Reviews some empirical evidence on the recent performance of alternative exchange rate arrangements in emerging markets. Examines the concrete circumstances under which either polar regime should be adopted. Studies how to make flexibility work in practice, with special attention to inflation targets and alternativie monetary policy rules. Focuses on the possible role of capital controls as a complementary policy.

In the aftermath of the Asian/global financial crises of 1997-98, how should emerging markets now structure their exchange rate systems to prevent new crises from occurring? This study challenges current orthodoxy by advocating the revival of intermediate exchange rate regimes. In so doing, Williamson presents a reasoned challenge to the new prevailing attitude which claims that all countries involved in the international capital markets need to polarize to one of the extreme regimes (to a fixed rate with either a currency board or dollarization, or to a lightly-managed float). He concludes that although there is some truth in the allegation that intermediate regimes are vulnerable to speculative crises, they still offer offsetting advantages. He also contends that it would be possible to redesign them to be more flexible so as to reduce their vulnerability to crises.

With the loss of Soviet control in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the move toward economic liberalization in many developing countries, a huge increase in the number of convertible currencies in the world has occurred. A key aspect of the management of these currencies involves their relationships with the world economy, which is determined

This paper investigates the effects of the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) on the choice of exchange rate regime in emerging markets (EMs), conditional on certain macroeconomic conditions. Using a large sample of EMs and after controlling for the selection bias associated with the adoption of IT, we find that IT countries on average have a relatively more flexible exchange rate regime than other EMs. However, the flexibility of the exchange rate regime shows strong heterogeneity among IT countries depending on their degree of openness and exposure to FX risks. Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of IT adoption on the exchange rate flexibility increases with the duration of the IT regime in place, and with the propensity scores to adopt it.

This paper reviews developments and issues in the exchange arrangements and currency convertibility of IMF members. Against the backdrop of continuing financial globalization and a series of emerging market crises since 1997, there have been important changes in the evolution of exchange rate regimes and the pace of liberalization of current and capital transactions among IMF member countries. There has been a shift away from intermediate regimes according to the IMF's official exchange rate regime classification system based on de facto exchange rate policies. The de facto exchange rate classification system has helped to clarify the nature and role of members' exchange rate regimes. It has facilitated discussions with country authorities about the implementation of exchange rate regimes and hence has contributed to more effective surveillance of the international monetary system. The use of exchange controls appears to have been little influenced by the degree of flexibility of exchange rate regimes or the occurrences of currency crises.

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

This paper examines the role of the exchange rate regime in explaining how emerging market economies fared in the recent global financial crisis, particularly in terms of output losses and growth resilience. After controlling for regime switches during the crisis, using alternative definitions for pegs, and taking account of other likely determinants, we find that the growth performance for pegs was not different from that of floats during the crisis. For the recovery period 2010-11, pegs appear to be faring worse, with growth recovering more slowly than floats. These results suggest an asymmetric effect of the regime during and recovering from the crisis. We also find that proxies of the trade and financial channels are important determinants of growth performance during the crisis, while only the trade channel appears important for the recovery thus far.