When Barack Obama entered the White House, he followed a long-standing precedent for the development and implementation of major policies by appointing administrators—so-called policy czars—charged with directing the response to the nation’s most pressing crises. Demonstrating that the creation of policy czars is a strategy for combating partisan polarization and navigating the federal government’s complexity, Vaughn and Villalobos offer a sober, empirical analysis of what precisely constitutes a czar and what role they have played in the modern presidency.

Distrust of government is a natural response to a controlling and out-of-control bureaucracy. The motivation for protest and reform is not animosity towards government and its legitimate functions, but a love of America and a passionate desire to pass on to the next generation the innumerable blessings of liberty. Citizens are frightened by the governments relentless growth, unsustainable debt trajectory, culture of corruption, and encroachment of individual rights.... Critics of the tea party movement attempt to derail it with meritless claims of racism, extremism, bigotry, conspiracy, class-warfare and malice. The claims are ridiculous. Tea party participants include members of every party, social class, ethnicity, age and gender; they hold varying views on a number of issues, but share a deep appreciation for the limited, constitutional government established by Americas founders. They see Washingtons profligate spending, imperious unaccountability, and reprobate political environment as symptoms of a federal government that recognizes no limitations on its power. They feel a civic responsibility to speak out and to work toward a return to constitutional governance and sound fiscal policy. This is not a book about the tea party movement. It is a book about the political, economic and cultural upheavals fueling the movement: the insanely escalating national debt; the increasingly coercive and contemptuous political establishment; the arrogant failure of true political leadership; and the pervasive assault on the society-sustaining virtues of truth, trust, integrity, morality, freedom, and civility.

The scope of presidential authority has been a constant focus of constitutional dispute since the Framing. The bases for presidential appointment and removal, the responsibility of the Executive to choose between the will of Congress and the President, the extent of unitary powers over the military, even the ability of the President to keep secret the identity of those consulted in policy making decisions have all been the subject of intense controversy. The scope of that power and the manner of its exercise affect not only the actions of the President and the White House staff, but also all staff employed by the executive agencies. There is a clear need to examine the law of the entire executive branch. The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power, places the law of the executive branch firmly in the context of constitutional language, framers' intent, and more than two centuries of practice. In this book, Louis Fisher strives to separate legitimate from illegitimate sources of power, through analysis that is informed by litigation as well as shaped by presidential initiatives, statutory policy, judicial interpretations, and public and international pressures. Each provision of the US Constitution is analyzed to reveal its contemporary meaning in concert with the application of presidential power. Controversial issues covered in the book include: unilateral presidential wars; the state secrets privilege; extraordinary rendition; claims of "inherent" presidential powers that may not be checked by other branches; and executive privilege.

Faced with crises that would challenge any president, Barack Obama authorized "pay czar" Kenneth Feinberg to oversee the $20 billion fund for victims of the BP oil spill and to establish—and enforce—executive pay guidelines for companies that received $700 billion in federal bailout money. Feinberg's office comes with vastly expansive policy powers along with seemingly deep pockets; yet his position does not formally fit anywhere within our government's constitutional framework. The very word "czar" seems inappropriate in a constitutional republic, but it has come to describe any executive branch official who has significant authority over a policy area, works independently of agency or Department heads, and is not confirmed by the Senate-or subject to congressional oversight. Mitchel Sollenberger and Mark Rozell provide the first comprehensive overview of presidential czars, tracing the history of the position from its origins through its initial expansion under FDR and its dramatic growth during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The President's Czars shows how, under pressure to act on the policy front, modern presidents have increasingly turned to these appointed officials, even though by doing so they violate the Appointments Clause and can also run into conflict with the nondelegation doctrine and the principle that a president cannot unilaterally establish offices without legislative support. Further, Sollenberger and Rozell contend that czars not only are ill-conceived but also disrupt a governing system based on democratic accountability. A sobering overview solidly grounded in public law analysis, this study serves as a counter-argument to those who would embrace an excessively powerful presidency, one with relatively limited constraints. Among other things, it proposes the restoration of accountability—starting with significant changes to Title 3 of the U.S. Code, which authorizes the president to appoint White House employees "without regard to any other provision of law." Ultimately, the authors argue that czars have generally not done a good job of making the executive branch bureaucracy more effective and efficient. Whatever utility presidents may see in appointing czars, Sollenberger and Rozell make a strong case that the overall damage to our constitutional system is great-and that this runaway practice has to stop.

A series of laws passed in the 1970s promised the nation unprecedented transparency in government, a veritable “sunshine era.” Though citizens enjoyed a new arsenal of secrecy-busting tools, officials developed a handy set of workarounds, from over classification to concealment, shredding, and burning. It is this dark side of the sunshine era that Jason Ross Arnold explores in the first comprehensive, comparative history of presidential resistance to the new legal regime, from Reagan-Bush to the first term of Obama-Biden. After examining what makes a necessary and unnecessary secret, Arnold considers the causes of excessive secrecy, and why we observe variation across administrations. While some administrations deserve the scorn of critics for exceptional secrecy, the book shows excessive secrecy was a persistent problem well before 9/11, during Democratic and Republican administrations alike. Regardless of party, administrations have consistently worked to weaken the system’s legal foundations. The book reveals episode after episode of evasive maneuvers, rule bending, clever rhetorical gambits, and downright defiance; an army of secrecy workers in a dizzying array of institutions labels all manner of documents “top secret,” while other government workers and agencies manage to suppress information with a “sensitive but unclassified” designation. For example, the health effects of Agent Orange, and antibiotic-resistant bacteria leaking out of Midwestern hog farms are considered too “sensitive” for public consumption. These examples and many more document how vast the secrecy system has grown during the sunshine era. Rife with stories of vital scientific evidence withheld, justice eluded, legalities circumvented, and the public interest flouted, Secrecy in the Sunshine Era reveals how our information society has been kept in the dark in too many ways and for too long.