In this dissertation, we show how the firm can improve its revenue and competitiveness through segmenting the market by exploring consumer heterogeneity. In the first essay, we show that asymmetric assortment breadth among two competing retailers can emerge as an equilibrium when consumers differ in their prior knowledge about their product preferences and their shopping costs. Under this equilibrium, the full line retailer expands the market demand by attracting the uninformed consumers with large shopping costs and the single product retailer passes on the savings from a streamlined assortment to the informed consumers by setting a lower price. Therefore, the two retailers soften the competition between them and both achieve higher profits. In the second essay, we consider a setting in which consumers experience distinct instances of need for a durable product at random intervals and derive random amount of utility from each instance. Consumers are differentiated according to the frequency with which they experience instances of need. For a firm that provides a durable product to such a market, we consider the implications of selling versus renting on a per-usage basis. Selling minimizes transaction costs, but may result in inefficient utilization of units that are produced. Alternatively, per-usage rentals allow more utility to be generated per unit of product that is produced. Focusing on these trade-offs, we identify conditions under which the firm should sell, offer per-usage rentals, or offer a combination of the two. In the third essay, we continue to use the durable good framework to study how various forms of government subsidy programs shift consumer's demand patterns and thus generate different magnitude of additional savings in resource consumption. We give the conditions under which each type of cash rebate programs does the best in generating resource savings per dollar spent.

This dissertation consists of three essays on the implications of consumer heterogeneity and uncertainty for firms' strategies. The first essay analyzes how firms should develop add-on policies when consumers have heterogeneous tastes and firms are vertically differentiated. The theory provides an explanation for the seemingly counter-intuitive phenomenon that higher-end hotels are more likely than lower-end hotels to charge for Internet service, and predicts that selling an add-on as optional intensifies competition, in sharp contrast to standard conclusions found in the literature. The second essay examines how firms should develop product and pricing policies when customer reviews provide informative feedback about improving product or service quality. The analysis provides an alternative view of customer reviews such that they not only can help consumers learn about product quality, but also can help firms learn about problems with their products or services. The third essay studies the implications of cognitive simplicity for consumer learning problems. We explore one viable decision heuristic - index strategies, and demonstrate that they are intuitive, tractable, and plausible. Index strategies are much simpler for consumers to use but provide close-to-optimal utility. They also avoid exponential growth in computational complexity, enabling researchers to study learning models in more-complex situations.

In this paper we explore the underlying consumer heterogeneity in competitive markets for subscription-based IT services that exhibit network effects. Insights into consumer heterogeneity with respect to a given service are paramount in forecasting future subscriptions, understanding the impact of price and information dissemination on market penetration growth, and predicting adoption path for complementary products that target the same customers as the original service. Employing a continuous-time utility model, we capture the behavior of a continuum of consumers who are differentiated by their intrinsic valuations from using the service. We study service subscription patterns under both perfect and imperfect information dissemination. In each case, we first specify the conditions under which consumer rational behavior supported by the utility model can explain a general observed adoption path, and if so, we explicitly derive the analytical closed-form expression for the consumer valuation distribution. We further explore the impact of awareness and distribution skewness on adoption. In particular, we highlight the practical forecasting importance of understanding the information dissemination process in the market as observed past adoption may be explained by several distinct awareness and heterogeneity scenarios which may lead to divergent adoption paths in the future. Moreover, we show that in the later part of the service lifecycle the subscription decision for new customers can be driven predominantly by information dissemination instead of further price markdowns. We also extend our results to time-varying consumer valuation scenarios. Furthermore, based on our framework, we advance a set of heuristic methods to be applied to discrete-time real industry data for estimation and forecasting purposes. In an empirical exercise, we apply our methodology to the Japanese mobile voice services market and provide relevant managerial insights from the analysis.

It focuses on the behavior of consumers and explores the role of heterogeneity in their valuation for the product and cost of purchasing via group-buying in the functioning of group-buying services as a price-discrimination device. Finally, the role of group-buying services in improving channel coordination under asymmetric information is studied in Chapter Four. This analysis shows that the availability of group-buying services provides an opportunity for the manufacturer to reduce the informational rents of the retailer arising from its private information about the market condition. Interestingly, the manufacturer can avoid paying these rents and regains the first-best profitability when asymmetry in information exists regarding the relative sizes of consumer segments. In other settings (e.g., when asymmetric information exists regarding consumers' price sensitivity), leveraging the group-buying mechanism nevertheless allows the manufacturer to design a contract that requires lower rents and improves channel coordination to some extent.

This research review brings together the most influential theoretical and empirical contributions to the topic of trade and inequality from recent years. Segregating the subject into four key areas, it forms a comprehensive study of the subject, targeted at academic readers familiar with the main trade models and empirical methods used in economics. The first two parts cover empirical evidence on trade and inequality in developed and developing countries, while the third and fourth sections confront transition dynamics following trade liberalization and new theoretical contributions inspired by the previously-discussed empirical evidence, respectively. Presented with an extensive original introduction by the editor, Trade and Inequality will be an invaluable tool in the study of this field to advanced undergraduate students, graduate students and faculty alike.