This publication provides a holistic approach to evaluate progress in the development of the nuclear power infrastructure based on the guidance contained in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG G 3.1 Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. It can be used by a Member State itself wishing to evaluate its progress (self evaluation) or as a basis for an integrated nuclear infrastructure review (INIR) mission. This revised version combines in one document an explanation of the methodology and the evaluation tables takes into account all new material and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and presents the results of the INIR missions implemented between 2009 and 2014.

The development and implementation of an appropriate infrastructure to support the successful introduction of nuclear power and its safe, secure, peaceful and sustainable application is an issue of central concern, especially for countries that are considering and planning their first nuclear power plant. In preparing the necessary nuclear infrastructure, there are several activities that need to be completed. These activities can be split into three progressive phases of development. This publication provides a description of the conditions expected to be achieved by the end of each phase to assist with the best use of resources. 'Milestones' refer to the conditions necessary to demonstrate that the phase has been successfully completed.

"The IAEA integrated nuclear infrastructure review (INIR) missions are designed to assist Member States in evaluating the status of their national infrastructure for the introduction of a nuclear power programme. From 2009 to 2014, fourteen IAEA INIR missions and follow-up activities were conducted in nine countries planning to implement a nuclear power programme and one country expanding an existing programme. During this time considerable experience was gained and this has been used to continuously improve the overall INIR methodology. This publication summarizes the results of the missions and highlights the most significant areas where recommendations were made."--Publisher's description.

The preparation of Country Nuclear Power Profiles (CNPP) was initiated within the framework of the IAEA's programme on assessment and feedback of nuclear power plant performance. It responded to a need for a database and a technical publication containing a description of the energy and economic situation, the energy and the electricity sector, and the primary organizations involved in nuclear power in IAEA Member States. The CNPP covers background information on the status and development of nuclear power programmes in countries having nuclear plants in operation and/or plants under construction. It reviews the organizational and industrial aspects of nuclear power programmes in participating countries, and provides information about the relevant legislative, regulatory and international frameworks in each country. The CNPP compiles the current issues in the new environment within which the electricity and nuclear sector operates, i.e. energy policy, and privatization and deregulation in these sectors, the role of government, nuclear energy and climate change, and safety and waste management, which differ from country to country. (This publication is also available

Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes. Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable. Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.

Member States intending to introduce a nuclear power programme will need to pass through several phases during the implementation. Experience shows that careful planning of the objectives, roles, responsibilities, interfaces and tasks to be carried out in different phases of a nuclear project is important for success. This publication presents a harmonized approach that may be used to structure the owner/operator management system and establish and manage nuclear projects and their development activities irrespective of the adopted approach. It has been developed from shared management practices and consolidated experiences provided by nuclear project management specialists through a series of workshops and working groups organized by the IAEA. The resultant publication presents a useful framework for the management of nuclear projects from initiation to closeout and captures international best practices.