Luís Silva Morais - Evolutionary Trends of EC Competition Law ? Convergence and Divergence with US Antitrust Law in a Context of Economic Crisis Este artigo faz parte da Revista de Concorrência e Regulação ? Ano 1 ? N.o 1 ? Janeiro-Março 2010 Consulte a página da revista em http://cr.almedina.net Esta revista está também disponível como parte de uma Assinatura.

Although it is commonly assumed that consumers benefit from the application of competition law, this is not necessarily always the case. Economic efficiency is paramount; thus, competition law in Europe and antitrust law in the United States are designed primarily to protect business competitors (and in Europe to promote market integration), and it is only incidentally that such law may also serve to protect consumers. That is the essential starting point of this penetrating critique. The author explores the extent to which US antitrust law and EC competition law adequately safeguard consumer interests. Specifically, he shows how the two jurisdictions have gone about evaluating collusive practices, abusive conduct by dominant firms and merger activity, and how the policies thus formed have impacted upon the promotion of consumer interests. He argues that unless consumer interests are directly and specifically addressed in the assessment process, maximization of consumer welfare is not sufficiently achieved. Using rigorous analysis he develops legal arguments that can accomplish such goals as the following: replace the economic theory of ‘consumer welfare’ with a principle of consumer well-being; build consumer benefits into specific areas of competition policy; assess competition cases so that income distribution effects are more beneficial to consumers; and control mergers in such a way that efficiencies are passed directly to consumers. The author argues that, in the last analysis, the promotion of consumer well-being should be the sole or at least the primary goal of any antitrust regime. Lawyers and scholars interested in the application and development and reform of competition law and policy will welcome this book. They will find not only a fresh approach to interpretation and practice in their field – comparing and contrasting two major systems of competition law – but also an extremely lucid analysis of the various economic arguments used to highlight the consumer welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects of business practices.

Mateus and Moreira present a formidable review of pressing issues in competition law and economics. Top officials, judges and experts from Europe and North America offer their insights into analytical issues, practical problems for companies, enforcers and complainants and on the state of trans-Atlantic divergence and convergence. The discussion on national champions and state aid is prescient. Throughout, the analysis is acute, cutting edge, and deep. Officials, counsel and scholars will draw from this fabulous book for years to come. Philip Marsden, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, UK Competition policy is at a crossroads on both sides of the Atlantic. In this insightful book, judges, enforcers and academics in law and economics look at the consensus built so far and clarify controversies surrounding the issue. There is broad consensus on the fight against cartels, with some countries criminalizing this type of agreement. However there is also wide debate on the questions of monopolization and abuse of dominant position, vividly highlighted by the recent Microsoft case. Furthermore, there are today diverging views on the interplay of business strategies and the control of market power on both a national and international scale. The book discusses the perennial issue in Europe of the conflicts between competition and industrial policies, once again bringing the theme of national champions to the fore. The contributing authors provide opinion on the efforts which have been made towards modernization in both the USA and the EU. Featuring new contributions by leading scholars and practitioners in antitrust, this book will be a great resource for antitrust enforcers, competition lawyers and practitioners and competition economists, as well as scholars and graduate students in antitrust and competition law.

The book is warmly recommended to practitioners and academics from both the legal and the economic field. Guido Westkamp, Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice . . . Glader offers strong commentary and case explanation, coupled with insightful analysis, in this complex area. . . This book is strong on both the relevant law, and the economics arena in which the law must be applied, and deals equally well with the US and EC principles and practice. Mark Furse, European Competition Law Review The pace and scope of technological change is increasing, but some innovative technologies take years before they give rise to saleable products. Before they do, there is competition in ideas and research, but the ideas cannot be market tested, because there are no products or services to offer to consumers. Competition law, in Europe and the USA, cannot be applied to competition in research for innovation as if it was competition between products. Completely different problems arise and a completely different approach is needed. This book, the first on innovation markets, shows how this new approach has been used by competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic in a wide variety of cases. It analyses in depth and detail the comparative law and economics of the problems arising from the different stages of these markets . It considers how far conclusions can be drawn about the future and comes to interesting, practical and sensible conclusions. And it avoids both unjustified scepticism and exaggerated enthusiasm about the theories of innovation markets. John Temple Lang, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Brussels and London; Trinity College Dublin, Ireland and Oxford University, UK This book examines the legal standards and their underlying economic rationale for the protection of competition in the innovation process, in both European competition law and American antitrust law. Apart from relevant regulatory frameworks, the author also reviews a range of case laws, which assess whether a transaction or unilateral conduct would limit market participants incentives and abilities for continued innovation and future competition. At the centre of this study is the innovation market concept. This concept entails the delineation, for purposes of antitrust analysis, of an upstream market for competing R&D. Questions of market definition, the assessment of innovation competition in defined markets, the role of efficiencies in the appraisal of transactions and possible remedies to alleviate anti-competitive effects are also explored. Updating the field of research in light of new developments and broadening and deepening the categorization and analysis of the innovation market area, this book will be of great interest to academics, practitioners and consultants, and also public policymakers.

This book represents a fresh approach to EC competition law - one that is of singular value in grappling with the huge economic challenges we face today. As a critical analysis of the law and options available to European competition authorities and legal practitioners in the field, it stands without peer. It will be greatly welcomed by lawyers, policymakers and other interested professionals in Europe and throughout the world.

This book further develops both the traditional and the behavioural approach to competition law, and applies these approaches to a variety of timely issues. It discusses several fundamental questions regarding competition law and economics, and explores the applications of competition law and economics. In turn, the book analyses the interplay of intellectual property rights and patents in various aspects of competition law, and investigates the impacts that developments in information technology, such as big data analytics, have on competition law. The book also discusses the impact of energy law reforms on energy markets from a competition law perspective. Competition law is a classic field of economic analysis. This is largely due to the fact that competition law uses terms such as market, price, and competition and must therefore rely on economic know-how and analyses. In the United States, economic analysis has greatly influenced not just the scholarship on antitrust law, but also judicial decisions and agency enforcement. Antitrust law and economics are based on the traditional paradigm of neoclassical economics, which relies on the assumption that the market players, i.e. consumers and producers, are rational. This approach to competition law was later received in Europe under the banner of a “more economic approach”. For the past two decades, behavioural law and economics, which seeks to generate better insights into legal phenomena by providing more realistic psychological foundations for economic models, and to offer a multitude of applications in legislation and legal adjudication, has challenged the traditional economic approach to law in general and, more recently, to competition law specifically.

This article explores the question of whether, following the modernization of EU competition law, Article 101(1), or Article 101 as a whole, requires, or is developing toward requiring, a rule of reason analysis similar to that carried out in the US under section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890. It commences by examining section 1 of the Sherman Act, its objectives, and the tools that have been utilized to resolve the question of whether an agreement unreasonably restrains trade. It then examines Article 81 against this backdrop. It concludes that despite a greater convergence between the US and EU approach to objectives in recent years, the bifucated structure of Article 81 and the difficulty of isolating competition from other Community policies means that significant differences undoubtedly remain and that the US approach to rule of reason analysis has not been embraced as a mechanism for distinguishing between agreements which do, and those which do not, harm competition.