The region of the Balkans has become one of the emblematic features of the post-Cold War geography of international relations. Understanding the extension of the European zone of peace to the Balkans is at the heart of this pioneering work into the post-Cold War socialisation of the region. How is peace (i.e. a security-community-order) initiated in the Balkans? Who are the dominant agents of such peace-promotion? What processes suggest the initiation of (lasting) peace in the Balkans? Under what circumstances do regional states comply with international standards? Looking at the order-promoting processes of both the EU and Nato, Emilian Kavalski offers us the first detailed and theoretically-informed comparative analysis of the role played by external actors in the Balkan region as a whole. In doing so, he provides us with an insight into the processes of peace-promotion in general, and the patterns of security-community-building in the Balkans in particular.

This book addresses the potential and limitations of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy in sustaining the expansion of the European security community towards the South Caucasus. The Caucasus’ complex regional security dynamics are a hard test for regional security community building and showcase both the challenges of security provision through liberal reforms and integration and of the interaction between security communities and balance of power. The author begins by conceptualizing security community expansion and then considers the ENP through this perspective, before moving on to individual case studies on Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The book will appeal to both scholars and practitioners interested in European security, the European Union external action, and the post-Soviet space.

This book focuses on the problems of, and prospects for, strengthening the global system of security governance in a manner consistent with the aspirations and practices of the EU. The EU approach to security governance has been successful in its immediate neighbourhood: it has successfully exported its preferred norms and principles to applicant countries, thereby 'pacifying' its immediate neighbourhood and making all of Europe more secure. The EU governance orientation ultimately seeks to enlarge the European security community and expand the geopolitical area within which armed conflicts are inconceivable, and where state and private actors converge around a set of norms and rules of behaviour and engagement. The EU's success along its immediate boundaries has not yet been replicated on a global scale; it remains an open question whether the EU system of governance can be exported globally, owing to different normative structures (for example, a tolerance of armed conflict or non-democratic governance internally), great-power competition (such as US--China), or ongoing processes of securitization that has made it difficult to find a commonly accepted definition of security. Moreover, the EU system of security governance clashes with the continuing unwillingness of other major powers to cede or pool sovereignty as well as varying preferences for unilateral as opposed to multilateral forms of statecraft. This edited volume addresses both the practical and political aspects of security governance and the barriers to the globalization of the EU system of security governance, particularly in the multipolar post-Cold War era. This book will be of great interest to students of security governance, EU politics, European Security and IR in general. James Sperling is Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron, Ohio, USA. Jan Hallenberg is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Security and Strategic Studies, Swedish National Defence College. Charlotte Wagnsson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Strategic and Security Studies at the Swedish National Defence College.

This title was first published in 2000: Both NATO and the European Union are in the early stages of enlargement processes that will see both organizations expand to include a number of former Communist countries from Central Europe. Simultaneously, these processes ignore and exclude the interests and concerns of Russia and Turkey, respectively in the name of European security. Are both of these processes condemned to fail because of what was left out, rather than put in, to the organizational mix of both alliances? Is the leadership of NATO, for example, making the single largest, and costliest, blunder in the history of the organization? And is this being done, as well as that by the European Union, in part because of narrowly-held theoretical perspectives that define security in the most minimalist terms? Too often these processes of enlargement are discussed both out of context and in seclusion from one another, as if neither affects the other in any way, shape or form. This work brings together both processes of enlargement in order to examine whether or not similar mistakes are being made by both organizations, with grave practical consequences. This work will also examine both processes of enlargement from a critical perspective in that it will challenge the theoretically-driven conventional wisdoms of both processes. By doing so, this work will illustrate the need to go beyond these theories of International Relations and advocate the use of a number of non-traditional and very alternative positions that will assist one in developing richer, more comprehensive and inclusive explanations and understandings of these processes, as well as the field of International Relations in general. This work seeks to challenge the current state of International Relations, broadly defined, on its own ground in the hopes of presenting and developing, something newer and exciting for tomorrow.

Many of the US criticisms of Western European reluctance to engage in the 2004 war in Iraq stem from a perception that these governments are 'weak on defence' or unwilling to 'pull their own weight' in the international system. Secretary Rumsfeld pejoratively designated traditional Atlantic Alliance allies as 'Old Europe', to distinguish them from the freshly minted, cooperative states of 'New Europe'. In doing so, Rumsfeld accused 'Old Europe' of yet again relying on the United States to solve shared security problems. This volume critically evaluates the validity of this view of Western European choices and policies. Rather than a primary reliance on military force as first line defence, it proposes that Western European governments are expanding the set of tools they have to apply to the post-Cold War array of security and defence problems. The volume examines the emergent European security approach from multiple perspectives, in multiple institutions and identities, and in different geographic contexts.