Examines seven theoretical perspectives of public budgeting: incrementalism, the budget process model, the organizational process model, the median voter model, the 'greedy bureaucrat' model, a post-modern model, and the transaction cost model. This title also examines and critically reviews major research from each perspective.

This title seeks to open new areas of inquiry into the art and skill of public sector budgeting. It sees it as an institutional process, decision making tool, and, when well done, a reflection of managerial efficiency.

Using theoretical frameworks to explore the political, organizational, and cultural dynamics of performance budgeting, this book examines the adoption of performance budgeting in a variety of countries, how it has been implemented, and why it succeeded or failed. Chapters include case studies from a wide range of continents and regions including the U.S., Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Each case study pays careful attention to the unique historical, political, and cultural contexts of reform and closely examines how performance informed the budgetary process. Chapters investigate theory-driven analysis, focusing on common themes related to international policy diffusion, organizational change, stakeholder politics and gaming, communication and information management, principal–agent dynamics, and institutional constraints. Contributors include both scholars and seasoned practitioners with extensive experience in implementing or advising performance budgeting reforms. With emphases on both theories and practices, this book is written for graduate courses in public budgeting and comparative public administration, providing theoretical insights into budgeting reforms in developing countries, as well as practice-relevant and actionable recommendations for current and future policymakers and budget reformers.

This collection is the first book-length work in many years to provide new theoretical direction to budget theory. Written by several of the most respected people in budgeting, including Allen Schick, Naomi Caiden, and Lance LeLoup, it explores such current topics as the scope of budgeting, the degree and source of variation in budgeting, and changes in budgeting process over time. New Directions will help to build a framework that is less confining than incrementalism, and will stimulate and guide future research. Some of the essays deal with the implications of looking at budgeting from a multi-year perspective, and the importance of allocating sources other than money (such as personnel ceilings); others pose questions about what a budget theory should look like, and how many budget theories are needed.

Behavioral economics questions the basic underpinnings of economic theory, showing that people often do not act consistently in their own self-interest when making economic decisions. While these findings have important theoretical implications, they also provide a new lens for examining public policies, such as taxation, public spending, and the provision of adequate pensions. How can people be encouraged to save adequately for retirement when evidence shows that they tend to spend their money as soon as they can? Would closer monitoring of income tax returns lead to more honest taxpayers or a more distrustful, uncooperative citizenry? Behavioral Public Finance, edited by Edward McCaffery and Joel Slemrod, applies the principles of behavioral economics to government's role in constructing economic and social policies of these kinds and suggests that programs crafted with rational participants in mind may require redesign. Behavioral Public Finance looks at several facets of economic life and asks how behavioral research can increase public welfare. Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein, and Jeff Strnad note that public support for a tax often depends not only on who bears its burdens, but also on how the tax is framed. For example, people tend to prefer corporate taxes over sales taxes, even though the cost of both is eventually extracted from the consumer. James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick assess the impact of several different features of 401(k) plans on employee savings behavior. They find that when employees are automatically enrolled in a retirement savings plan, they overwhelmingly accept the status quo and continue participating, while employees without automatic enrollment typically take over a year to join the saving plan. Behavioral Public Finance also looks at taxpayer compliance. While the classic economic model suggests that the low rate of IRS audits means far fewer people should voluntarily pay their taxes than actually do, John Cullis, Philip Jones, and Alan Lewis present new research showing that many people do not underreport their incomes even when the probability of getting caught is a mere one percent. Human beings are not always rational, utility-maximizing economic agents. Behavioral economics has shown how human behavior departs from the assumptions made by generations of economists. Now, Behavioral Public Finance brings the insights of behavioral economics to analysis of policies that affect us all.

Foreword p. xi Preface to the Fifth Edition p. xix Preface to the First Edition p. xxvii Biographical Note p. xxxiii Chapter 1 Budgeting as Conflicting Promises p. 1 Budgets Are Conflicting Commitments p. 7 Tax Preferences p. 11 Appropriations: The Power of Congress and Power Within Congress p. 13 The President Is Both Rival and Partner of Congress p. 16 Conflicting Promises: The Multiple Meanings of Budgetary Control p. 19 Chapter 2 Budgets as Struggles for Power: A Historical Perspective p. 25 Colonial Origins p. 26 Turning Points: Civil War through World War I p. 30 The Executive Budget Movement p. 33 Dislocation and Continuity: Depression and War p. 40 Chapter 3 The Dance of the Dollars: Classical Budgeting p. 42 Calculations p. 44 Complexity p. 44 Aids to Calculation p. 45 Incremental Budgeting p. 46 Roles and Perspectives p. 50 The Agency p. 50 The Bureau of the Budget p. 54 The Appropriations Committees p. 56 Strategies p. 57 Be a Good Politician p. 58 Clientele p. 58 Confidence p. 60 Congressional Committee Hearings p. 62 Strategies Designed to Capitalize on the Fragmentation of Power in National Politics p. 62 Chapter 4 The Collapse of Consensus p. 68 The Growth of Entitlements p. 69 Economic Activism p. 70 Federal Credit p. 71 Priorities p. 72 Impoundment p. 73 The Budget Act: More Checks, More Balances, but Not More Control p. 75 Impoundment Again p. 75 Congressional Budget Office p. 76 Senate Budget Committee and House Budget Committee p. 76 Scheduling p. 76 Resolutions p. 77 Reconciliation p. 78 Complexity p. 78 A Congressional Budget, or Merely More Budgeting? p. 78 The Budget Process, 1975--1979: Making Totals Stick p. 79 Classical Budgeting Withers Without Quite Disappearing p. 81 Chapter 5 The Politics of Dissensus p. 83 Why Budget Decisions Became So Difficult p. 84 The Focus on Totals p. 84 The End of Economic Management p. 85 Dominance of the Deficit p. 86 Polarization of the Parties p. 87 The Congressional Budget Act in the 1980s p. 88 R and R: Resolution and Reconciliation p. 88 Deferral and Rescission Redux p. 90 The Shifting Budgetary Base p. 91 Continuing Omnibus Resolutions p. 92 OMB in an Era of Perennial Budgeting p. 93 Top-Down Policy Making p. 94 Continuous Budgeting p. 94 Negotiating with Congress p. 95 Implications for OMB p. 96 Dissensus in Congress p. 97 Role Reversal p. 97 Rolled on the Floor p. 98 Budgeting Penetrates Congress p. 100 Gimmicks p. 100 Chapter 6 The Politics of Balancing Budgets p. 103 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings p. 105 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 p. 106 The Clinton Budget of 1993 p. 108 The Politics of Radical Reversal 1995 p. 111 Prologue: Constitutional Amendment and Rescission p. 112 Budgets and Counterbudgets: The President's Budget and the Congressional Resolution p. 113 Incrementalism in Mirror Image: Appropriations p. 114 Confrontation: Continuing Resolutions and the Debt Limit p. 115 Reconciliation and Intransigence p. 118 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 p. 120 Chapter 7 Entitlements p. 123 The "Ought" and "Is" of Entitlements p. 124 Entitlements and Budgeting p. 129 How Do Entitlements Start? p. 132 Why Do Entitlements Grow? p. 135 Maintaining Commitment: Social Security p. 136 Escalating Costs: Medicare p. 138 Expanding Eligibility: Medicaid p. 140 Provider Pressures: End-Stage Renal Disease p. 142 How Have Entitlements Been Controlled? p. 144 Declining Need: Black Lung Disease p. 145 Ending an Entitlement: Welfare p. 146 Entitlements and Others p. 148 Appropriations: Head Start and WIC p. 148 Tax Expenditures: Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) p. 149 Formula Grants to States: Adoption Assistance Program, Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, and the Ryan White Care Act p. 149 Chapter 8 Budgeting for Defense p. 152 Dimensions of Defense p. 153 Defense Strategy and Funding p. 155 The Internal Budget Process p. 161 Planning, Programming, Budgeting p. 161 Acquisitions p. 165 The Congressional Budget Process p. 170 Reprogramming p. 173 Secrecy p. 175 Cuts p. 176 Contingencies p. 179 Chapter 9 Reform p. 181 Norms of Budgetary Behavior p. 181 Forms of Budgeting p. 184 Reform Without Conflict p. 184 The Politics in Budget Reform p. 186 Unit of Measurement: Cash or Volume p. 187 Time Span: Months, One Year, Many Years p. 188 Calculation: Incremental or Comprehensive p. 189 Management Reforms p. 191 Performance and Budgeting p. 191 Centralization and Decentralization: The Role of OMB p. 193 Credit Reform p. 195 Financial Management p. 196 Capital Budgeting p. 197 Limits p. 198 The Line-Item Veto p. 200 Chapter 10 From Surplus to Deficit p. 205 The Disappearing Deficit p. 205 The Politics of Budget Surplus p. 208 The End of the Surplus p. 212 Afterword p. 219 Characteristics of the Budget Process p. 219 The Budgetary Process Is Powerful Yet Impotent p. 220 The Budgetary Process Is Structured Yet Formalistic p. 220 The Budgetary Process Is Complex Yet Segmented p. 221 Budgetary Politics Are Polarized but Moderated p. 223 Glossary p. 225 Guide to Acronyms p. 230 Select Bibliography p. 231 Credits p. 245 Index.

This primer succinctly summarises key theoretical concepts in fiscal choice for both practitioners and scholars. The author contends that fiscal choice is ultimately a choice of both politics and economics. The book first introduces budget institutions and processes at various levels of government, which restrict budget decision makers' discretion. It also explains budget decision makers' efforts to make rational resource allocations. It then shows how and why such efforts are stymied by the decision makers' capacity and institutional settings. The book's unique benefit is its emphasis on all the essential topics, with short, module-type chapters which can be read in any order.