Calvinist determinism destroys moral responsibility and makes God the author of sin. These two accusations are not new, and were arguably anticipated by Paul in Romans 9, but they remain today the most important objections offered against Calvinist/determinist views of human free will. This book is a philosophically rigorous and comprehensive defense of Calvinism against these two families of arguments. With respect to human moral responsibility, it discusses whether determinism destroys “free will,” turns humans into pets or puppets, and involves or is analogous to coercion and manipulation. It responds to the consequence argument and direct argument for incompatibilism, the principle of alternate possibilities, the “ought implies can” maxim, and related claims. With respect to the authorship of sin, it discusses whether Calvinist determinism improperly involves God in evil. Does it mean that “God sins,” or “causes sin,” or “wills sin” in problematic ways? “Does God intend our sin, or (merely) permit sin?” In each case the coherence of the Calvinist view is defended against its most potent objections, to reject the claim that Calvinism is “excusing sinners and blaming God.”

Calvinist determinism destroys moral responsibility and makes God the author of sin. These two accusations are not new, and were arguably anticipated by Paul in Romans 9, but they remain today the most important objections offered against Calvinist/determinist views of human free will. This book is a philosophically rigorous and comprehensive defense of Calvinism against these two families of arguments. With respect to human moral responsibility, it discusses whether determinism destroys "free will," turns humans into pets or puppets, and involves or is analogous to coercion and manipulation. It responds to the consequence argument and direct argument for incompatibilism, the principle of alternate possibilities, the "ought implies can" maxim, and related claims. With respect to the authorship of sin, it discusses whether Calvinist determinism improperly involves God in evil. Does it mean that "God sins," or "causes sin," or "wills sin" in problematic ways? "Does God intend our sin, or (merely) permit sin?" In each case the coherence of the Calvinist view is defended against its most potent objections, to reject the claim that Calvinism is "excusing sinners and blaming God."

A collection of seventeen philosophical essays that systematically investigate heaven, or paradise, as conceived within theistic religious traditions.

"A compelling spiritual memoir that traces Bignon's fascinating quest for answers to life's most profound questions." --Lee StrobelGod Wasn't In His Plans Until . . . Guillaume Bignon was a French atheist . . . and he was perfectly happy. He was very successful as a software engineer in finance, a musician, and a volleyball player. Yet a chance encounter with a beautiful woman would change the way he thought about his life and beliefs forever. Confessions of a French Atheistis the unusual story of Guillaume Bignon--a man who didn't need God but who grew to believe in God after he thought through the nature of morality, the relationship between science and faith, the supernatural, and the reliability of the Bible. With rigorous reasoning, remarkable authenticity, and a sense of humor, Guillaume takes the reader on a journey of his innermost questions and surprising discoveries.

Reformed Christians do not believe in free will. This is a common assertion today and it is completely false. The Reformed tradition does advocate free will, just not libertarian free will. A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology explains how the Reformed tradition articulated its view of human freedom and moral responsibility in terms of rational spontaneity. It shows how the Reformed view of rational spontaneity is compatible with contemporary compatibilist and semi-compatibilist views, especially that of guidance control. This work addresses a number of pressing issues in the current academic climate. Is Reformed theology theological determinism? Is it compatibilism? Did Jonathan Edwards part ways with the Reformed tradition? What is the relationship between Reformed theology and contemporary compatibilist and semi-compatibilist positions in analytic philosophy? This book addresses these questions by exegeting the classic Reformed confessions, catechisms, and Reformed scholastics. It sets them in relation to contemporary analytic philosophy. It is an exercise in analytic theology. The reader will come away with a better understanding of how the Reformed viewed free will and moral responsibility in light of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Must we be free to truly love? Evil is a problem for all Christians. When responding to objections that both evil and God can exist, many resort to a "free will defense," where God is not the creator of evil but of human freedom, by which evil is possible. This response is so pervasive that it is just as often assumed as it is defended. But is this answer biblically and philosophically defensible? In God Reforms Hearts, Thaddeus J. Williams offers a friendly challenge to the central claim of the free will defense—that love is possible only with true (or libertarian) free will. Williams argues that much thinking on free will fails to carve out the necessary distinction between an autonomous will and an unforced will. Scripture presents a God who desires relationship and places moral requirements on his often--rebellious creatures, but does absolute free will follow? Moreover, God's work of transforming the human heart is more thorough than libertarian freedom allows. With clarity, precision, and charity, Williams judges the merits and shortcomings of the relational free will defense while offering a philosophically and biblically robust alternative that draws from theologians of the past to point a way forward.

Contrary to what many philosophers believe, Calvinism neither makes the problem of evil worse nor is it obviously refuted by the presence of evil and suffering in our world. Or so most of the authors in this book claim. While Calvinism has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years amongst theologians and laypersons, many philosophers have yet to follow suit. The reason seems fairly clear: Calvinism, many think, cannot handle the problem of evil with the same kind of plausibility as other more popular views of the nature of God and the nature of God's relationship with His creation. This book seeks to challenge that untested assumption. With clarity and rigor, this collection of essays seeks to fill a significant hole in the literature on the problem of evil.