The IMF's Consultative Group on Exchange Rate issues (CGER) has been conducting exchange rate assessments as part of the surveillance process since 1997. This paper evaluates CGER assessments from 1997 to 2006, by comparing these to subsequent movements in real effective exchange rates (REER). We find that CGER's estimated misalignments have predictive power over future REER movements, especially over longer horizons and after changes in fundamentals are accounted for. But while CGER misalignments frequently predict the direction of currency movements correctly, misalignments have tended to be persistent, resulting in systematic errors-overprediction for undervalued currencies and underprediction for overvalued currencies.

The assessment of external positions and exchange rates of member countries is a key mandate of the IMF. The External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology has provided the framework for conducting external sector assessments by Fund staff since its introduction in 2012. This paper provides the latest version of the EBA methodology, updated in 2022 with additional refinements to the current account and real exchange rate regression models, as well as updated estimates for other components of the EBA methodology. The paper also includes an assessment of how estimated current account gaps based on EBA are associated with future external adjustment.

Are the current account fluctuations in oil-exporting countries "excessive"? How should their real exchange rate respond to the evolution of external (and domestic) fundamentals? This paper proposes methodologies tailored to the specific features of oil-exporting countries that help address these questions. Price-based methodologies (based on the time series of real effective exchange rates) identify a strong link between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade, but have relatively limited explanatory power. On the other hand, an empirical model of the current account, which fits oil exporting countries' data well, and an intertemporal model that takes into account the stock of oil reserves provide useful benchmarks for oil exporters' external balances.

As the premier forum for global economic governance, G20 was successful in warding off the global economic crisis of 2008–09 and preventing it from becoming a full-blown depression. This book assesses the progress of the G20 with a focus on India. It discusses the role India has played in the success of the G20 process and, more importantly, delineates the possible barriers to India's enhanced involvement in the G20, and in global governance in general. As the global economy remains mired in uncertainties - stemming from the Euro crisis, lacklustre economic performance in the United States, and slowing of major emerging economies - this volume fills the need for a collection of analytical research papers from the perspective of emerging economies, and takes stock of the performance of the G20 thus far. It also points towards the unresolved issues and the future course of action in global financial and macroeconomic stance.

Global current account balances—the overall size of current account deficits and surpluses—continued to widen in 2021 to 3.5 percent of world GDP, and are expected to widen again this year. The IMF’s multilateral approach suggests that global excess balances narrowed to 0.9 percent of world GDP in 2021 compared with 1.2 percent of world GDP in 2020. The pandemic has continued to affect economies’ current account balances unevenly through the travel and transportation sectors as well as a shift from services to goods consumption. Commodity prices recovered from the COVID-19 shock and started rising in 2021 with opposite effects on the external position of exporters and importers, a trend that the war in Ukraine is exacerbating in 2022. The medium-term outlook for global current account balances is a gradual narrowing as the impact of the pandemic fades away, commodity prices normalize, and fiscal consolidation in current account deficit economies progresses. However, this outlook is highly uncertain and subject to several risks. Policies to promote external rebalancing differ with positions and needs of individual economies.

Can the G-20 become a steering committee for the world's economy? Launched at a moment of panic triggered by the financial crisis in late 2008, the leaders' level G-20 is trying to evolve from crisis committee for the world economy to a real steering group facilitating international economic cooperation. What can and should such a "steering committee" focus on? How important could the concrete gains from cooperation be? How much faster could world growth be? Is there sufficient legitimacy in the G-20 process? How does the G-20 relate to the IMF and the World Bank? How can Australia in 2015, and then Turkey in 2016, chair the process so as to encourage strategic leadership? The East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University and the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution joined forces in putting together this volume and asked opinion leaders and policymakers from G-20 countries to provide their independent perspectives. Contributors include Colin Bradford (Brookings), Peter Drysdale (Australian National University), Kemal Dervis (Brookings), Andrew Elek (Australian National University), Ross Garnaut (University of Melbourne), Huang Yiping (China Center for Economic Research), Bruce Jones (Brookings), Muneesh Kapur (IMF), Homi Kharas (Brookings), Wonhyuk Lim (Korea Development Institute), Rakesh Mohan (IMF), David Nellor (consultant, Indonesia), Yoshio Okubo (Japan Securities Dealers Association), Mari Pangestu (Republic of Indonesia), Changyong Rhee (former Asian Development Bank), Alok Sheel (Government of India), Mahendra Siregar (Republic of Indonesia), Paola Subacchi (Chatham House, London), Carlos Vegh (Brookings), Guillermo Vuletin (Brookings), and Maria Monica Wihardja (World Bank).

The answer seems affirmative. We compare currency carry trades with an investment strategy based on currency fundamentals: taking a long (short) position in undervalued (overvalued) currencies. Carry trades have high risk-adjusted returns, but are subject to "crash risk." In contrast, the fundamental strategy has lower risk-adjusted returns, but is less prone to crash risk, because the realization of crash risk coincides with corrections towards fundamentals. In particular, the fundamental strategy outperformed carry trades during the recent global financial crisis. Building on these results, we present early warning indicators for potential turbulence in the currency market.