Exchange rate-based inflation stabilization (ERBS) policies are associated with a boom-recession cycle in economic activity and sustained real exchange rate appreciation. A class of models in the literature has explained these empirical regularities with the lack of credibility of the stabilization plans. The lack-of-credibility models typically assume perfectly forward-looking pricing behavior without inflation stickiness and attribute the slow decline in inflation to the consumption boom that occurs due to the perceived temporariness of the ERBS policy. This paper tests the empirical validity of forward-looking pricing behavior in Mexico and Turkey, two countries which have experienced ERBS. It finds that the forward- and backward-looking components of inflation weigh approximately equally in pricing behavior, and therefore, that inflation is partially sticky. The paper then develops the theoretical implications of partial inflation stickiness in a lack of credibility model of ERBS and concludes that the presence of stickiness significantly reduces the persistence of the consumption boom predicted by the model, but helps to explain the recession in the late phase of the stabilization.

Do exchange-rate-based stabilizations generate distinctive economic dynamics? To address this question, this paper identifies stabilization episodes using criteria that differ from those in previous empirical studies of exchange-rate-based stabilizations. We find that, while some differences can be detected between exchange-rate-based stabilizations and stabilizations where the exchange rate is not the anchor, the behavior of important variables does not appear to differ—especially output growth, which is good in both cases. There is also no evidence that fiscal discipline is enhanced by adopting an exchange-rate anchor, or that there are any systematic differences in the success records of stabilizations that use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and those that do not.

This paper examines two important issues for a small high-inflation open economy with trade controls where the government implements an exchange-rate based stabilization program: first, the extent to which the degree of openness of the economy influences the probability of success of the program; and second, the conditions under which a trade reform, implemented in conjunction with the stabilization program, will increase the probability that stabilization will be successful. The paper shows that in an economy with high export and import price elasticities, structural reforms to increase openness can be important in determining the success of the program.

Disinflation programs in chronic inflation countries do not normally follow the usual Phillips curve tradeoff in the medium run. Instead of having a sharp recession in the early stage of stabilization, there often is an initial expansion of output followed by a recession and balance of payments difficulties. This pattern is related to programs that use the exchange rate as an instrument of disinflation.

This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.