This book provides a case for the de-stigmatisation of ethnophilosophy by demonstrating its continuing relevance in contemporary African philosophy. The book brings together established and brilliant young scholars who defend ethnophilosophy as a unique source of African philosophy with the capacity to colour African philosophical scholarship, thereby distinguishing African philosophy from other philosophical traditions of the world and setting the stage for philosophical dialogue in the 21st century characterised by multiculturalism and globalisation. The volume addresses the future of African philosophy by closely linking the past of this tradition with the exciting projects of the contemporary system builders whose works emerge from the ethnophilosophical while transcending it. The book is aimed at African philosophy experts, scholars of intercultural philosophy, African studies scholars and graduate students of African and intercultural philosophy.

Using classic texts in African philosophy, Bruce B. Janz applies the strand of cognitive science known as enactivism to realise new connections and intersections between both fields. The idea that cognition is embodied and embedded in a social world neatly maps onto specifically African epistemologies to outline a new direction of study on what philosophy is. By working through a rich range of texts and thinkers, Janz provides a fruitful new interpretation of African philosophy and provides close readings of seminal and sidelined thinkers to provide an invaluable resource for students and scholars. Janz's study takes in the creative humanism of Sylvia Wynter, Placide Tempels's Bantu Philosophy, Mbiti's theory of time, Oruka's last work on sage philosophy, Mogobe Ramose's own version of Ubuntu, Sophie Oluwole's active literature of philosophy, Achille Mbembe's excoriating attack on the effects of colonialism on life in Africa, and Suzanne Césaire writings on négritude. This book reorients African philosophy towards an active and creative future informed by enactivist thinking.

In answering the question of life’s meaning, the African perspective is only just beginning to emerge. While this is true, a critical examination of African theories of meaningfulness, the possibility of life’s meaninglessness, as well as ideas about the proper mode/mood for living with the meaninglessness of life are largely underexplored within the African philosophical tradition. This book provides several plausible accounts of meaning in/of life from an African perspective, examines the relationship between death and life’s meaningfulness, and explores the possibility of life’s meaninglessness, proposing the “philosophy of indifference” as the proper mode/mood for living with the meaninglessness of life.

Franciscan priest Placide Tempels’s 1946 book, Bantu Philosophy, introduced a new discourse about African thought and beliefs, questioning the universality of Western philosophy and establishing paradigms that continue to dominate discussion of the relationships between Africa and the West today. More than 75 years after the publication of this influential text, this volume brings together a wide range of contributors to examine the legacy and impact of Tempels’s work for the study of African philosophy and religion. Reflecting on whether Bantu Philosophy reinforces conflict or convergence between Africa and the West, and its reception within Africa, scholars from both African and Western institutions provide new perspectives on both Tempels’s ideas and ongoing debates in African philosophy and religion.

The issue of a logic foundation for African thought connects well with the question of method. Do we need new methods for African philosophy and studies? Or, are the methods of Western thought adequate for African intellectual space? These questions are not some of the easiest to answer because they lead straight to the question of whether or not a logic tradition from African intellectual space is possible. Thus in charting the course of future direction in African philosophy and studies, one must be confronted with this question of logic. The author boldly takes up this challenge and becomes the first to do so in a book by introducing new concepts and formulating a new African culture-inspired system of logic called Ezumezu which he believes would ground new methods in African philosophy and studies. He develops this system to rescue African philosophy and, by extension, sundry fields in African Indigenous Knowledge Systems from the spell of Plato and the hegemony of Aristotle. African philosophers can now ground their discourses in Ezumezu logic which will distinguish their philosophy as a tradition in its own right. On the whole, the book engages with some of the lingering controversies in the idea of (an) African logic before unveiling Ezumezu as a philosophy of logic, methodology and formal system. The book also provides fresh arguments and insights on the themes of decolonisation and Africanisation for the intellectual transformation of scholarship in Africa. It will appeal to philosophers and logicians—undergraduates and post graduate researchers—as well as those in various areas of African studies.