The People's Republic of China has experienced numerous challenges and undergone tremendous structural changes over the past four decades. The party-state faces a fundamental tension in its pursuit of social stability and regime durability. Repressive state strategies enable the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its monopoly on political power, which is consistent with the regime's authoritarian essence. Yet the quality of governance and regime legitimacy are enhanced when the state adopts more inclusive modes of engagement with society. How can the assertion of political power be reconciled with responsiveness to societal demands? This dilemma lies at the core of evolutionary governance under authoritarianism in China. Based on a dynamic typology of state-society relations, this volume adopts an evolutionary framework to examine how the Chinese state relates with non-state actors across several fields of governance: community, environment and public health, economy and labor, and society and religion. Drawing on original fieldwork, the authors identify areas in which state-society interactions have shifted over time, ranging from more constructive engagement to protracted conflict. This evolutionary approach provides nuanced insight into the circumstances wherein the party-state exerts its coercive power versus engaging in more flexible responses or policy adaptations.

The People’s Republic of China has experienced numerous challenges and undergone tremendous structural changes over the past four decades. The party-state now faces a fundamental tension in its pursuit of social stability and regime durability. Repressive state strategies enable the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its monopoly on political power, yet the quality of governance and regime legitimacy are enhanced when the state adopts more inclusive modes of engagement with society. Based on a dynamic typology of state–society relations, this volume adopts an evolutionary framework to examine how the Chinese state relates with non-state actors across several fields of governance. Drawing on original fieldwork, the authors identify areas in which state–society interactions have shifted over time, ranging from more constructive engagement to protracted conflict. This evolutionary approach provides nuanced insight into the circumstances wherein the party-state exerts its coercive power versus engaging in more flexible responses or policy adaptations.

In Varieties of State Regulation, Yukyung Yeo explores how the Chinese central party-state continues to oversee the most strategic sectors of its economy, and how the form of central state control varies considerably across leading industrial sectors, depending on the dominant mode of state ownership, conception of control, and governing structure.

As the rest of the world worries about what a future might look like under Chinese supremacy, Edward Luttwak worries about China’s own future prospects. Applying the logic of strategy for which he is well known, Luttwak argues that the most populous nation on Earth—and its second largest economy—may be headed for a fall. For any country whose rising strength cannot go unnoticed, the universal logic of strategy allows only military or economic growth. But China is pursuing both goals simultaneously. Its military buildup and assertive foreign policy have already stirred up resistance among its neighbors, just three of whom—India, Japan, and Vietnam—together exceed China in population and wealth. Unless China’s leaders check their own ambitions, a host of countries, which are already forming tacit military coalitions, will start to impose economic restrictions as well. Chinese leaders will find it difficult to choose between pursuing economic prosperity and increasing China’s military strength. Such a change would be hard to explain to public opinion. Moreover, Chinese leaders would have to end their reliance on ancient strategic texts such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While these guides might have helped in diplomatic and military conflicts within China itself, their tactics—such as deliberately provoking crises to force negotiations—turned China’s neighbors into foes. To avoid arousing the world’s enmity further, Luttwak advises, Chinese leaders would be wise to pursue a more sustainable course of economic growth combined with increasing military and diplomatic restraint.

The changing relationship between East and West, principally between China and America, has brought the whole matter of achieving peaceful and harmonious relations between nations to the fore — particularly with regard to China's recent ascendancy in world affairs. Competition among nations with different forms of governance raises important questions such as: What forms of governance work best to enable people to have harmonious and peaceful life together — both within and amongst nations? What principles can we discover in human history that might point us toward some answers to this fundamental governance question? What might the answers from the past suggest about the future? Where might the future lead?To find answers to these questions, we set out upon a discovery adventure, going back some 30,000 years in time — to trace the evolutionary progress in human governance from the hunter-gatherer period until today. We also adopted a framework provided by Dr Stephen Pinker's landmark study of the nature of violence over time entitled The Better Angels of Our Nature to provide context and contrast to our own discoveries.We discovered several basic principles: First, the forms of human governance made an evolutionary progress over the past 30,000 years. Second, the most basic driver for this progress was and still is technological change, which forces complementary changes in governance — or seals institutional failure. Third, we discovered that just three basic factors determined whether a particular form of governance succeeded in flourishing as a tribe, nation, empire or nation-state. Those fundamental factors are: boundaries, founding mythology, and the Rule of Three.Indeed, our most fundamental finding has been the Rule of Three itself: the principle that says that dyads have inherently unstable natures, whereas triads — like three-legged stools — possess inherent stability. Throughout time, the most successful human arrangements have been those with intricate hierarchies of governance that have the Rule of Three deeply woven into each level.As for the future, we claim that the best international structure would take the symbolic form of an archipelago of nations interconnected with a system of bridges — where each bridge consists of an intercourse route between two nations, and the nature of the intercourse is largely trade in goods and services followed by cultural exchanges of ideas. A Basic Principle: It is far easier to build bridges between nations than to rebuild nations in some other nation's image. Bad actors amongst nations may then get dealt with as villagers used to deal with nasty neighbors — through shunning and shaming, where shunning means the ceasing of trade intercourse.

China's future is arguably the most consequential question in global affairs. Having enjoyed unprecedented levels of growth, China is at a critical juncture in the development of its economy, society, polity, national security, and international relations. The direction the nation takes at this turning point will determine whether it stalls or continues to develop and prosper. Will China be successful in implementing a new wave of transformational reforms that could last decades and make it the world's leading superpower? Or will its leaders shy away from the drastic changes required because the regime's power is at risk? If so, will that lead to prolonged stagnation or even regime collapse? Might China move down a more liberal or even democratic path? Or will China instead emerge as a hard, authoritarian and aggressive superstate? In this new book, David Shambaugh argues that these potential pathways are all possibilities - but they depend on key decisions yet to be made by China's leaders, different pressures from within Chinese society, as well as actions taken by other nations. Assessing these scenarios and their implications, he offers a thoughtful and clear study of China's future for all those seeking to understand the country's likely trajectory over the coming decade and beyond.

Why has China grown so fast for so long despite vast corruption? In China's Gilded Age, Yuen Yuen Ang maintains that all corruption is harmful, but not all types of corruption hurt growth. Ang unbundles corruption into four varieties: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, and access money. While the first three types impede growth, access money - elite exchanges of power and profit - cuts both ways: it stimulates investment and growth but produces serious risks for the economy and political system. Since market opening, corruption in China has evolved toward access money. Using a range of data sources, the author explains the evolution of Chinese corruption, how it differs from the West and other developing countries, and how Xi's anti-corruption campaign could affect growth and governance. In this formidable yet accessible book, Ang challenges one-dimensional measures of corruption. By unbundling the problem and adopting a comparative-historical lens, she reveals that the rise of capitalism was not accompanied by the eradication of corruption, but rather by its evolution from thuggery and theft to access money. In doing so, she changes the way we think about corruption and capitalism, not only in China but around the world.