This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring a Russian invasion of the Baltic states, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's current posture is weak.

Through a variety of policies and actions--and most recently in a new military doctrine adopted in February 2010--Russia has indicated the types of situations and threats that might cause it to resort to using nuclear weapons. This volume examines Russia's evolving framework for nuclear deterrence and its implications for U.S. military operations in Europe.

"Over the last twenty years, Russia has observed and studied how the US prepares and executes military operations, and it is now time for the US and NATO to recognize how Russia conducts operations to achieve its political objectives. Recent Russian operations provide a sneak peek at how Russia may act in the future in a region that, history has shown, is of particular interest to Russia. The single event which most stoked the fire of conflict between Russia and the Baltic states was the joining of NATO in 2004 by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This paper recommends that NATO and the US implement a portfolio of deterrence measures across all instruments of power that are focused on vulnerabilities within the Baltic states which Russia could capitalize upon to expand its regional influence without triggering an Article 5 response. In the final analysis, the risks of not enacting strong deterrent measures within the Baltic states could prove disastrous not only to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but to the NATO Alliance as well. The US and NATO must make it abundantly clear to Russia that there is a line that cannot be crossed without serious consequences. The cost will be great in both blood and treasure to compel Russia to reverse a move it already made. The implementation of this paper's recommendations will send a crystal clear message to Russia of the US and NATO's full commitment to the Baltic states, their willingness to go to war to defend them, and the enduring strength of NATO's collective security guarantee."--Abstract.

Through a variety of policies and actions--and most recently in a new military doctrine adopted in February 2010--Russia has indicated the types of situations and threats that might cause it to resort to using nuclear weapons. This volume examines Russia's evolving framework for nuclear deterrence and its implications for U.S. military operations in Europe.

This study presents the outcome of a Track II dialogue among civil society leaders, security experts, academics, and government representatives from across the Baltic States, Poland, and the United States who came together to discuss the shared threats and challenges facing NATO’s eastern flank in light of Russia’s aggressive behavior toward its neighbors. The objective of the study was to enhance scholarship on the challenges stemming from the Ukraine crisis and to inform public discussions on the evolving nature and future of security and defense relations among the United States, the Baltic States, and Poland.

"Russia's recent aggression against Ukraine has disrupted nearly a generation of relative peace and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors and raised concerns about its larger intentions. From the perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the threat to the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- former Soviet republics, now member states that border Russian territory -- may be the most problematic of these. In a series of war games conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, RAND Arroyo Center examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games' findings are unambiguous: As presently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Fortunately, it will not require Herculean effort to avoid such a failure. Further gaming indicates that a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades -- adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities -- could suffice to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states"--Publisher's web site.

With the collapse of the USSR and expansion of the Alliance to the east, NATO decided that its defense and deterrence policy will be based on the ability to send reinforcements. No credible scenarios in which NATO’s military could be used for aggression against Russia, yet Russian propaganda presented NATO as a threat. The conflicting visions of Russia and NATO of the security arrangements in Europe increase the risk that Kremlin will provoke a conflict with NATO under the pretext of acting in self-defense to demand the acceptance for Russian sphere of influence.The question asked in this paper is how NATO can deter Russia from provoking a military confrontation with the Alliance. The article argues that, the Alliance will have to base its deterrence on the ability to defend its territory, which requires the ability to maintain political cohesion, respond to conventional escalation and fight a large-scale, high-intensity conventional war. It will also have to be able to deter Russia from the use of nuclear weapons.The paper concludes that strengthened conventional and nuclear deterrence is unlikely to deter Russia from the attempts to exploit political vulnerabilities in member states and in the Alliance as a whole. Russia’s strategic goals will not change as long as the regime defines them in the opposition to the West and NATO is perceived as an obstacle for their achievement.