We present the first necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be a unique perfect-foresight solution to an otherwise linear dynamic model with occasionally binding constraints, given a fixed terminal condition. We derive further results on the existence of a solution in the presence of such terminal conditions. These results give determinacy conditions for models with occasionally binding constraints, much as Blanchard and Kahn (1980) did for linear models. In an application, we show that widely used New Keynesian models with endogenous states possess multiple perfect foresight equilibrium paths when there is a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, even when agents believe that the central bank will eventually attain its long-run, positive inflation target. This illustrates that a credible long-run inflation target does not render the Taylor principle sufficient for determinacy in the presence of the zero lower bound. However, we show that price level targeting does restore determinacy providing agents believe that inflation will eventually be positive.

Since its initial publication, this text has defined courses in dynamic optimization taught to economics and management science students. The two-part treatment covers the calculus of variations and optimal control. 1998 edition.

This textbook is aimed at newcomers to nonlinear dynamics and chaos, especially students taking a first course in the subject. The presentation stresses analytical methods, concrete examples, and geometric intuition. The theory is developed systematically, starting with first-order differential equations and their bifurcations, followed by phase plane analysis, limit cycles and their bifurcations, and culminating with the Lorenz equations, chaos, iterated maps, period doubling, renormalization, fractals, and strange attractors.

Game theory is the theory of social situations, and the majority of research into the topic focuses on how groups of people interact by developing formulas and algorithms to identify optimal strategies and to predict the outcome of interactions. Only fifty years old, it has already revolutionized economics and finance, and is spreading rapidly to a wide variety of fields. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games is an assessment of the state of the art in its field and the first modern book on linear-quadratic game theory, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing strategic decision making problems in economics and management. Linear quadratic dynamic models have a long tradition in economics, operations research and control engineering; and the author begins by describing the one-decision maker LQ dynamic optimization problem before introducing LQ differential games. Covers cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and treats the standard information structures (open-loop and feedback). Includes real-life economic examples to illustrate theoretical concepts and results. Presents problem formulations and sound mathematical problem analysis. Includes exercises and solutions, enabling use for self-study or as a course text. Supported by a website featuring solutions to exercises, further examples and computer code for numerical examples. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games offers a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of this extensively used class of economic models, and will appeal to applied mathematicians and econometricians as well as researchers and senior undergraduate/graduate students in economics, mathematics, engineering and management science.

The second edition of a rigorous and example-driven introduction to topics in economic dynamics that emphasizes techniques for modeling dynamic systems. This text provides an introduction to the modern theory of economic dynamics, with emphasis on mathematical and computational techniques for modeling dynamic systems. Written to be both rigorous and engaging, the book shows how sound understanding of the underlying theory leads to effective algorithms for solving real-world problems. The material makes extensive use of programming examples to illustrate ideas, bringing to life the abstract concepts in the text. Key topics include algorithms and scientific computing, simulation, Markov models, and dynamic programming. Part I introduces fundamentals and part II covers more advanced material. This second edition has been thoroughly updated, drawing on recent research in the field. New for the second edition: “Programming-language agnostic” presentation using pseudocode. New chapter 1 covering conceptual issues concerning Markov chains such as ergodicity and stability. New focus in chapter 2 on algorithms and techniques for program design and high-performance computing. New focus on household problems rather than optimal growth in material on dynamic programming. Solutions to many exercises, code, and other resources available on a supplementary website.