The doctrine of judicial recusal enables - and may require - a judge who is lawfully appointed to hear and determine a case to stand down from that case, leaving its disposition to another colleague or colleagues. The subject is one of considerable import and moment, not only to 'insiders' in the judiciary, but also to litigants and their lawyers. Understanding the principles which guide recusal is also to understand the fundamentals of judging in the common law tradition. The subject is therefore of considerable interest both at practical and theoretical levels, for it tells us most of what we need to know about what it means "to be a judge" and what the discharge of that constitutional duty entails. Unsurprisingly therefore, the subject has attracted controversy, and some of the most savage criticisms ever directed at particular judges. The book commences with an introduction which is followed by an analysis of the essential features of the law, the legal principles (common-law origins, the law today in the USA, UK and Commonwealth) and the difficulties which currently arise in the cases and by operation of statute. The third part looks at process, including waiver, necessity, appellate review, and final appeals. Three specific problem areas (judicial misconduct in court, prior viewpoints, and unconcious bias) are then discussed. The book ends with the author's reflections on future developments and possible reforms of recusal law.

The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)

In this famous treatise, a Supreme Court Justice describes the conscious and unconscious processes by which a judge decides a case. He discusses the sources of information to which he appeals for guidance and analyzes the contribution that considerations of precedent, logical consistency, custom, social welfare, and standards of justice and morals have in shaping his decisions.

The rule of law paradigm has long operated on the premise that independent judges disregard extralegal influences and impartially uphold the law. A political transformation several generations in the making, however, has imperiled this premise. Social science learning, the lessons of which have been widely internalized by court critics and the general public, has shown that judicial decision-making is subject to ideological and other extralegal influences. In recent decades, challenges to the assumptions underlying the rule of law paradigm have proliferated across a growing array of venues, as critics agitate for greater political control of judges and courts. With the future of the rule of law paradigm in jeopardy, this book proposes a new way of looking at how the role of the American judiciary should be conceptualized and regulated. This new, "legal culture paradigm" defends the need for an independent judiciary that is acculturated to take law seriously but is subject to political and other extralegal influences. The book argues that these extralegal influences cannot be eliminated but can be managed, by balancing the needs for judicial independence and accountability across competing perspectives, to the end of enabling judges to follow the "law" (less rigidly conceived), respect established legal process, and administer justice.