengthen the IMF’s engagement with fragile states following our recent evaluation, and this statement is being presented to the IMFC for endorsement. In addition, the IEO has completed two updates of past evaluations, advanced work on two ongoing evaluations (on IMF financial surveillance and on IMF advice related to unconventional monetary policies), and is now considering its future work program in light of the External Evaluation.

This paper discusses that the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) has also launched three new evaluations—which will analyze the IMF’s role on fragile states, its financial surveillance activities, and its advice on unconventional monetary policies—and two evaluation updates—which will look into the IMF’s exchange rate policy advice and structural conditionality. The evaluation found that, for the most part, the IMF’s euro area surveillance identified the right issues during the pre-crisis period but did not foresee the magnitude of the risks that would later become paramount. The IMF’s surveillance of the financial regulatory architecture was generally of high quality, but staff, along with most other experts, missed the buildup of banking system risks in some countries. The report found several issues with the way decision making was managed by the IMF. In May 2010, the IMF Executive Board approved a decision to provide exceptional access financing to Greece without seeking preemptive debt restructuring, even though its sovereign debt was not deemed sustainable with a high probability.

This paper examines the performance of emerging market economies (EMs) during the recent global crisis and draws policy conclusions. It considers how EMs were affected by the initial impact of the crisis, examines the extent to which they were able to undertake countercyclical policies to moderate the impact, and highlights factors that have influenced the pace and timing of their recovery. Finally, it considers policy challenges facing EMs as the crisis subsides. This paper sheds light on the role of reserves in crises, and provides contextual background for work on the future financing role of the IMF.